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Israel and Jordan (Northwest)

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GOD OF ABRAHAM IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL

M. Z. Frank

ISRAEL WAS BORN in a strictly civil ceremony, without a prayer or a psalm. A bearded patriarch in the gathering of notables at the Municipal Museum in Tel Aviv on May 14, 1948, rose, and in a voice choked with tears pronounced the traditional benediction that the Almighty had "caused us to live and to subsist and to reach to this day." There were a few scattered responses of Amen.

Nine months later, when Chaim Weizmann stepped into the crowded hall in the Jewish Agency building in Jerusalem, where the first Knesset (Assembly) met, to take the oath of office as first President of the new state, many of those present wept aloud. It was a most fitting moment for a religious ceremony to give expression to popular sentiment. And yet, Weizmann had his

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head uncovered and made no mention of God in his oath. Again a bearded patriarch rose and pronounced an even more solemn benediction — one reserved for the kings and rulers of this earth. Again there were scattered responses of Amen, though this time there were probably more people who wished they were religious and could experience the same emotions as the man who made the benediction.

On the day before the new President took his oath of office, I witnessed a remarkable scene in the Knesset. The Assembly was meeting for its third day and was debating the rights and prerogatives of the Head of the State who was to be elected that night. Suddenly a tall black-bearded man in a long frock, such as are worn by the orthodox East European Jews, quickly strode over from the visitors' section to the wall alongside the dais on which sat the Speaker and members of the Government. With his face to the wall and his back turned on the deputies and visitors, he began swaying to and fro, reciting the afternoon service:

Blessed be Thou, O Lord, our God, King of the Universe, God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, great, mighty and awe-inspiring God. . . .

Restore us, O our Father, to Thy Law, inspire us to Thy worship, and cause us to have full repentance before Thee. . . .

Sound a great trumpet for our liberation, raise a banner for the ingathering of our exiles and assemble us together speedily from all the four corners of the earth into our own land. . . .

Restore our law-makers as in olden times, and our state-counsellors as in the days of yore. . . .

Mayest Thou mercifully re-establish Thy presence in Thy city of Jerusalem and dwell therein again, as Thou hast promised, and rebuild it speedily within our lifetime as an enduring edifice. . . .

The lawmakers and state counsellors of Israel, now restored, paid no attention to the worshiper at the wall, and went ahead with the agenda. Some were perhaps a bit annoyed. There is nothing wrong in an observant Jew reciting the Mincha in public. It is done even in the lands of the Gentiles — but he might have retired to an adjoining room where he would not disturb the session.

Among the lawmakers and state counsellors was Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who, in a debate in the Knesset in February 1951, was to assure Rabbi Isaac Meir Levin, Minister of Public Welfare, that if he ever invited him to his home for dinner he would order special dishes, and engage a special cook and religious supervisor over the food to make it kosher. There was the late David Remez, Minister of Communications and later Minister of Education, who diligently searched any religious book for unfamiliar Hebrew forms and words, but had hardly any other interest in them. There was Aaron Zisling, son of a pious rabbi and now one of the leaders of the Leftist Mapam, who then was still Minister of Agriculture. He has always shown a zealous concern for freedom of conscience and often condemns the dominant Labor Party Mapai for its unholy alliance with "the clergy."¹ There was Menachem Beigin, former leader of the terrorists. Though not religious himself, he has a sentimental weakness for the orthodox practices of his childhood and a political reason for paying his respects to the pious environment from which he recruited many of his supporters. But one of his aides, Eri Jabotinsky, recently broke with him and is now waging a gallant battle for the right of any Jew to eat pork in his own country. Beigin made himself particularly obnoxious that afternoon by a rude personal attack on Weizmann, for which he was rebuked by the Speaker.

The worshiper at the wall appropriately concluded his prayer on the following words:

Grant peace, goodness and blessing, life, favor, loving kindness and mercy to us and to the whole of Israel, Thy people. . . . O God, guard my tongue from evil. . . . May He who established peace in His heights promote peace among us and the whole of Israel, Amen. . . .

The man who recited the afternoon prayer probably intended it as a symbolic gesture, one of quiet defiance or a reminder that the fulfillment of God's prophecy of the Restoration is greater than its erring human agents and that the fulfillment of the Prophecy would some day be more complete. It is an attitude

¹ The corresponding word in Hebrew — *kemura* — has an especially nasty connotation, being formed from *komer*, which usually means the type of priest that Jewish children in the ghetto always associated with incitements to hatred and persecution. Less dogmatic radicals use the term *kele-kodesh* (holy vessels), which is legitimate even among the religious Jews.

characteristic of the majority of religious Jews both in Israel and abroad, though there are many variations of the amount of patience and aggressiveness they show toward the present regime. A tiny minority is downright hostile and considers the creation of the State as a calamity, a black crime against the Almighty.

For the present, the nonreligious are in control. The Ben-Gurions, the Remezes, the Zislings, are the products of an age that revolted against the tyranny of an extremely exacting religion and embraced the Russian variety of radicalism of the late 19th and early 20th century. They represent the pioneers of the decisive period in Israel's growth who have placed their stamp on the nation, as did the Pilgrim Fathers on America.

But the present large immigration, much of it from backward countries where the modern ideas of the separation of Jewish nationality from Jewish religion have hardly reached, may soon change the whole outlook. At the same time, predictions would be foolhardy. It will be a long time before that inchoate mass of newcomers becomes sufficiently integrated in the country to be able to form any definable attitude. It is difficult to say how many even among the most pious of the immigrants — the Yemenite Jews — will try to conform to the type of Ben-Gurion, and how many will want to influence Ben-Gurion or want to replace him by a Yemenite *hacham* (wise man, or rabbi). The force of religion is not easily predictable even with a relatively well known group, and most of the newcomers to Israel from the Muslim countries are hardly known to the leading Jewish scholars. One never knows what real or potential attitudes may lurk behind the meek docility of the Yemenite Jew as he speaks in his quaint Biblical Hebrew. The Persian Jew, whose knowledge of Hebrew is much more meager, is even more of a puzzle.

In October 1950, during the festival of Succoth (Tabernacles), I ran into a group of Yemenite boys, all wearing long earlocks, walking from one immigrant camp to another. As I stopped to talk with them the name of Ben-Gurion cropped up.

"Is he good or bad?" I asked.

"Good and bad, both," was the evasive answer of the leader, a boy in his early teens.

"What is there about him that is bad?" I pressed.

The boy flared up. "Sometimes I think it is worse than with the Arabs. We can put a bar across the entrance to our camp to keep the automobiles out on a holiday, but we can't help seeing them on the highway. We see men and women smoking on the Sabbath, when we walk out of our camp." Then he concluded: "When this business with the Arabs is over, there will be war between the Yemenites and the Ashkenazi Jews." He hastened to correct himself: "I mean, the freethinkers."

It is difficult to say how much of that outburst was the spontaneous reaction of Yemenite Jews, how much of it was induced by propaganda carried on by orthodox East Europeans, how representative it was, how far it was merely an outlet for the resentment felt by the Oriental Jews against the superior attitude and superior position of the European Jews. I do not believe there is anyone in Israel who can give a knowledgeable and unbiased answer to these questions.

Except for that slip, the boy spoke the identical language of an ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi from the Meah Shearim quarter in Jerusalem — or even certain sections in Williamsburg, Brooklyn. The similarity is all the more striking in view of the two thousand years or more of history and geography which separate the European Jews from the Yemenite Jews. There are streets in Jerusalem inhabited by European Jews, where men and boys — even little boys — wear long earlocks. These streets are roped off on a Saturday to keep out the ungodly car drivers. Some hot-headed youths on those streets employ less peaceful methods to warn the sinners.

The Meah Shearim quarter in Jerusalem and sections of Safed and Tiberias are Jewish communities which long antedate Zionist colonization. They carry on in the same old mode of life, as if the whole dynamic history of the country since 1880 had passed them by. They seem to be as unaffected by Zionism and the State of Israel as the French Canadian villagers in a remote section of the Province of Quebec are unaffected by the French Revolution, Karl Marx, or Freud. Although most of them can speak a fluent Hebrew with the Sephardic pronunciation which is the standard in Israel, they will employ it only reluctantly with outsiders. Among themselves they speak only Yiddish. Any

newly arrived child in an immigrant camp will try to pick up Hebrew as fast as he can and use it wherever possible, anxious to feel that he belongs to the country. But not a child in Meah Shearim.

These communities, both in Palestine and in Europe, have lost many people through defections. They represent pathetic, apparently petrified, remnants of a past age. But what they may hold for the future is hard to tell. It is out of neighborhoods such as these in Europe and in Palestine that men like Ben-Gurion and Zisling have come. So also have many young Yemenite Jews and children of Yemenite immigrants been quick in adopting the ways of the modern Ashkenazi. They cut their earlocks and speak glibly about socialism in a Hebrew whose sentence structure is more Russian than Biblical.

II

Nothing in Israel is so simple that it can be understood without some reference to the complex historical background of its growth. Stock comparisons with other countries, especially with America, are apt to be misleading. And the emotional quality so often attendant upon the discussions of Israel's problems is a hindrance rather than a help.

The legitimate aspiration of the average American Jew to see religion and state constitutionally separated in Israel, as in the United States, is usually accompanied by a most unreasonable indignation that they have not been separated yet. It is forgotten that such advanced liberal democracies as England and Norway still have established churches, little as that has come to mean in practice today; that Israel has no written constitution and that most of its laws are a mere carry-over from the immediate past; that while there is no separation of church and state in Israel, neither is there an official religion, for the situation is still undefined. American Reform rabbis are shocked that they are precluded from performing marriage ceremonies in Israel. They forget that Reform Judaism and its off-shoot in America are recent developments in Jewish history, and that Reform Jews did not migrate to Israel; also, that at the time the law was promulgated in 1926 there was not a single Reform congregation in

Palestine, and that there are very few of them even today — at any rate, not enough for anyone in the press or in Parliament to voice a demand for their rights. In the view of the writer and of a good number of thinking Israelis, Israel has much to gain from the introduction of the American type of Conservative synagogue (which is far more adapted to Israel than the Reform synagogue), with its web of social activities. But this is a peculiarly American development growing out of the American environment and influenced by America's Christian religious life. One is amazed, therefore, to read a report by one of the most scholarly Conservative rabbis in America who headed a mission to Israel, which expressed something amounting to angry denunciation of Israel's synagogues for not having that sort of thing. On top of all comes the dull-witted, uninformed radical of bygone days who is willing to accept a Jewish State as an inevitable historic calamity but only on condition that it strictly conform to the ideals of Emma Goldmann. He finds it "heartbreaking" that in a mere three years Israel has already "become" a "theocracy."

A few simple historic facts must be restated even for those who know them, since their pertinent relation to the situation at hand is often overlooked.

When the Zionist movement arose, the Jewish world was in a state of intense fermentation. Jewish religion, despite the many mystical and ethical currents and sects it developed, remained rigid in its strict observance of outward forms and had, by that time, become extremely intolerant of any innovation. On the other hand, outward influences came upon it like a whirlwind, setting in motion and releasing many dynamic forces. Zionism was one of them; a modern literature in Hebrew and Yiddish, another. The classical Hebrew literature produced during that period is full of revolt against the prevalent mode of life in the ghetto, in a spirit of acrimonious criticism which surpasses even the Russian literature of the same period, by which it was largely inspired. The pioneers of Israel were a product of that age — and of a part of the world which did not know the gradual evolution of religious forms and concepts such as took place in the West.

The opposition of most orthodox Jews to Zionism did not

merely stem from a blind die-hard conservatism and from a literal faith that the return to Zion could only be fulfilled through direct Divine intervention. It also had its roots in the immediate past in Europe, and in the memory of the calamitous movement led by Sabbatai Zebi of Smyrna, who declared himself the Messiah, gathered a million Jews to lead to Palestine, but ended by adopting Islam to escape execution at the hands of the Sultan's servants. The religious laxity of many of the Zionist leaders was a contributing factor.

The fermentation in the ghetto set off many creative forces: Jews became great in science, in arts, in politics; Jews created their own literatures and their own state. But so far, little of that creative energy has shown itself in Jewish religion. There are indications of it here and there among the Religious Labor Zionists who established religious collectives in Israel, and in kindred groups, but these are, at best, beginnings. The new religious forms evolved by American Jews, which while pragmatically useful and workable are not distinguished for intensity of spiritual experience, have no counterpart in Israel or in any country from which Jews come to Israel except Germany.

Members of the dominant group in Israel — like all East European radicals — share with the orthodox their disapproval of this tampering with religion. The average Jewish radical of Eastern Europe has genuine respect for genuine orthodox religion sincerely practiced and may even wish it to continue as a force strong enough to serve as a living link with the past — but not strong enough to hamper his own freedom. He looks with amused contempt on the many varieties of Judaism as they have evolved in America.

It is also important to have some idea of the legal and constitutional history of the Jewish community in Palestine before Israel. The British Government, on assuming the administration of Palestine in 1921, found in the existing Turkish law (as also in that of other Islamic countries, former European states, and many parts of the British Empire) a recognition of religious communities as legal entities. The Zionists, more especially the Labor Zionists, would have preferred a secular autonomous body, but they were ready to meet the desire of the British au-

thorities half-way and to build up their secular autonomous entity within the legal framework of the religious community which the British proposed as a modified form of the Turkish law. The minimum of concession to religion required by the British was the acceptance of the legal position of the rabbinical council and its jurisdiction over matters of personal status. After an initial struggle against the granting of equal suffrage to women in the Assembly of Deputies, the Religious Zionist party — Mizrachi — accepted the arrangement. The late Chief Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, one of the outstanding scholars of his day and the Sephardic chief rabbi, also accepted — very much in the spirit of the Jew who recited his *Minha* at the session of the Knesset in Jerusalem. But the more extreme orthodox party, Agudat Israel, which did not acquiesce in the Zionist homeland until the eve of the declaration of the State, bitterly opposed the law and finally won the right to opt for a separate community undefiled by the irreligious.

Before the final legal stamp was put on the arrangement by the British House of Commons in 1926, the ultra-orthodox sought to prevent the passage of the legislation altogether. Their only articulate representative was an erratic but gifted Dutch Jew, a poet of some merit and the Jerusalem correspondent of the London *Daily Express*, by the name of Israel Jacob de Haan. He held the position of Executive Secretary of the Agudath Israel. On June 30, 1924, as he was preparing to leave for London to fight the law which was to lay the foundations of Jewish political autonomy in Palestine, de Haan was mysteriously assassinated.

Zionist leaders continually fought to widen the scope of their autonomous community and to give it more and more of a secular character. But they could not tamper with the authority of the rabbinate in personal status and still keep their autonomy. The most rabid secularist-nationalist among the Jews must admit that in the last analysis, the test of whether a man is a Jew or not, in Palestine or elsewhere, is whether or not he formally belongs to the Jewish religious community.

After the establishment of the State, the Government of Israel allowed the old arrangement to stand, leaving intact the authority

of the religious courts, and adding some new concessions to the religious as a price of holding them in the coalition.² Any other course would have meant a partnership with the pro-Soviet Mapam on the Left or with a combination of the General Zionists and Herut — the latter being the former Irgunists — on the Right. It was, at the time, the only possible course. But in essence the horrendous crime of the Israeli leaders in selling out to "theocracy" is the same compromise the same leaders made in the early twenties, when they were much younger and more militantly secularist, in order to set up a Jewish autonomous body out of which, less than thirty years later, grew the State of Israel.

III

Until recently, Ben-Gurion studiously avoided public discussion of two problems he rightly considered the most explosive and most likely to set off repercussions outside of Israel. One is the problem of Israel's social and economic structure. The other is the place of religion in the new state. In the closing months of the first Knesset in the early spring of 1951, however, he tossed the question of religion into the open in what was probably a shrewdly calculated piece of political strategy. Behind his tactics there seems to hide a long-range plan to advance the solution in a statesmanlike manner.

How far both the economic and the religious questions in Israel agitate Jews in the United States may be gathered from two recent occurrences. On May 10, 1951, as crowds gathered to fill the Madison Square Garden in New York for the first appearance in America of Israel's Prime Minister, a group of young orthodox Jews, carrying placards, picketed the entrances in protest against the alleged oppression of Jewish religion in Israel. And in mid-June, shortly after Prime Minister Ben-Gurion departed for home, the Zionist Organization of America devoted most of the sessions at its Annual Convention in Atlantic City to criticisms of the alleged blunders and misdemeanors of Ben-Gurion's socialist government in the economic field. Ben-

² Needless to add, the Muslim and the Christian religious courts enjoy similar privileges. No Catholic can get a legal divorce in Israel. A Jew can — in accordance with rabbinical law; a Muslim, in accordance with Islamic law.

Gurion himself, while in the United States, seemed to take the religious protestants lightly: he met a deputation of orthodox leaders and defended the position of his government in good humor. But the activities of the Z.O.A. in linking up with the main opposition party in Israel infuriated him to such an extent that he cancelled his scheduled appearance at a Madison Square Garden rally sponsored by the Z.O.A.

No doubt the economic struggle, though less spectacular, is the more serious one, certainly for the immediate future. A few fanatics in the extreme orthodox sections of Jerusalem may decide to throw a bomb on the Knesset, and some of them do set fire to cars that run on Saturdays. But these few youngsters have no following to speak of and few sympathizers. On the other hand, the number of young men in Israel who seriously talk of the possibility of overthrowing what they term the dictatorship of the Labor Party (Mapai) and of the Histadrut by force of arms, is considerably greater. Many of them are former members of the terrorist Irgun, which enjoyed active support from the anti-Socialists, both in Israel and in the United States. Their unauthorized importation of arms on the *Altalena* during the truce in the summer of 1948, with the stubborn refusal to turn the arms over to the government, looked suspiciously enough like a putsch to induce Ben-Gurion to order the opening of fire on the ship from the beaches of Tel-Aviv.

The results of the elections of July 1951 reduce the possibilities that the struggle for Israel's economic structure will take any violent form. Some 70 or 75 percent voted for a welfare state; the extremist Herut has lost in strength, and its two most spectacular leaders, Menachem Beigin and Peter Bergson, retired from political activity. Also, pro-Soviet Mapam has lost some of its strength. But the conservative middle class party, the General Zionists, has made considerable gains, and with the backing of the Zionist Organization of America, presents an opposition force that will have to be reckoned with. If Ben-Gurion's party should persist in ignoring them, they can stage some effective acts of economic noncooperation, as they did in August 1950 when they closed down all shops as a protest against the rationing of clothes. Their influence on prospective Ameri-

can investors cannot be disregarded. Still less can Ben-Gurion afford to disregard the demands and the criticisms of the American investor himself.

The forces arraigned in the economic struggle can fairly correctly be appraised and the general outlines of a compromise between them envisaged. The welfare state in Israel is probably there to stay and the power of labor will continue to be great. But, barring a Soviet invasion or some other unforeseen catastrophe, a further move in the direction of allowing more room to private enterprise is in the cards, more than ever since the elections in July. But once a degree of stability is reached which most citizens will accept as normal, the tension of the economic struggle may decrease to such an extent that other issues will come to the fore. Religion may then in time become the main issue.

It is safe to predict that the Yemenite or Persian laborer, having tasted the benefits of the unique social security system of the Histadrut, will not be swayed by arguments from Adam Smith, Herbert Hoover, or Abba Hillel Silver. But how he will react to the propaganda of the religious groups and what forms that propaganda may take, is impossible to say.

IV

It is not easy at first sight to discern the stirrings of a religious revival among the Jews in Israel, preoccupied as they are with more tangible problems, but these stirrings are there — among the religious youth who try to harmonize religion with the different varieties of socialism and Zionism; among the formerly militant secularists and their children who have a hankering for the beauty of the old forms, now that the bitterness of the age of revolt is gone and that the main bearers of those forms are dead with the death of martyrs in Hitler's gas chambers. Also, the Israeli war of liberation and its success — exaggerated in popular imagination — encourages the seeking of an explanation in Divine intervention.

It is far more difficult to estimate the potentiality which lies in these stirrings of religious sentiment. This is especially so

because of the new population elements involved, with their different, still unexplored, backgrounds, their complex problems of adjustment and inevitable demoralization attendant upon the uprooting of populations and the abrupt transition from one type of civilization to another.

In one way, at least, the pious Jews of Asia and Africa are different from those of Europe: they never offered any serious resistance to the Zionist idea. They accepted it, when its message came to them, in their simplicity, as the fulfillment of the Prophecy and nothing more. It never occurs to them to object to the use of Hebrew in daily conversation. A typical — and touching — story was once told me by a woman who went to Northern Africa to some of the most backward Jewish communities to bring them the message of the new State. They learned from her, for the first time — six years after the event — that 6 million Jews had been slaughtered by the Nazis. Despite the orthodox prohibition, more strictly observed in Oriental Jewish communities than in Europe, she was allowed to sit in with the council of rabbis and lay leaders, all men. At the end of the discourse, the aged rabbi reproached her: "Why did you Jews of Europe insult us so deeply? You know that, according to the Talmud, to be among the first in the rebuilding of the Holy Land is the foremost of all commandments, and yet you waited seventy years after you began your work before you let us know."

It will hardly enhance the moral climate of Israel if these simple-minded cave-dwelling Jews of Northern Africa (many of whom have already migrated to Israel) or their children are suddenly to be dragooned by propaganda into the super-sophisticated world of ideas of the East European Labor Zionists. Judging by some recent utterances and actions of Ben-Gurion and some of his colleagues, there seems to be the beginning of an appreciation of the problems. Besides, there is the much stronger element of workaday practical politics. These newcomers, unpracticed as they are in democracy, are full-fledged citizens in a democratic state; their votes are needed to keep the Labor Party in power.

A highly intelligent student of Political Science at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem told me of a study he made in a new

settlement of Yemenite Jews in connection with the election of their first municipal council. The Religious Bloc, which considers the Yemenite Jews its rightful preserve, appealed to them on the grounds of true Jewish religion but committed the blunder of trying to impose upon them religious functionaries from among its own party hacks. The Labor Party — Mapai — acted more skillfully. It engaged a young Yemenite member of the party to do the electioneering. He first of all confirmed the leading rabbi, cantor, and other functionaries in their positions, made things more attractive to them, and won them over. Next he addressed the new citizens in a manner no one would even dream of using in a mess hall of a kibbutz or in a trade union hall, say, in Haifa:

"The mighty King David Ben-Gurion," he told them, "having been able, with the help of God to beat seven Arab kings, has brought you forth on eagle's wings out of the thralldom of Yemen into the free and restored land of Israel and has given you land."

It worked. Mapai won the contest.

In a village near Tel-Aviv, inhabited by new immigrants from Turkey, I saw the boys at school wearing scull caps.

"Is that a school run by the Religious Bloc?" I asked the leader of the community.

"No," he said, "it is a Histadrut school, but of the religious section. I myself am not religious, but these people wanted their children to be taught in the religious spirit, so I arranged for our religious section to move in."

The young leader is a confirmed Laborite, and his approach to the problem of religious education of the people he leads — and whom he has every intention of leading into the Labor Party camp — is probably as cynically partisan as the Religious Bloc and even nonreligious opponents of Labor claim it to be. But this is one of the issues on which Ben-Gurion is adamant, and from an over-all, long-range, statesmanlike point of view, he is probably right. He insists that religion must not be the special domain of any organized political party, but that any group of citizens, organized for any purpose, has a right to make special accommodations for those of its members who insist on observing orthodox religious practices.

V

While the measure of religious fermentation under the surface of things cannot easily be gauged, the amount of religious politicking and of political horse-trading by religious leaders is all too exposed to the world's gaze. In the past months, Ben-Gurion, an inordinately astute tactician, has managed to force it out into the open, and, as it turned out, to the disruption of the Religious Bloc.

The Religious Bloc in the Knesset consisted of four parties: Mizrachi, a middle class religious Zionist party dating from 1903; its labor faction (which is a later growth and is subdivided into at least two smaller factions); Agudat Israel, a formerly anti-Zionist organization which, before the establishment of the State, had undergone a gradual evolution towards the Zionist ideal but always refused to join a body controlled by secularists; and Labor Agudat Israel. The labor element in the Religious Bloc was strongest. Its rank and file built some of the finest collective farms and settlements in Israel. These are the products of a genuine religious movement among the orthodox youth seeking to combine religion with socialist practice and fulfillment.

United only on religious questions, and holding the balance of power in the coalition which formed the Government prior to the July 1951 elections, the Religious Bloc kept on pressing for more concessions, especially during a period when the Government lost prestige in the eyes of the public. In October 1950 the Religious Bloc complained that the Labor functionaries were using intimidation on the newcomers to induce them to send their children to nonreligious schools, and that the earlocks of pious Yemenite children were being snipped off by ungodly doctors and nurses. Ben-Gurion accused the Religious Bloc politicians of squeeze play and resigned. His party prevailed upon him to patch up his differences with the Religious Bloc and to reorganize his cabinet without an appeal to the electorate. In February 1951 the crisis broke out anew. This time Ben-Gurion resigned in a manner that made it impossible to withdraw and elections were called for midsummer. In his letter to the President explaining his resignation, Ben-Gurion accused the anti-

labor element in the Religious Bloc of using religion as a cloak for combating social legislation. The Religious Bloc accused the Labor Party of breaking a solemn agreement over the disposition of immigrant children.

The latter point is of some interest. The Government of Israel has inherited from the organized Jewish community of Palestine four recognized Hebrew school systems: the General, the Labor, the Mizrahi (religious), and the Agudat Israel (ultra-religious).³ All parents, whether settled or newcomers, can freely opt for their children the type of school they desire, except that the original agreement in the old coalition called for the exclusive jurisdiction by the Religious Bloc over the education of Yemenite children in the camps without any option. When most immigrant camps were abolished and turned into work villages, the Government claimed that the agreement did not apply to the latter. At the same time the Labor Federation (Histadrut) opened special schools for religious children.

Ben-Gurion's defense in the Knesset, much as it may have been motivated by mere politics, at the same time shows a statesman-like approach:

"I don't want to perpetuate the distinction between a Yemenite Jew and any other Jew," he said. "I want the Yemenite Jews to become government officials and army officers as fast as possible. I want the Yemenite Jew to forget that he is Yemenite just as I have forgotten that I am Polish." As for the legality or propriety of the Labor Federation's opening its own religious schools, Ben-Gurion's position has already been explained above: he is determined to take religion out of politics.

Shortly after the dissolution of the coalition in February (which, nevertheless, was to carry on as a caretaker government until after the elections), Ben-Gurion presented to the Knesset one bill after another to irritate the orthodox: first a bill to abolish the widely abused exemption granted to orthodox young

³ There are variations among the Labor schools, and, still more, among the religious schools. Outside the pale of recognized schools, are the extreme orthodox schools, with a total attendance of less than 3,000 in all of Israel, where no secular subjects are taught at all and where the use of Hebrew is taboo. As already indicated above, that type has its counterpart in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, where a Jewish all-day school has its troubles with the Department of Education for refusing to include secular subjects in its curriculum.

women subject to military service; then a bill to make women's equality before the law apply in the religious courts as well as in civic courts (thereby doing away with the only remaining legal disability of women); next a bill giving the Minister of Labor wide authority to declare what type of work on Saturdays is so vital to the welfare of the State that it should supersede the religious prohibitions. What this really meant was that Mrs. Golda Meyerson was to have greater authority in purely religious matters than the Council of Rabbis.

The result was an uproar on both sides of the ocean, and a reported plot by young fanatics in Jerusalem to blow up the Knesset. But, as Ben-Gurion probably anticipated, the fury spent itself before the elections and the Religious Bloc split between its bourgeois and labor components. The latter are the natural allies of Ben-Gurion's Labor Party.

Religious Laborites, despite their fairly strict adherence to the letter of the Law, are quite liberal in their interpretation of the spirit of religion. They do recognize the equality of women in their own settlements (where, during the war, women bore arms and took up positions), and they do rely on education and voluntary acceptance rather than on coercion by the state for the spread of religious Judaism. Even they, however, demand a minimum of public recognition of some fundamental laws. Some concessions will probably have to be made to them. They represent a growing force, having increased their strength in the last elections, and they are the natural allies of the ruling party in the broad lines of its economic policy. Their support is necessary in order to strengthen Labor's position vis-à-vis the General Zionists, whose price for entering the coalition or for any other form of cooperation is even less modest now than it ever was.

The two non-Labor religious parties, Mizrachi and Agudat Israel, were badly beaten at the polls. This demonstrates that religion as such is not an issue with the electorate. Taking the longer view, it is still a force to be appeased and won, but under the present setup, concessions to religion can be treated separately from principles of economics.

THE LESSON OF TURKEY

Richard D. Robinson

THE STARTLING SUCCESS of American aid to Turkey is not generally understood in this country. We are prone to assume that Turkey's determined anti-Soviet, pro-Western orientation is somehow anchored in the rather substantial military, economic, and moral support we have provided it. To the indignation of not a few Turks, some of us even attribute exclusively to this American involvement the recent appearance of democratic political institutions in Turkey. Not only does this claim strip Turkey of any pride in self-accomplishment, it is patently false. While it is certainly true that American aid has constituted a critical move in the Turkish buildup, it has been only one among even more vital forces.

Turkey is moving rapidly along the path of Western technological, scientific, and liberal evolution. It does so by reason of its own free choice. Recent American aid may have accelerated the pace somewhat, but Turkey's orientation to the West — and specifically toward the United States — is a thing of Turkish design; it is not a matter of temporary political expediency. Turkey's Western-oriented development was well under way at least a generation before either the Marshall Plan or the Truman Doctrine was conceived.

In claiming too much for our dollars we not only wound friends but blind ourselves to invaluable insights which could contribute materially to our own defenses. Of all the "underdeveloped" and "backward" nations¹ with which we are actively

¹ Frequently these words are used loosely and interchangeably. Here, "underdeveloped" refers to an area possessed of the possibility for development, and "backward" refers to a state of mind — attitudes — which have arrested the technical and scientific development of the people living within the area concerned. Turkey is both.

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concerned, Turkey has perhaps registered the greatest progress in terms of economic advance and developing democratic political institutions. The "why" of that progress merits sober reflection.

Geographically, the important thing about Turkey is that it enjoys no real degree of isolation. It faces continuous external pressures which threaten its very existence. Thirteen times, for instance, over the past three centuries it has been involved in violent conflict with the Russians.² For the Turk, the Cold War is of several centuries' duration. Of even greater importance, perhaps, has been Turkey's contiguity with Europe, a position lending itself to greater cultural exchange with the West than would have been the case were Turkey hedged on all sides by Asiatic peoples.

Despite considerable progress over the near past, the economy of the country — if judged by Western standards — is still cast essentially in a mold of semi-primitive, peasant agriculture of very low efficiency. The industrial revolution is only now permeating to the village level where the mass of people (at least 75%) live. The new machines and techniques will doubtless send wave after wave of social restlessness washing across Anatolia as they force major shifts in population distribution (both geographical and occupational), in social institutions, and in moral codes. Technological change is always a powerful subversive element in respect to status quo. But inasmuch as there appears to be no throttling population pressure as measured against existing national resources, the possibility for further economic development would seem great.³

² In 1677-81, 1696-1702, 1710-11, 1736-39, 1768-74, 1783, 1787-92, 1806-12, 1826, 1828-29, 1854-56, 1877-78, and 1914-15.

³ Best available data indicates, for instance, that potential agricultural land per capita in Turkey is possibly over 5 acres. (United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East* [January 31, 1951], p. 69.) One should note, however, that no adequate land, soil, or mineral survey has yet been made in Turkey. It should also be pointed out that even though no over-all population pressure is apparent in Turkey, the pressure in certain areas is critical. This situation has been noted by the writer in the Gaziantep, Adana, and Black Sea regions; by Paul Sterling, British anthropologist, in the Kayseri area; and recognized officially in a statement prepared for the writer by the Director-General of the Office of Land Affairs (Ankara, June 13, 1950). For a recent study of development possibilities in Turkey see *The Economy of Turkey: An Analysis and Recommendations for a Development Program; Summary of the Report of a Mission Sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Turkey* (Washington, D.C., 1951).

Politically, modern republican Turkey has evolved rapidly. In World War I, Turkey — then in control of what remained of the Ottoman Empire — sided with the Central Powers, was defeated, and was abruptly relieved of almost all of its non-Turkish territories. Out of the dust of conflict and crumbling Ottoman authority arose a Turkish leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. At first, Atatürk was merely a military hero who led a successful and brilliantly-manuevered revolt against the Allied occupying powers, reorganizing the Turkish forces vanquished in World War I literally under the noses of the Allies. So embarrassing became the situation engineered by Atatürk that a favorable treaty of peace was gained for the new Turkey, and the Allies were forced to withdraw from the Anatolian Peninsula and ultimately from Istanbul and European Turkey.

Atatürk, assuming the stature of a national hero by reason of these events, seized dictatorial powers. Maneuvering with great adroitness and care, he succeeded in destroying the Sultanate, the seat of power in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. He then forced the dissolution of the Caliphate, office of the spiritual head of Islam. Authoritarian and ruthless as Atatürk might have been, there existed a fundamental difference between this man and the Hitlers and Mussolinis — his motives.

Using the helpful insight of hindsight, one feels that Atatürk was sincerely intent upon raising the standard of living of his people, upon shaking Turkish civilization free from its long lethargy and injecting into it more of a dynamic, progressive, and liberal quality. Doubtless he felt that such was essential if Turkey were to remain a nation, that in the absence of political and economic development a power vacuum would inevitably follow and foreign masters be drawn in. The entire physical and human resources of the nation were needed in a superhuman effort to make up for the decades of stagnation and neglect.

Atatürk undertook to launch the move toward these goals through a series of forced reforms, particularly a studied de-emphasis of everything smacking of the old reactionary Islam to which the masses adhered. In this, he was only partially successful. But into the area thus cleared, there was thrust the propaganda of nationalism and the makings of an education system

more liberal and scientific than that which had existed previously. Technical development was pushed with vigor. Modern State-operated factories and mines came into existence to lead the way in Turkey's industrial revolution, for that is precisely what it was. Those who dared oppose these moves were suppressed ruthlessly, perhaps even summarily executed if occasion warranted. The regime may have been unduly ruthless, but a great many of the reforms and projects thus created are dynamic realities today.⁴

In those early years of the Turkish Revolution it was feared that liberalism and democracy would mean simply license to resist the reforms forced by the top leadership. Hence personal freedom was sharply curtailed and liberal political institutions forbidden. Even so, the legal framework for a political democracy was created with the adoption of a republican constitution, although for many years its guarantees of personal freedom meant little. It became increasingly apparent, nonetheless, that Atatürk and his colleagues believed in a truly representative government, but only at such time when the cultural level of the people was adequate to support it.

During his lifetime, Atatürk made one attempt to establish a two-party parliamentary government: in 1930 he deliberately created a political opposition. It soon developed, however, that the more reactionary elements were exploiting the new freedom in an attempt to destroy the whole fabric and philosophy of the revolution. Consequently, Atatürk — acting with typical ruthlessness — jettisoned the experiment and crushed the very opposition which he had encouraged.⁵

In 1938, Atatürk died, and İsmet İnönü — president in name,

⁴ Some may feel that this analysis runs roughshod over the Period of Reform (the so-called Tanzimat of the mid 1800's), of the Young Turk Movement of the early 1900's, and of the influence of the nationalistic thought expounded by Ziya Gökalp and others. The author feels, however, that many Western writers and scholars have exaggerated the impact of these movements upon the life and thought of the common people of Turkey. Nationalistic writers, the Tanzimat, and the Young Turk Revolt no doubt prepared that small group of Turkish intellectuals congregated in Istanbul for the Atatürk reforms — a process which was an indispensable element in making possible a new leadership when it appeared — but had little if any effect in smoothing the way for such reforms in Turkey's 40,000 village communities.

⁵ This account may be an erroneously simplified version of the shortlived *Serbest Fırkası* (Liberal Party), but it seems the only plausible one given the currently known facts.

but in fact, dictator — carried on. As the years slid by, the face of Turkey began to change. Law and order was established in all regions of the country under a secular government. Education began to have its impact at the grass-roots level. An improved system of roads and communications drew more and more of the Anatolian village population into the stream of national and world consciousness. State industry — located as much for its educational and developmental impact as for economic consideration — drew significant numbers of villagers into direct contact with the machine age. Age-old attitudes and superstitions began to give way. These processes were slow to take form, but form they did under constant pressure applied by Turkish leaders.

After World War II, perhaps somewhat encouraged by the victory of the more liberal nations over the totalitarian and sensing a new security in the flow of American aid, the Turkish rulers permitted the growth of political opposition. In 1945 a political opposition developed within the single, all-powerful Republican People's Party, splintered off from the parent organizational stem and set to work to fire national opinion on its behalf. Slowly İnönü's administration gave ground; free speech, free press, free assembly became facts. In permitting this development, İsmet İnönü no doubt realized that the national interest clearly required ideological identification with the Western democracies. But this does not detract from the credit due him, for few men consciously encourage the conditions leading to their own political demise even in the national interest. The opposition thus launched, bolstered by two years of intense campaigning on the village level, rode into power in May 1950 in Turkey's first honest and contested general election. President İnönü stepped down without quarrel to lead the loyal opposition. Such has been the recent political revolution in Turkey.

Looking at Turkey geographically, economically, and politically, one can make four general observations of primary importance:

First, Turkey's geographical position is such that the country faces continuing external pressures, thereby forcing on it the necessity for main-

taining substantial defenses, both military and moral. Its position also makes for direct cultural contact with Europe.

Second, Turkey's underdeveloped economy is such that the industrial revolution is only now hitting the semi-primitive, village community level with perceivable impact.

Third, the Turkish Revolution (including the recent appearance of liberal political institutions) has come about through deliberate maneuvers on the part of certain top Turkish leaders, not via any compelling popular demand. This statement does not mean that if the political freedoms now existent were suddenly abrogated the people would not now react violently, for already the common folk have come to have a conscious vested interest in their new freedoms.

Fourth, further political and economic development of Turkey is not only possible but imperative if creation of a power vacuum is to be prevented and adequate defenses maintained.

As for Turkish society, it tends traditionally toward the illiberal and is weak in personal incentive and responsibility — at least, when mirrored against Western society. One may question the value of this criterion, but the Turks themselves have chosen it by deliberately orienting the economic and political development of their country to that of the West and in recent years, specifically to that of the United States. The writer has been called upon an uncounted number of times by individual Turks — townsfolk and villagers — to contrast this or that feature of Turkish life with the American. These requests were motivated out of something deeper than mere curiosity; there was evident almost a hunger to make a good showing by American standards. Any number of times the writer has had occasion to remark in Turkish company that a particular thing in Turkey surpassed a comparable article or skill in America. Invariably, the Turks were pleased. The goals they have set for themselves — mechanization and democratization — are those of the West. It is for this reason that developments in Turkey must be analyzed on the basis of Western experience and that comparison of things Turkish to Western is valid. Simultaneously, of course, one must recognize clearly the impact on Western practices implanted by Turkey's rich cultural heritage, and the necessity for modifying those practices when transplanted to that culture. The distinction between principle and practice here is important.

There are distinct reasons why Turkish society has tended

toward the illiberal.⁶ First and foremost is the matter of early childhood conditioning. From his first days of self-consciousness, the Turkish child is taught unquestioning obedience to the word and command of his father. This disciplined subservience to recognized authority is further strengthened by the child's relationship with the village community, the type of community in which the vast majority of Turks find themselves. Such a community is essentially a family group, whose activities are closely controlled by the family-village elders. In these semi-isolated, compact village clusters, there is no such thing as personal privacy; every act of every individual is known to the community. Under such circumstance, substantial social pressure forces the individual into the traditional patterns of behavior.

One such pattern prevents half the population — the female half — from realizing to any appreciable degree its human potential, a further illiberal feature. From all areas of rural Turkey competent observers agree that the status of village women has altered very little from the traditional. In the towns and cities, of course, startling changes have been wrought on this score over the past two decades, but not so in most village communities. One highly qualified observer writes confidentially, "Within the family, the young man is next to his father in authority in the house, and while there is often affection between brother and sister, he is master and she servant." Another competent observer writes, "Authority in the unit [household] rests firmly in the male head of the household. A man can and does give abrupt orders to any of the women and children of the household. . . . Socially, the gulf between men and women is striking. . . . Most husbands treat their wives as conveniences, and only show concern when they are too ill to work." Even the word for "woman" in village vernacular is *eksik*, meaning something deficient and incomplete. An accelerating change in the status of village women can be expected, however, to arise out of the ever-increasing number of girls going into the village schools (both as teachers and students), the employment of

⁶ At the same time, one should take note that there do exist within the Turkish cultural framework certain traditions upon which a liberal social philosophy could be erected. Two such are the traditions of social mobility and the Islamic brotherhood of man; also the implications of the constitutional principle of *halkçılık* (populism).

women in industry at wages equal to those of men, the awarding of equal political rights for women, and the rapid improvement in town-village communication. The upgrading of women's status in urban communities will also have an indirect effect.

A concept of modern sociology is that of "role conflict," having to do with the conflicting obligations of an individual self-identified with more than one "reference group," each group perhaps possessing different moral codes. Thus, the individual American becomes responsible to many different moral codes — those of family, church, community, business, Rotary Club, nation, Chamber of Commerce, etc. — many of which may conflict at important points. It would seem to follow that as the number of codes to which an individual feels responsible increases, the more variable (or, in a sense, liberal, anti-traditional, individual) does his behavior become. Under such circumstances, the pull of any particular moral code on the individual is probably weaker than if he were subject to the pull of only one, for he has a wider range of choice, must weigh alternative actions and consequences, and in many cases resolve the conflict by individual (nontraditional) action.

In the case of the Anatolian villager, the individual generally belongs to no organization other than the family-village community,⁷ the village mosque (around which are organized no social groupings), and the Nation. No others compete for his allegiance. Although more true of the relatively isolated and internally-related village community, the paucity of organizational affiliations even in Turkish cities is novel to the American. For example, in Gaziantep, a town of 70,000 in south central Turkey, there was in 1949 not a single strictly private social organization other than the two political parties. There existed several government-sponsored or quasi-government organizations, but even their membership was limited to very few individuals. In the mosques, one found no evidence of informal social groupings demanding an individual's allegiance. Service clubs — in the American sense — were nonexistent. Degree of social organization appears to be an important sociological difference

⁷ The family and village community are considered here as having identical moral codes. In most village communities the recognized interests, and hence demands, of family and village seem to be almost indistinguishable.

between Turkish and American societies. One would thus expect the villager's tie to any one of his few allegiances to be remarkably strong, and such is indeed the case. In fact, the strength of traditional codes is so great that little room remains for individualization, the essence of liberal society.

The religion of the Turkish villager, a type of arrested Islam, still further shores up this subservience to tradition and authority. His is a religion of dogmatic fatalism⁸ and of detailed ritual which governs the most intimate personal behavior habits. One does not alter his lot in life; he tends to accept it as ordained by Allah. Poverty is almost held to be a virtue. Islam need not be this type of religion at all; it can well be a dynamic, progressive force. That is what it becomes in Turkey's new village schools. But in the mind of the Turkish peasant-villager, Islam still adheres to the traditional. The Anatolian's Islam may be, in final analysis, merely an unconscious rationalization of his relative inability to control the physical environment. In this way, perhaps, the Islam of the Turkish villager may be likened to the Christianity of the medieval European villager.

Subservience to tradition and authority is further bolstered by the customary method of education, the emphasis in which even yet is almost entirely upon the rote memory of fact at the expense of liberal discussion or instruction as to methods of thought.⁹ This situation remains the rule even though a more progressive education may now be on its way in.

The Turk's experience in the army makes even stronger this conditioned response of disciplined subservience to authority, for the Turkish Army has been until very recently constructed along rigid, Prussian-like caste lines. Top-ranking American military officials in Turkey indicate an acute awareness on their part of the problems arising out of this rigidity in Turkish military organization. Major General William H. Arnold, Chief

⁸ For instance, a powerful motif of fatalism (or perhaps, more accurately, predestinationism) pervades *Bizim Köy* [*Our Village*], a depressing but realistic account penned by a young Anatolian village school teacher which gained unexpected popularity when it appeared in the spring of 1950. There is little doubt as to the book's authenticity; the writer has both visited "Our Village" (Çardak on the shore of the Salt Lake) and talked with Mahmut Makal, the school teacher-author.

⁹ This tendency in Turkish education is noted in the Report of the International Bank's Mission to Turkey, pp. 49-51, also in a recent statement by the Turkish Minister of Education (*Hürriyet*, June 11, 1951).

of the American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, told the writer in a September 1950 interview that the most pressing need in the Turkish Army was for junior officers and noncommissioned personnel adequately trained as small unit leaders, men willing and able to assume personal responsibility and initiative in small unit operations. Substantial improvement on this score is now being reported.

The head of the Turkish State seems to be regarded by the peasant as somewhat analogous to the Father of the Tribe, albeit decreasingly so. Vocal Turks have long been decrying this "great leader mentality." The old Sultan-Caliph was looked upon as a supreme patriarch, his relationship to the ordinary folk being almost that of father to son. And to that father, one owed absolute obedience. Likewise, the relationship of government official to ordinary citizen has traditionally been that of master to servant — definitely not one founded on mutual confidence and equality.

These attitudes are changing, but it takes time, effort, and patience. The significant thing about Turkey is that they are, in fact, giving way to more progressive, liberal concepts — and giving way with ever-increasing speed. For close on thirty years now, effective Turkish leadership has deliberately planned and molded the development of the country — a development aimed at ultimately evolving a more productive economy and liberal political institutions. That these developments were forced on a society fundamentally illiberal and weak in personal incentive makes the whole development even more amazing. The process of change was necessarily slow and faltering during the earlier years; only now is it being speeded up. Roughly, the step-by-step development of Turkey's unique evolution has been thus:

First, an attempt to destroy by the force of authoritarian government many of the symbols and continuity of traditions which had arrested the development of Turkish civilization (Forceful change was required by reason of national urgency and the fundamentally static and illiberal nature of Turkish society.);

Second, the expansion of education and the preaching of nationalism in an attempt to bring about a rapid increase in literacy and national consciousness;

Third, a forced economic development of the country by regimenting all possible resources in an all-out effort to industrialize and mechanize (but

in such a way as to produce peaceful change and not destroy the social organization of the nation) ;

Fourth, establishment of liberal political institutions — tolerance of opposition, free press, free speech, honest and contested elections, peaceful transference of political power.

Admittedly many mistakes have been made along the way. Force has no doubt been employed where peaceful persuasion would have proven more effective. Undue inefficiency and high-handedness in administration may have been tolerated. But be that as it may, substantial progress has been registered toward those Turkish goals listed above.¹⁰

At the same time, very real dangers beset the Turkish nation. Has it liberalized politically so rapidly that its free institutions will be undermined by reactionary religious, economic, and political elements which would exploit the new freedom to regain their lost power? The transition from authoritarianism to liberalism has been rapid. Those authoritarian moves necessary to create conditions under which a democracy might flower in themselves give rise to an antiliberal psychological environment. Is the process self-defeating?

Of the peasants, perhaps 80 percent ¹¹ are still illiterate in any meaningful sense, and many are still isolated from the general stream of national life. Under such circumstances, old attitudes and superstitions smolder for many generations and can be fanned into flame easily by chauvinistic demagogues to consume the progress of the past three decades. Even now reactionary

¹⁰ Although expressing great admiration for Turkish accomplishments, historian Arnold Toynbee issued a word of caution in this regard after a 1949 visit to Turkey. He pointed out, in a BBC broadcast, that Turkey was in danger of losing contact with its rich culture of the past. How to maintain such contact and still move ahead is one of Turkey's three really pressing problems. The other two are keeping rural Turkey apace the modernization of Ankara and Istanbul, and transforming the government to a fully constitutional system. This last seems to have been solved, at least for the present.

¹¹ The official literacy rate is 36.6% of those above 7 years of age. (Statement by the Turkish Minister of Education, December 21, 1948.) It is felt that the definition of literacy used here (a simple "yes" answer to the question, "Can you read and write?") is unduly loose. Careful estimates would indicate that not more than 25% of the population over the age of 7 (and probably not over 20% of the villagers) are literate to a degree which means anything politically, socially, or economically. And it is a moot question whether or not even a graduate of the 5-year village school who does not continue his education and reads nothing after graduation (as seems to be overwhelmingly the case) can be called literate. Many educators doubt it.

religious groups appear to be gnawing on the vitals of the Turkish Republic.¹²

The potential dangers in these internal conflicts appear to be well understood by Turkey's political leadership. Vigorous effort is being made to avoid the upheavals which were so evident in Western social evolution—the struggle between labor and capital, farm and city, education and superstition, church and state, men and women. On the Turkish statute books are some of the most advanced pieces of social legislation. They have been placed there in an attempt to legislate out of existence the causes for some of the conflicts which made early Western social evolution such a slow and uneven process. This advanced legislation—having to do with labor relations, hours and wages, social security, health insurance, land reform, child labor, women in industry, public health, equality of women, progressive income taxation, and the like—was not enacted in answer to any compelling popular demand. Rather, it represents a planned attempt to skip some of the more dangerous rungs in the ladder of Western evolution.

At the same time, one should not assume that all of these laws are being enforced in a wholly satisfactory manner. Some apply only to very limited sectors of the economy (e.g., labor laws and social insurance legislation). Others have unfortunate shortcomings (e.g., the exemption of all farm income from the income tax). And still others have not been applied generally. For instance, the Land Law of 1945 specifically limited private holdings to something like 1,200 acres, the balance to be purchased by the government and distributed to peasants on easy credit terms. But, in fact, exhaustive personal inquiry from one end of Turkey to the other has failed to produce a single case in which private land actually had been distributed in this fashion. State-owned properties, on the other hand, are in the process of being portioned out to landless or near landless peasants in a highly commendable program.

¹² A number of politically conscious Turks seem to be increasingly convinced that what appears to be a rising tide of religious reaction in Turkey is not strictly indigenous. Charges have been made that the Soviet Union is using reactionary Islam as a political weapon to create social unrest. The charge has yet to be documented publicly, but coincidental religious activity of this nature in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan—all apparently aimed at upsetting the status quo—at least arouses suspicion.

Political leadership in Turkey realizes that the country's lack of geographical isolation brings such international pressures to bear upon it that internal disunity must be avoided if national autonomy is to be maintained. For the same reason, Turkey does not have the time to go through a slow evolution stretched out over several centuries. It must close the gap between itself and the West and do so fairly rapidly. Yet Turkish society remains fundamentally illiberal and tradition-bound, although it is now changing rapidly.

The problem of Turkey is thus posed. It consists of equal parts urgency and difficulty. The resolution of this dilemma has been — whether by accident or design — a well-ordered one, so much so that the Turk has abdicated his position as the degenerate of Europe to become one of the more respected and robust members of the world community. These six policies may be suggested as the basis for this remarkable Turkish development:

First, establishment of security for the individual (e.g., law and order, continuity of law, and common expectation of justice) by a well-intentioned, progressively-minded (although until recently, undemocratic) government which desired — and now seems to be gaining — the relative confidence of the mass of people;

Second, an expanded program of technical and increasingly liberal education to challenge the superstition and dogmatic fatalism of village society;

Third, a deliberate program of encouraging economic incentive by stating the rewards for increased personal effort in terms of the felt needs of the people (The felt needs in a semi-primitive village society such as Turkey's are the basic necessities of life and those which the culture dictates, not necessarily free enterprise capitalism and political democracy.);

Fourth, the delayed introduction of democratic political institutions until basic social, educational, and economic reforms could be securely launched (An authoritarian government can play a valuable — if not, necessary — role, as in Turkey. It all depends on methods, motivation and objectives.);

Fifth, the fitting of modern machines and industry to the social structure of the country in such a way as to minimize dislocation and unrest but still spread their benefits over the entire population (State economic planning and activity have been important in Turkey and probably necessarily so, advice to the contrary by professional Western economists notwithstanding. Considerations other than the purely economic have rated high priority in the Turkish industrialization and mechanization process.);

Sixth, substantial American and European aid — both economic and military — in support of a progressive, well-intentioned, and relatively popular ruling group.

By reason of this sixfold process, even though imperfectly applied at times, Turkey has become the Western bulwark in the Middle East. Its military strength and anti-Soviet alignment are, in reality, but corollary to these developments. In their absence it is doubtful that Turkey could now withstand the possible onslaught of Soviet power and ideology, despite its long hostility toward things Russian. Mere hostility through habit is no longer adequate defense against Russian imperialism, because since the days of Czarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire at least four important factors have been changed or added. First, the power relationship between Turkey and Russia has been overwhelmingly weighted on the Russian side. Second, Russian power has been coupled with an ideology claiming universal truth and which seemingly possesses a considerable measure of attraction for the peoples of the more backward and underdeveloped areas where ruling groups block fundamental reform. Third, there has been a development by the USSR of highly effective mass propaganda techniques and media which, for reasons as yet undisclosed, have not yet been fully unleashed in Turkey. Fourth, the mechanization and urbanization of Turkish society has begun, a process which will possibly generate greater social mobility and individual insecurity, and thus greater susceptibility to extremist propaganda. In other words, the anti-Russian policy of today's Turkey must rest on much sounder stuff than that of yesterday's. The potential challenge to its autonomy is infinitely more subtle and powerful.

It is readily admitted that the six factors enumerated above beg a very large question: "How was it that these Western-oriented policies were in fact conceived and executed in Turkey and not elsewhere?" To attribute the process simply to the genius of Atatürk implies the further query, "Why the existence and character of Atatürk?" His existence was clearly unpredictable. As for his character, one can mention his lower class origin, orientation to the military, participation in and growing disgust with the Young Turk movement, contact with the German military and with French thought, and his frustrating experience with the inept government of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. The personality of Atatürk is certainly part of the Turkish

story. But another part of that same story is the long process of historical conditioning which provided the indispensable minimum in terms of leadership, intellectual environment, and susceptibility to change upon which a revolutionary program must be founded. Doubtless a third factor in the story was Turkey's geographical proximity to the main stream of European civilization, thereby making possible close cultural contact. For the fourth part of the Turkish story one must concede very liberal quantities of fortuitous circumstance, urgency, and chance combination.

The view expressed here should not, however, be taken to imply that similar events elsewhere need be externally indeterminate or historically conditioned to this same degree. Existence of a climate favorable to economic and political development need not be left entirely to chance. We can desist from consciously or unconsciously thrusting obstacles before potential Atatürks, obstacles such as the insistence that they conform to our political and economic forms and values or that the status quo must at all times be maintained. Further, the historical continuity of national cultures is now being bent before the attack of Soviet and American ideologies (both of which claim universal truths), modern communications, and technical invention. And mass communications media have rendered possible rapid and large-scale cultural assimilation even in the absence of geographical proximity to the source of that culture. For these reasons, the Turkish story need not be an exception.

It may be, therefore, that within the Turkish experience is a lesson of general application. It may be that those six conditions which we have found implicit in the evolution of modern Turkey constitute principles upon which successful Western-sponsored developmental programs in the underdeveloped-backward areas must rest.

ABDALLAH'S JORDAN: 1947-1951

Esmond Wright

GIVEN THE SIZE and the resources of his Kingdom, the late Abdallah of the Jordan must be judged one of the more skillful of modern Arab rulers. Unlike Ibn Saud, he won his way by diplomacy, by patience, by a subtle balancing of forces and interests. Unlike Faruq, he succeeded in marrying the interests of a foreign power with the nationalist demands of his people. Though wayward and impulsive at times and ambitious to a degree, these qualities brought him rich dividends: he was popular with the British Government — indeed, their only reliable ally in the Middle East; he doubled the resources and trebled the population of his Kingdom by the acquisition of Arab Palestine; the successes of his army and his statecraft made him almost as powerful a force in the Middle East as the combined strength of the Arab League itself. His career is testament to the truth of that proverb of his people that runs: "You win if you sit with the middle kind."

His success was mainly diplomatic. In the social and economic problems of his Kingdom he took less interest, and indeed, until the acquisition of Eastern Palestine, there was no pressing need to pay much attention to them. This situation then changed: the last three years raised acute problems which for Abdallah were novel and perplexing. Many of his new subjects were (and still are), by comparison with the Transjordanians, well-educated; some of them had (and still have) contempt for the backward tribal lands of Moab and Edom; a few of them, mainly the followers of the ex-Mufti, are not yet converted to the rule of Amman.

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TREATY RELATIONS AND INDEPENDENCE

Until 1946 the Amirate of Transjordan was governed in terms of an Agreement with Great Britain signed on February 20, 1928,¹ and of an Organic Law published on April 19, 1928.² On all questions of foreign policy, the Amir agreed to be guided by British advice, which was given by a British Resident at Amman, representing the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan in Jerusalem. Items affecting the finance or the constitution of the country were first to be submitted to the British Government. No armed forces were to be raised or maintained in Transjordan without British consent. For its part, Britain agreed to accept responsibility for the defense of the country, to help finance the Transjordan Frontier Force, and to meet any deficit in the ordinary expenses of administration. No opposition would be raised by Britain to Transjordan's association, for customs or other purposes, with such neighboring Arab states as might desire it. With these limitations on its freedom, an "independent" government came into existence: the Amir was to be advised by an Executive Council, consisting of a Chief Minister and 5 other Ministers, appointed by the Amir, and by a Legislative Council, consisting of this Executive plus 16 elected representatives. The Electoral Law which accompanied the Treaty and the Organic Law provided that these 16 elected representatives should consist of 9 Muslim Arabs, 3 Christian Arabs, 2 Circassians and 2 representatives of the Bedouin. They were to be elected indirectly by a male franchise of all Transjordanians, not being Bedouin, over the age of 18.

In minor respects, these provisions were altered in the next twenty years. In 1929 the right of freedom of speech was accorded to the members of the Legislative Council, but only when the Council was in session — approximately three months in the year. This concession indicated the limitations on the country's constitutional progress. In 1934 Transjordan was given the power to appoint consular representatives in the neighboring Arab states — by 1945 there were three: at Cairo, Baghdad, and Damascus. In 1939 Mr. Malcolm MacDonald announced in the

¹ Treaty Series No. 7 (1930), Cmd. 3488; see Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1928* (London, 1929), pp. 321-28.

² Cmd. 3069 (1928).

House of Commons that the British Government had agreed that a Council of Ministers responsible to the Amir should replace the Executive Council. In broad terms, however, the Government of Transjordan from 1928 to 1947 remained an autocracy modified less by the popular will than by the presence of the handful of British advisers. It was neither responsible nor constitutional in a Western sense. What responsibility there was, was to the Amir alone. There were from time to time waves of unrest, which in 1928-29 took the form of an unofficial National Congress, demanding a national parliament and a responsible ministry. But the demands were not sustained for long, and the Amir's spontaneous replies took the form of a press censorship, or of the house arrest or exile of his critics. He was only slowly weaned from these methods.

It was the circumstances of World War II that transformed the character of Transjordan's government. Abdallah's loyalty to the British connection at a time when it was unpopular in the Arab world, the skill and courage of his Arab Legion in helping to liberate Syria and to check Rashid 'Ali in Iraq in 1941, and the diplomatic exchanges with London through 1943 and 1944 on the future of his country, prepared the way for the new Treaty of March 22, 1946. By its terms, Britain recognized Transjordan as an independent state, with Abdallah as King. According to the Constitution which was drawn up,³ his Parliament was to consist of two Houses. The Chamber of Deputies, elected for 5 years by manhood suffrage, was to have 20 members, of whom 4 were to be Christians, 2 to represent the Bedouin, and 2 to represent the Circassian and Shishan community. This Chamber was to have legislative powers, but no control over finance or government appointments. A second Chamber, or Council of Notables, was to have 10 members, appointed by the King.

An annex to the Treaty allowed Britain training facilities in the country, and a Military Mission. These terms were, however, far from popular. In the Arab world, they afforded proof that Transjordan, with all its newly-won sovereignty, was pre-

³ Published in the *Official Gazette*, No. 886, Feb. 1, 1947. See also *Middle East Journal*, I (July, 1947), p. 322.

pared to remain dependent on Britain. Nor were they completely satisfying to Abdallah, since the USSR used the Britain-Transjordan relationship to block Transjordan's admission to the United Nations.

In March 1948, therefore, a second Treaty was signed, on a basis of "co-operation and mutual assistance." This treaty⁴ is to run for twenty years. A joint Anglo-Transjordan Defense Board was created to coordinate defense matters, and on it the two powers were to be represented by an equal number of military experts. Under the 1946 Treaty, Britain had been allowed to station armed forces at various points in the country. The new Treaty provided that R.A.F. units would be maintained at Amman and Mafrq only, but full transit facilities were to be provided. This arrangement followed closely the abortive treaty with Iraq of January 15, 1948 — and it received, at first, a similar reception. Subhi Abu Ghanima, the exiled Transjordanian politician, demanded that it should not be ratified until approved by the Arab League, a view upheld in Baghdad and Cairo. There were familiar reports of student demonstrations against the Treaty in Es Salt and in Cairo.⁵ But from Abdallah and the majority of his subjects the Treaty of 1948, which is still binding, won a ready acceptance. Life for him was less complicated than it was for Nuri Sa'id of Iraq.

FIRST ELECTIONS

The first Parliamentary elections were held in Transjordan on October 20, 1947. Their form, however, was strange enough. One hundred thousand male Transjordanians over the age of 18 had been registered as electors by Samir Rifa'i Pasha, who had been Prime Minister since February 1947. These 100,000 were estimated by him as one-sixth of his country's total population — he was more optimistic than the British Government about the size of Transjordan. They were to elect 20 representatives for the Lower House. Only one political party, the Government-sponsored "Al-Nahda" (Revival), made its appearance. The chief opposition group, headed by Abu Ghanima, abstained, but

⁴ Treaty Series No. 26 (1948), Cmd. 7404.

⁵ *Al-Ahram*, March 4, 1948.

it voiced its protests loudly from the safety of Damascus: a "real" constitution should be drafted by a freely elected assembly; the Treaty with Britain should be repudiated, British troops should go; Abdallah's dreams of a Greater Syria and of other foreign adventures were leading him to ignore the social problems of his people. Abu Ghanima alleged, probably with some justice, that his supporters in Transjordan were under police surveillance. Some other critics, especially the financial expert Sulayman al-Nabulsi, stood successfully as independents.

It was not expected that there would be any sharp public interest in these elections. The comment of the Transjordanian Consul in Jerusalem, on refusing visas to two American journalists on the grounds that they had applied too late, indicated a political calm that was rare at election times in the East: "You know, these Americans have no patience, they are always in a hurry." Nevertheless, many candidates showed skill and energy in campaigning, even to the dropping of leaflets from planes flying over villages and Bedouin camps. Sixty percent of the electorate voted. The Government Party won handsomely, and was especially strong in Amman itself. It was still royal government, and nonresponsible: the Cabinet needed not Parliament's support, but the King's. The new First Minister, Tawfiq Pasha Abu al-Huda, had been in and out of office since 1938, and had been Transjordanian delegate to the Alexandria Conference in 1944 which created the Arab League. By 1947, however, he was critical of the League and a strong advocate of the Greater Syria project. The elections were more significant as a demonstration of a united Transjordan front toward its neighbors than for any effect they might have on domestic policy.

RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES

In the latter part of 1947 Abdallah redoubled his efforts to manufacture a Greater Syria. Nuri Sa'id, then President of the Iraqi Senate, had discussed the proposed merger of the finances and the defenses of the two countries on his visit to Amman in April 1947. Abdallah followed it up by visiting Baghdad himself. In his speech from the throne in Amman, on the occasion

of troop reviews, in press releases, Abdallah came back repeatedly to his thesis of the unity of historic Syria. With the political atmosphere in the Arab countries highly charged because of events in Palestine, every movement on Syria's southern border, — especially Damascus' troubles with the Atrash family in the Jabal Druze — was attributed to the wily effendi in Amman. Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt accused Abdallah of sowing dissension in the Arab community at a critical moment. Abdallah replied by summoning a congress in September 1947, which expressed support for the Free Hijaz movement.

Following the session of the Council of the Arab League in Lebanon in October 1947 which discussed a strategy for Palestine, a delegation headed by Azzam Pasha visited Amman to satisfy itself of Abdallah's loyalty to the League's authority. When discussing the value of the meeting with Abdallah, the delegation and the Arab press expressed its customary unanimity. In fact, at a time when all the Arab leaders were vying with each other in bellicose declarations, Abdallah pleaded for the maintenance of order in Palestine and for a peaceful solution. The strain on Transjordan-Syrian relations remained such as to necessitate a personal meeting of President Shukri Quwwatli and Abdallah at Deraa in May 1948, by which time effective unity of action on the Palestine question had become imperative. At the same time, Abdallah announced that he would take personal command of the armies of Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon when they moved into Palestine.⁶ On the British withdrawal from Palestine on May 15, 1948, Iraqi and Transjordan troops occupied Jericho and the central section of the Judean hills and began the battle for Jerusalem. Streams of refugees began to cross the River Jordan. By the end of July, Abdallah was the sole Arab ruler with conspicuous territorial and military gains. Nevertheless, he accepted the Palestine truce requested by the Security Council. The tolerance that he later showed toward Israel was easier to endorse in distant London or Washington than in the hills of Galilee.

⁶ One of the influences brought to bear on Abdallah was an Arab League guarantee to pay his army the £2 million armed subsidy hitherto supplied by Britain.

ANNEXATION OF ARAB PALESTINE

By March 1948 it was already clear that the situation in Arab Palestine had turned in Abdallah's favor. The Arab League had denied the Palestinian Arab Higher Executive all the important military commands and blocked much of its political influence. *De facto*, Abdallah's Arab Legion was in the country, and *de jure* as guardian of Palestine's frontiers, he had a better claim to the allegiance of the territory than any rival. In Central Palestine, all who wished to preserve the semblance of order looked to Abdallah — mayors, small traders, enemies of the Husaynis like the Nashashibis and the Tuqans. It seems clear now that after the failure of the efforts of Brig. Clayton, the British Minister for Arab Affairs in Cairo, to maintain a unified Arab front at the Arab League Conference, Britain began to turn primarily to support of Abdallah. To Palestine Arabs, the Transjordan Treaty with Britain seemed to suggest London's endorsement of his policy. Historically, Northern Transjordan and Central Palestine had frequently been united — it was the separation which was unusual. The Peel Report in 1937 had approved the merger as economically and politically desirable.

Five days before the transfer of authority from Britain to the United Nations Palestine Commission, an Arab Legion mission headed by Brig. Glubb visited the pro-Abdallah leaders — the Mayors of Hebron and Gaza, Shaykh Muhammad Jabari and Rushdi Shawwa respectively. On May 15 the Legion occupied Jericho and took control over a large part of Northern Judea; along with the Iraqi levies it continued from then on in effective occupation of the area, including the Old City of Jerusalem. The only strongly dissenting voice was that of the Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni speaking from Gaza in September, where he was supported by Egyptian troops.

By October 1948 Abdallah had organized in the "National Palestine Congress" an opposition group to the Gaza government. It won strong support in Central Palestine — from Ahmad Bey Khalil, the former mayor of Haifa, from Sulayman Tuqan, and from Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, former leader of Palestine Istiqlal and keen advocate of a Greater Syria. Abdallah was considering

the formal setting-up of a government of his own in Nablus, when the step was made unnecessary by the defeat of the Egyptians in the Gaza sector in October. While riots were occurring in Cairo, Alexandria, and Damascus, and the Prime Minister of Syria was in flight, pilgrimages of supporters continued to Amman. Under Abdallah's pressure, the question of the recognition of the Gaza government was removed from the agenda of the Arab League. The Palestine Congress held a second meeting, this time in Jericho, where Shaykh Jabari presided over 2,000 Arabs, mayors, tribal leaders, *mukhtars*, military governors, and delegations from Arab Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and the refugee camps. Along with a call for the continuation of the struggle for liberation went a demand for the union of Arab Palestine with Transjordan under the title of "South Syria," and the establishment of an advisory committee of Palestine Arabs to assist Abdallah.

For the first time, the question of the future government of the territory was raised. As if to confirm the durable nature of the new arrangement, though no doubt merely as coincidence, the British Government declared on the same day as the Jericho meeting that British forces would defend Transjordan if it were attacked. The decisions of the Jericho Conference were confirmed by the Transjordan Cabinet four days later, and by its Parliament ten days later; every "legal and international" measure was to be taken, it declared, to translate them into effect. Religious leaders came to Abdallah's support — he was declared King of Palestine and Transjordan in the name of Allah and the Prophet.

Shades of Damascus and 1920 and the establishment of Faysal! But the Arab world had changed since 1920. The creation of Faysal's Kingdom had been greeted with rejoicing by its neighbors. In 1948 *Akhbar al-Yawm* described the Jericho declaration as a "stab in the back for Islam." The Mufti breathed fire — and veiled reports reached the West, via the Beirut correspondent of the *News Chronicle* and the Hebrew newspaper *Ha-Dor*, that his Syrian supporters were responsible for an attempt on Abdallah's life in Amman in December. The Mufti's fulminations were repeated by every Arab capital: the Arab

armies had entered Palestine to liberate it from the Jews, not to minister to Abdallah's ambitions; Abdallah's action, declared Shukri Quwwatli, the Syrian President, was inconsistent with the national and humanitarian aims for which the Arab armies had entered the Holy Land. Even Hashimite Iraq joined the chorus. Only distant Yemen, mindful of Abdallah's support in its own difficulties a few months earlier at the time of the Imam Yahya's assassination, voiced timid approval.

It mattered little. The Muslim ulemas of Palestine told 'Al-Azhar to mind its own business; Jabari addressed a scornful open letter to King Faruq; and on December 20, 1948, Abdallah appointed Shaykh Hisam al-Din Jarallah, M.B.E., a former official of the Palestine Government, to replace Hajj Amin as Mufti of Jerusalem. This indeed was reminiscent of the events of 1920, for Jarallah had been a candidate for the office nearly thirty years before, when the British High Commissioner in his wisdom had selected Hajj Amin. He would be a rash prophet, however, who would suggest that Hajj Amin had ceased to count in the Middle East, for one might have thought the same in 1940. In October 1949 he took advantage of the pilgrimage to Mecca to visit Ibn Saud and to solicit aid against Abdallah. His agents continued to be active in the refugee camps in the Nablus area. But with the transfer of Arab Palestine to Abdallah and the loss of the office of Mufti, much of the basis of his appeal disappeared. In January 1949 two of his lieutenants, Kamil Arakat, former commander of Al-Futuwwah, the ex-Mufti's youth organization, and Munir Abu Fadhal, commander of his "Jihad" squadrons, joined Abdallah. It is not in the Arab character to back the losing horse indefinitely.

The military and diplomatic events of the summer of 1948 revealed much that hitherto had only been guessed at by observers of Arab politics. The Arab war against Israel was less a proof of Arab unity than an attempt to manufacture it. Abdallah's diplomatic victory in Palestine — his victory, that is, against his Arab allies — was due not only to their military weakness, their divided counsels, the corruption and inefficiency of their public services, but to his own freedom of action. Whatever originally he may have owed to Britain, he was not at all

bound by it in the summer of 1948. By that time, Abdallah's loyalty was rather to the handful of British officials in Transjordan who had trained his Legion and whom he personally liked than to any anonymity labelled the Foreign Office. In fact, when British officials in Transjordan heard him described as a British puppet, they must sometimes have wondered who was the puppet of whom. Personality in politics is apt to take little heed of statutory limitations: Abdallah had a will of his own, and like another great figure of our times, though more successfully, he had a faith in his own hunches, a readiness at times to ignore advice and advisers, which brought him rich rewards.

Apart from relations with Britain, he was free in other senses too. The vaunted unified command of the Arab troops never materialized, so as a Supreme Commander, Abdallah was never handicapped by staff officers from each Arab ally. The social backwardness of his country deprived him of any vigorous domestic opposition: the war that produced three *coups d'état* in Syria and numerous alarums in Cairo only brought steadily greater prestige to the occupant of the Shunah Palace in Amman. He was fortunate also in his ally in Baghdad — Nuri Sa'id came to power again in Iraq in January. Finally, the United States Government recognized the Government of Transjordan for the first time on January 31, 1949.

Once the exhilaration of success had passed, however, there were real problems to be faced in cis-Jordan. Although Abdallah recognized the storm sweeping the Arab capitals and delayed final annexation, the responsibility of administration was already his. At the beginning of 1949 the Legion controlled Hebron, Bethlehem, Jericho, the Old City of Jerusalem, and Ramallah; in February Iraqi units began to transfer control of the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm "triangle" to the Legion also. This administration was centralized at Ramallah under a Governor-General of all Transjordan-occupied territory, 'Umar Matar Pasha. In March a military gave way to a civil administration. Partly this was in order to present a *fait accompli* to the Conference of Arab States that met in Beirut in April. It had, however, been only a matter of time, and timing: even in the Iraqi-held triangle, the local administration had been Transjordanian from

the beginning. Na'im Tuqan became Governor of Hebron District, Ahmad Khalil of the Ramallah and Samaria District. Although Abdallah al-Tall remained Governor of the Old City, he became a civilian. Transjordan citizenship was extended to all former Palestinian Arabs, but the British Mandatory Laws were to continue in operation until formally abrogated. On April 3, 1949, Transjordan and Israel signed an Armistice Agreement in Rhodes, whereby Transjordan's control of central Palestine was conceded. On May 3, the Transjordan Cabinet was reformed to include three Palestinian Arabs. In June came a new and euphonious title: the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan.

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM⁷

By October 1948, it had been estimated that there were 200,000 refugees in Transjordan-controlled territory. By the spring of 1949 the estimate had risen to 300,000. In Ramallah, there were thought to be 80,000; in the Nablus area, 50,000. In the Samaria area, the figures were put as high as 130,000 in April 1949. Ahmad Bey Tuqan, when acting as Jordan's observer at the U.N. Special Political Committee Hearings on the Arab refugees in November 1950, estimated that the total had then reached 500,000, and that there were in addition, he thought, a further 100,000 who had lost their means of livelihood as a result of the war. This total of 600,000 was more than half again the estimated total population of Transjordan before the Palestine war began.

In the figures she compiled in the summer of 1949, Miss Thicknesse considered that there were 88,000 refugees in Transjordan and 220,000 in central Palestine. The U.N. representatives in the spring of 1949 described the 300,000 inhabitants of central Palestine as "still in their homes but virtually ruined" and therefore qualifying for relief. From the beginning, the problem for the U.N. was made especially difficult by the poor living conditions of the non-refugee groups, frequently indistinguishable from that of the refugees proper. The poverty of

⁷ Figures cited from S. G. Thicknesse, *Arab Refugees: A Survey of Resettlement Possibilities* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949).

the country and its lack of water, the claims of the existing population to what land there was, the grazing rights of the Bedouin, the lack of capital and of trained administrators, the intractable character of the refugee groups, the political uncertainties — these handicapped what goodwill and resources were available from the U.N. or in Jordan itself.

Despite all the difficulties they would have to face, the refugees were encouraged by Abdallah to settle in Jordan. In giving them shelter, he was being true to the traditions of hospitality and succor of his people; and he was continuing his nation-building, not only by the numbers but by the greater skills of the Palestinians. But this policy brought many difficulties, quite apart from the humanitarian and social issues raised by the condition of the refugees. It delayed the Greater Syria project for some two years; by the westward shift in Jordan policy it may even have destroyed what force there was in the dream of Syrian unity. The anti-Israel note was strengthened, a direction which was in contrast, as we have seen, from Abdallah's earlier maneuvers.⁸ When a deputation of Arab mayors from Samaria visited Amman in April 1949 pressing for a renewal of the war against Israel, Abdallah put the blame for the armistice with Israel on British and American pressure. The refugee groups brought new problems, too, to the economy of Jordan.

In the spring of 1949, Abdallah approached Britain for a loan to help him undertake some development projects. Mr. Mayhew, then Under-Secretary to Mr. Bevin, told the House of Commons on May 4 that an interest-free loan of £1 million had been advanced for this purpose. Abdallah had already put a scheme of his own into effect, entirely financed by Transjordan — the Wadi al-Arab project, inaugurated near Shunah, for a dam and irrigation channel designed to irrigate 7,500 acres and to provide land for an additional 100,000 families. Plans were made also for the building of a new airfield at Jericho and for a road from Amman to Aqaba. The most important Arab-devised scheme,

⁸ Abdallah had to tread very warily here. He seems to have been genuinely sympathetic to a permanent settlement with Israel, if only to secure his own *de facto* boundaries. He aimed also at securing an outlet to the sea either at Gaza — prevented by the Egyptian occupation of that area — or north of it. His plans for a settlement and for a nonaggression pact with Israel were a constant grievance to his neighbors, and to the Arab League.

however, was that of Musa Bey Alami, the founder of the Arab Development Society, who drew up plans for agricultural development and for model villages in the Jiftlik district in the Jordan Valley. The Transjordan Government promised a 5,000-acre concession and customs exemption for equipment, and the Iraq Government helped with a grant of £P500,000.⁹ Expert advice was as necessary as capital, however, and in September 1949 the engineering firm of Murdoch McDonald was engaged as consultants. This firm accepted parts of the Hays Plan for a Jordan Valley Authority — the drainage of the Huleh area, the value of a Mediterranean-Dead Sea power system, the diversion of the Litani River into the Jordan basin. To them, however, the overwhelming need was for an international authority for the whole area, and it seemed to them that the cost of major schemes had been underestimated. The Clapp Mission's report to the U.N.¹⁰ reinforced the case for an international authority, and suggested two pilot projects for Jordan, one the development of the Wadi Qilt in Arab Palestine, the other a \$6-million development project for the Wadi Zirqa east of the Jordan. With an optimism drawn from American rather than Arab experience, Mr. Clapp suggested that these projects would allow the Jordan Government to gain "know-how" for later projects.

There was no dearth of projects, but they were largely paper plans. At the time, both the Arab League and the majority of the refugees thought more of return than of resettlement. This hope was slowly abandoned, and in proportion as it was abandoned, criticism of U.N., Britain, and Amman began to mount. Despite the work of UNRWA and despite the generosity of individual U.N. members, not enough capital was forthcoming appreciably to alleviate conditions in the refugee camps. In March 1951, the Arab League made a virtue of necessity when it recommended the resettlement of the refugees in their present surroundings so far as possible.

In the meantime the refugee situation had brought about serious economic deterioration. By the spring of 1950, reports were circulating among refugees of mismanagement of relief funds —

⁹ For a more complete report of this project, see pp. 497-501.

¹⁰ *Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission to the Middle East (Lake Success, 1949)*.

an unpleasant case had come to light in Bethlehem in September 1949 involving forgery of Red Cross food ration cards. The poverty in Central Palestine was such that in 1949 for the first time in human memory there was no pilgrimage to Mecca. There was not only chronic poverty — not at all new — but Governmental unwisdom. Unemployment was higher than ever before on record — no estimate put it lower than 70 percent, and in October 1949 *Falastin*, the Old City daily, put it as high as 98 percent of the “workers” in Arab Palestine. One of the major causes seems to have been the work of the Government Committee for Imports. Even the moderate *Al-Nahda* described its policy as “chaotic” and suggested that bribery was a main influence in the issue of import licenses. Importers with long experience were unable to obtain licenses, new and inexperienced firms made their appearance. Little protection was given to local industry — the soap industry of Nablus suffered acutely and at one stage came almost to a stand-still — and little encouragement to exports. There were other causes of economic difficulty: the loss of the Israel market, which before 1948 had absorbed 90 percent of Transjordan’s exports; the poverty and misery of the refugee camps; the surplus of luxury goods no longer exportable westwards, plus a poor harvest and famine conditions in the south. It was a pointer to future difficulty that in August 1950, six months after the Ministry for Refugee Affairs had been abolished on the grounds that all refugees had been absorbed, a Jordan anti-Communist law was extended to Arab Palestine. When Transjordan prepared a special budget for the occupied areas of Palestine in 1949–50, it allotted well over one-quarter of it to police and prison services. Of the budget for the Old City of Jerusalem, approximately 75 percent went to salaries, police, and administration.

It is easier to criticize this situation than to see what Abdallah could have done, given the poverty of his national resources and his exchequer. The normal Transjordan budget prior to 1948 was approximately £1 million per year — much less than the annual British grant for the maintenance of the Legion. Abdallah was not accustomed to economic issues of this magnitude, and he was, naturally enough, preoccupied with the political issues

involved in the control of his new area. Indeed, the appointment of the venerable and venerated Raghib Bey Nashashibi, former Mayor of Jerusalem, first to the new post of Minister of Refugees (August, 1949) and then as the first Palestine Arab to the Governor-Generalship of Arab Palestine (September), was designed as much to bridge the gap between control and formal absorption as to improve refugee conditions. Abdallah was concerned too with the public security and defense of the area. In August 1949 Ahmad Bey Tuqan, then Director of Education in Arab Palestine, announced that all secondary school pupils were to receive military training. In September a National Defense Movement was created to act as an auxiliary to the Arab Legion — and as recruiting agency too. The training was to be given by Arab Legion officers. New camps were to be built, and villages north and south of Jerusalem and in the triangle were to be re-fortified. In February 1950 a law was passed enforcing compulsory military service for all men over twenty.

In March 1949 Britain had increased its grant to the Legion from £2 million to £3.5 million. On his visit to Britain in August, Abdallah argued forcibly that this was inadequate. The League needed, he argued, to be doubled in numbers — its 9,000 men were now insufficient for their vastly increased duties — and it needed re-equipping in the light of its Palestine experience; it needed tanks rather than lightly armoured desert cars, and it needed aircraft. This involved the enlarging of Mafraq airfield — which would in itself cost about £3 million — and a scheme of air training. The beginnings of this scheme got under way in 1950, when officers for training were sent to Britain and an Army Staff College was set up at Zirqa. The first pilots trained in Britain paraded before Abdallah in July 1951.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN AN ENLARGED JORDAN

The core of Abdallah's interest remained the politics of his new territory, and its relation to his neighbors. He was ready at the beginning to use autocratic methods to curb opposition — that was the way it had been done in Transjordan, and the war with Israel gave him a ready excuse. Newspaper editors who criticized Amman, like Abdallah Rimawi — "I see heads in

Amman that need cutting" — of *Al-Ba'th*, or Kamal Effendi Nasir, editor of the Ramallah weekly *Al-Jil al-Jadid*, found themselves exiled to the desert frontier post of Al-Bayr. By June 1949 six Egyptian papers had been banned from Transjordan territory. State officials were forbidden to join political associations.

These were, however, only short-term expedients. Abdallah was making plans for the final incorporation of Eastern Palestine into his own Kingdom. It would bring not only a much larger population but a new quality, for the Palestine Arab was on balance better educated and politically more mature than the Transjordanian. Apart from teachers, merchants, and craftsmen, there was the Palestine Arab corps of administrators of the former Mandatory Government. As we have already seen, some of Abdallah's Transjordanian advisers were themselves Palestinians. When Abu al-Huda reconstructed his Cabinet in May 1949, he increased its numbers to nine, and the three new appointments went to Palestinian Arabs: Musa Nasir (Communications), Khulusi al-Khayri (Agriculture and Commerce), and Ruhi Bey 'Abd al-Hadi (later Pasha) (Foreign affairs). This last post, in fact, became almost a prerogative of the Palestinians. These three men had for long been connected with the Hashimites, and all had had Government experience under the Mandatory. 'Abd al-Hadi had originally been in the Turkish diplomatic service, then was Principal Assistant to the Chief Secretary in Palestine. Musa Nasir had been a District Officer in the Ramallah area and had progressive views on education — he founded the Bir Zayt school. Al-Khayri had been Director of the Arab (Propaganda) Office in Washington. Palestinians were promptly used as diplomats — Dr. Yusuf Haykal Bey, the former Mayor of Jaffa, was appointed first Jordan Minister to the U.S., and Edmond Bey Rock, a former Jaffa editor, went as Minister to Rome. The Jordan Press benefited — six dailies began to appear in Amman, including that edited by the blind Arab writer Shaykh Sulayman Taji Faruqi.

These men brought a new stimulus to political and social life, and a new challenge to the Government. Undoubtedly Abdallah's administration was strengthened, but the process was not uni-

formly successful, and it had implications of which Abdallah was perhaps not fully aware. Not all Palestinians were loyal — he lost some leading supporters to the Husaynis, and Abdallah al-Tall became a refugee and critic in Cairo. Some of his appointments were unpopular in Arab Palestine, because the officials concerned were regarded as deeply pro-British — especially Ruhi 'Abd al-Hadi and Musa Nasir.

Personalities apart, the acquisition of this better-educated but destitute and war-ravaged area radically altered the nature of government in Jordan. Until the summer of 1949, Abdallah was a King without a people. Government in Jordan had involved a direct relationship between a King of tribal origin and a Foreign Power with largely imperial interests. From now on, and increasingly, Government would conform to the frequent Middle Eastern pattern of a triangular relationship: a people, which whether urban or rural is steadily xenophobic; a foreign power, ready to be generous if its main interests are reliably served, rarely obtrusive, represented locally by a small but able group of unique figures, who had by this time acquired a double loyalty, to Amman as well as to London; and a ruler, maintaining his throne by the balance of power between the other two, always in appearance leading his people, never in fact leading them very far.

Abdallah's role indeed only became a "normal" one, in the Middle Eastern context, in 1949; until then, his position, like his peace of mind, was unusual, and exotic. Hitherto, he had played off an illiterate people, who had in practice neither a share in government nor a wish for it, against a beneficent imperialism, whose few officials on the spot were acceptable to the King. From now on, he had to handle a new area, long accustomed to government, suffering unusual hardships, with leaders who might be loyal enough to the Hashimite theme of Arab unity but were quick to differ from Abdallah on methods of attaining it — and who were especially ready to view his British patrons against a background very different from his own. More than that, Jordan had recently obtained its own Parliament, as Palestine had not, and the Palestinian Arabs were fully aware of the value of Parliaments for the discussion of grievances. On his

trip to Britain in 1949, Abdallah might well have taken time out to read the history of Elizabethan and Stuart England, for his country was reaching a similar point in its constitutional development.

The Palestinian Arabs differed particularly from the Transjordanian in their attitude to Britain. If they were anti-Israel in temper, they were equally anti-British, and, after the acceptance of defeat, even more anti-British than anti-Israel. When *Al-Ba'th* reappeared after its suspension in June 1949, it lost little time in declaring Britain the betrayer of Palestine. The demand was for an Arab state and an Arab army under an Arab commander. In August an "underground" was discovered, with links, allegedly, with Israel. The new stimulus Palestinians had brought to the press led in October 1949 to the appearance of an anti-Abdallah daily in Amman, *Al-Mithaq*. Both in trans- and in cis-Jordan, economic conditions were grist to the critic's mill. Abdallah's various expedients — the suggestion, never carried out, of moving his capital from Amman to the Old City of Jerusalem,¹¹ his weekly visits to the Haram al-Sharif, his tours of Palestine — could do little permanently to placate Arab criticism. They did serve one purpose — they helped to hinder the internationalization of Jerusalem, which his Arab neighbors were all too willing to support.

The nature of the change in Jordan's politics is best illustrated by the elections of April 1950. From 100,000 voters in 1948, the total had risen to 304,000, of whom 157,000 were in Arab Palestine and the rest in trans-Jordan. There were over 120 candidates for 40 seats, 20 to represent West and 20 East Jordan. All ran as independents, and 7 were returned unopposed (all in East Jordan). The campaign, like that in 1947, was less party-political than national: for Abdallah it was mainly a weapon whereby Arab Palestine might be converted and the Arab world impressed. He stressed the importance of the reconstruction projects of the U.N. Economic Survey (Clapp) Mission and he emphasized the value of peace with Israel — by no means a vote-

¹¹ On the contrary, it was decided in November 1950 to transfer all major government departments from Jerusalem to Amman. The move was to be completed by April 1951. The politics of the Old City were unpleasantly partisan.

catcher in West Jordan. One of the few editors who openly demanded it, and who stood as a candidate himself, Dawud al-'Isa, was defeated. To vote at all, declared the ex-Mufti, was to approve of Abdallah's annexation, and to accept as permanent the State of Israel. The annexation, he argued, meant the partition of Palestine between Jews and British.

The campaign was mild, on the whole. There were some disturbances in Hebron, Nablus, and the Old City, and there were some accusations of forged ballot papers: the voting in one area was said to be well over 100 percent. One example of the difference between elections in the East and in the West was afforded in the complaint of *Al-Sariah* in Nablus, which criticized the participation of Cabinet Ministers in elections. This, it thought, put a dangerous pressure on electors. Authority should be neutral, not responsible.

Some prominent critics of Abdallah were successful. They included the *Al-Ba'ith* group — Abdallah Rimawi in Ramallah and Abdallah Nawas, a Christian Arab, in the Old City — and some former supporters of the Mufti, including Kamal Arakat and Mustafa Bushnaq. Of the new Cabinet of 11 members, 5 were Palestinians. The new Prime Minister, Sa'id Pasha al-Mufti, was a Circassian. It had been announced in March that after the elections the Cabinet would be responsible to the new Chamber and not to the King. A few days after the election Abdallah appointed a new Senate of 20 members, most of whom were royal supporters and 7 of whom were Palestinians. On April 24, the two Houses formally approved the annexation of Arab Palestine. Without prejudice to the final settlement of Israel's boundaries, Jordan was now a single Kingdom. In his Speech from the Throne, Abdallah declared that the reasons for this were as much economic and defensive as sentimental. West Jordan had been severed from its mother country too long — a reminder, perhaps, that expansion westward was only one of Abdallah's ambitions. With reservations on the boundary issue and on the future status of Jerusalem, Britain approved the merger on April 27. Neither in the West nor in the Middle East was there anyone to deny Abdallah's claim. What was significant was not the two years' delay in formalizing it, but the link-

ing of annexation with the opening of the new constitutional chapter in the country's history.

That chapter did not begin auspiciously. Press censorship had to be reimposed in September 1950. After the merger, the resentment formerly visited by Arab Palestine on Jew or Briton was pointed toward Amman. The Palestinian deputies, supported by their colleagues in the Amman press, had on occasion a majority in the new Parliament, and criticism of Abdallah increased steadily: attacks were made on his failure to aid the refugees, on the Greater Syria notion, on the pro-Israel trend, on the reputed power of Glubb Pasha. In October 1950 the Cabinet was reconstructed. 'Abd al-Hadi returned to the post of Foreign Minister, and a close friend of the King's, 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha Khalifah, became Minister of the Interior. Either because he genuinely had faith in the slow workings of the democratic spirit, or because he had greater faith in the skill of these two officials, Abdallah allowed an opposition "National Front" party to become legal at the same time. Its leader was Sulayman al-Nabulsi, a former Minister, and its organ was *Al-Mithaq*, which began to run a popular daily complaints column. It proved all too popular: it was closed down in March 1951. In December 1950 Parliamentary criticism of the British connection rose to a crescendo; it was alleged that inaccuracies in maps prepared by Glubb Pasha had permitted Israel's occupation of the Rutenberg border area, and that the Legion had been inactive in resisting it. Abdallah imposed a press censorship on Parliamentary proceedings, and this added fuel to the flames. Sa'id Pasha al-Mufti resigned in December on grounds of ill-health. He was succeeded by Sa'id Pasha Rifa'i.

The final blow to hopes of easy constitutional development came with Parliamentary rejection of the budget in May 1951. In January Abdallah had sought a further loan and an increased grant for the Legion from Britain. He asked also for the release of Palestine Arab sterling. A new agreement was concluded in March; Jordan was to pay £1 million toward the liabilities of the former Palestine Government and £15,000 annually toward the pensions of the former officials of the Mandatory Government. In making its payment, Jordan would relinquish £500,000

of its share of the surplus of the Palestine Currency Board, and the remaining £500,000 would be funded at interest and would be paid over fifteen years. The May budget, however, showed a deficit of £2 million. The expenditure on public services, salaries, and defense rose by 30 percent over the previous year. Though the development project for the port of Aqaba was mentioned, Parliament rightly thought the reconstruction schemes inadequate, and rising costs were making them steadily less possible. The opposition howled for economy in the public services, and especially in the police. The difficulty was that Abdallah had conceded freedom of debate and discussion of finance in a country where the economic equilibrium is difficult to maintain and where so far it had remained favorable only because of British grants-in-aid. Richard Crossman has pointed out that a £40 million loan to resettle the refugees would "remoralize the little country." Without it, or similar financial resources, experiments in constitutional government in Jordan seem to be a noble risk. When the budget was referred back to the Cabinet, Abdallah dissolved Parliament and announced in May 1951 that new elections would take place in three months. The Budget proposal was meanwhile to be put into force under a temporary law.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the ultimate significance of these new constitutional trials and experiments, Jordan's strength has increased over the last three years in a diplomatic, a military, and a "prestige" sense. It would be foolish to judge its place in the Arab world by the size of its budget alone: the Legion has proved its military value and has given a new security to the Eastern deserts; the dynastic links with Iraq and the diplomatic links with Turkey are close; whatever the recent past may indicate there is in Jordan a political reliability that is not to be found in Syria or, perhaps, in Egypt; the merger with Arab Palestine has been accomplished with an ease few could have foreseen in 1947 or early 1948.

Many students of the Arab world have been ready to conclude in recent years that the Sharifian policy of Lawrence was a mistake, that Britain might have been wiser to listen to Cox and

Philby and the Indian school. There may be some truth in this reasoning. It is, however, equally striking that it was a member of the Sharifian family — though one whom Lawrence appreciated little — who showed not only consistent loyalty to Britain but a patience and a moderation that is unusual in Arab politics today. Abdallah was sane and shrewd. If his pleas for the unity of the Arab peoples reflected Hashimite ambitions, his statecraft reflected realism. As he declared at Nablus in January 1949, "There is a time for fighting, and a time for waiting." There is a truth here not limited to the Arab world.

On July 20, 1951, the little king in Amman, on his weekly visit to the Haram al-Sharif, paid the price of his moderation and his sanity. His murder was the act of a certain Mustafa Shukri 'Ashu, a twenty-one-year-old tailor in Jerusalem, allegedly an adherent of the ex-Mufti. Abdallah's efforts to build up a constitutional government for his enlarged kingdom had helped to bring about his own death. Although the exact causes of the deed are not yet fully known, it is safe to assume that among them are the fanaticism, the social distress, the anti-Hashimite, anti-British, and anti-Israel sentiments sketched in this paper.

His death checks many hopeful developments in Jordan and removes a linch-pin from the British — and Allied — security system of the Middle East as a whole. Jordan may be restless and liable even to civil war, which some of its neighbors may be happy to foster. Western long-range strategic planning may need modification. Israel may find the task of keeping the peace with its neighbors more difficult: bellicose declarations and hostile acts against Britain and Israel might at least, in the present climate, give security against assassination. With the dreamer's death, his Greater Syria plan fades. And the center of the political gravity of the Arab East, which for some three years has been in Amman, moves back to Cairo. Whatever the ex-Mufti may gain, the Cairo-Saudi Arabia axis no longer has any serious opposition to face in the councils of the Arab League. Next to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the deed of destruction wrought by the tailor of Jerusalem may be the most pregnant single event in the Middle East since 1945.

RURAL SOCIAL CENTERS IN EGYPT

Beatrice McCown Mattison

EGYPT'S VITAL PROBLEM, unlike that of any other country in the world, is clearly and quickly visible. No traveler entering Egypt during the day by air can fail to be impressed by the narrowness of the green cultivated strip bordering the Nile and the vastness of the deserts on either side. No visitor walking down a city street or through a country town or even driving along a country road can fail to be struck by the crowds of human beings who seem to swarm everywhere. No statistics are needed to prove that the 3 percent of Egypt which is not desert is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. However, even this visual evidence attains sharper focus from the statistics: 19,088,839 people are living on 5,963,059 acres of land (1947 Census); between 15 and 16 million of these people are directly dependent on the land for their living. This represents a higher density of population per square mile than can be found in the highly industrialized countries of Europe although the bulk of the population in Egypt is rural. Yet unlike India and China, where famine so frequently carries away large segments of the population, death from starvation is a rare occurrence among the fellahin of Egypt.

What extraordinary set of circumstances makes this possible? The first answer is the almost incredible fertility of the Nile Valley. For centuries the Nile has been depositing each year in Egypt the rich silt brought from Central Africa. Thus though the area watered by the Nile is limited, its fertility is annually replenished. This the Egyptian cultivator appreciated at a very early date. For thousands of years he has encouraged and induced

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the Nile to spread as far as possible over the land on either side of its banks during the height of its flood in July and August. Thus, even without the aid of extra fertilization, the cultivated area has always been able to produce crops at an astonishingly high yield per acre. However, since the latter part of the 19th century the ancient system of basin irrigation¹ has been largely superseded by perennial irrigation, made possible by the construction of great dams and barrages. This change in technique has meant not only fuller use of the Nile water but also a more intensive use of the land under cultivation. In the past only one crop per year could be produced on a given area because for parts of the year the land was either without water or was flooded. Now, in the four-fifths of the cultivated area of Egypt where perennial irrigation is in use, it is possible to produce one and a half to two crops a year and at continuing high yields per acre.²

To maintain these high yields under such exhaustive cropping has necessitated a heavy use of artificial fertilizers, mostly imported — a situation the dangers of which became obvious during World War II when the importation of fertilizers was sharply reduced. Moreover, more frequent watering of the land has brought about a dangerous rise in the water table where perennial irrigation is practiced and a rapid increase in the spread of bilharzia, one of the dread endemic diseases which sap the vitality of the fellahin. It has also made possible a rapid increase in population disproportionate to the increase in agricultural land. In the past fifty years the population of Egypt has increased by 96.8 percent while agricultural land has increased by only 12 percent,³ the rate of increase in agricultural land having been considerably slower since 1917 while the population has grown at almost the same pace throughout this period. The

¹ Under this method the entire cultivated area is divided into an elaborate system of basins watered by an equally elaborate system of canals. During the period of the Nile flood in July and August, these basins are flooded for a fortnight, after which the water is returned to the Nile, having deposited its precious load of silt.

² The average wheat yield is 17 hundredweight per acre, nearly as high as that of Great Britain; corn gives the highest yield per acre in the world; while cotton, the principal export crop, yields an average of 606 lbs. per acre compared with 238 in the United States and 368 in the Soviet Union. Doreen Warriner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (London and New York, 1948), p. 29.

³ From a paper prepared by Dr. Ahmed Hussein Pasha, former Minister of Social Affairs, for the Third Agricultural Conference held in Cairo on March 26, 1949.

sharp rise in crop yields has kept the country from a serious threat of starvation, but has not protected a large part of the population from malnutrition. Nor has this increased productivity of the land been able to prevent a serious drop in real income per head of rural population.

It may be asked why this situation has not been relieved by the flow of agricultural workers into industry. To a very limited extent this has been true. But the tragic fact remains that opportunities for non-agricultural work in Egypt are few in relation to the numbers available for employment, and by and large the worker in the city or town, even though his money income per year is higher than it would be in the country, generally lives in conditions more detrimental to health and of greater poverty than those in rural areas. Consequently, approximately 70 per cent of Egypt's population is still dependent on agriculture.

LIVING CONDITIONS AMONG THE FELLAHIN

The ability of the Egyptian peasant to survive, and even to increase in number, has been due largely to his ability to maintain existence at an extraordinarily low level. He is, on the average, one of five children, representing the survivors of 8 to 10 births, and has a life expectancy of 38 years.⁴ He lives in a one- or two-room mud brick house, which accommodates all members of his family, including probably several relatives and such livestock and poultry as he may possess.⁵ He may own some land since over 50 per cent of those actively engaged in agriculture are also land-owners. However, the area will be small because 72.1 per cent of those owning agricultural land in Egypt in 1948 owned less than one acre, and 94.2 per cent owned under five acres. Therefore he must supplement his income by working as a day laborer on a large estate or by becoming a tenant on a sharecropper or cash-rent basis. Due to the rapid increase of population in proportion to available land, rents are very high, frequently exceeding net farm income. In such a case, the Egyptian tenant farmer receives,

⁴ The Egyptian birthrate is one of the highest in the world, averaging over 40 per thousand, but the infant mortality rate is likewise high, 1 out of every 4 children born dying during its first year, and another dying before it reaches the age of 5. Charles Issawi, *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis* (London and New York, 1947), pp. 44, 45.

⁵ Henry Habib-Ayrout, S. J., *The Fellaheen* (Cairo, 1942), Chap. VII, "The Fellah at Home."

in effect, no compensation for his labor or that of his family or livestock.⁶ With a current average rent of about £E30 per acre of agricultural land and average revenues of about £E55 per acre,⁷ it is obvious that the fellah is going to have a hard time keeping out of debt, particularly in view of the fact that for approximately 95 percent of the agricultural families annual per capita income is less than £E10.⁸

The gravity of the situation is obvious, and despite the widely accepted belief that the fellah is passive and unrebelling, there is always the danger that even he might no longer remain inert should his meager existence deteriorate further. That there is a grave possibility of such deterioration became apparent during the depression years of the early '30's when the drop in the fellah's money income exceeded the drop in prices of things he had to buy.

Aware of the problem in all its aspects, members of the Egyptian Association for Social Studies decided, in 1936, to inaugurate experimental programs in three different villages to attempt to improve the lot of the fellahin. The attack was not to be limited to one phase only of peasant life but to reduce poverty, disease, and ignorance simultaneously. These early experiments by a private group showed such promise that one of the most important objectives of the Ministry of Social Affairs, newly established in 1939, was to set on foot a government-sponsored program to raise the standard of living of the fellahin. This program actually got under way in May 1941 when five agricultural experts were dispatched to five different villages. Six more Rural Social Centers were established in 1943. The success of the first eleven was so convincing that in 1946 it was decided to make the program nationwide with the ultimate goal of a Rural Social Center for every village or group of villages numbering 10,000 people. By 1950 there were in fact 126 Rural Social Centers serving nearly a million and a half fellahin, and the aim was to

⁶ Dr. Ahmed Hussein Pasha, *loc. cit.*

⁷ Latest figures from the Ministry of Social Affairs. Also Dr. Labib Saad, "Standards of Living in Minufiya Province—Especially in Relation to Maldistribution and Fragmentation of Land Holdings," *Second Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States of the Middle East* (Cairo, 1950), p. 241. The £E is equivalent to \$2.88.

⁸ Dr. Mohamed Munir el-Zalaky, "The Functional Relationship between Low Agricultural Incomes and the Low Agricultural Standard of Living in Egypt," *Second Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States of the Middle East* (Cairo, 1950), p. 422.

establish additional Centers at a rate of 30 to 40 per year. Unfortunately, lack of funds and trained personnel has prevented expansion at this rate, but progress nevertheless continues.

THE RURAL SOCIAL CENTERS PROGRAM

What is the Rural Social Centers program, and how does it propose to perform the Herculean task of raising the standard of living of the rural population of Egypt? The program, as envisaged by Dr. Ahmed Hussein Pasha, former Minister of Social Affairs, and his associates in the Fellah Department is a vigorous and many-sided attack on all the factors immediately responsible for the improverished conditions under which most of the fellahin pass their days. For example, it was reasoned that a scheme to improve health and sanitary conditions in a particular area would prove inadequate if the income level remained so low that the people were victims of chronic malnutrition. On the other hand, projects to increase incomes could be conducted only through a program of education and would, in turn, be unsuccessful without improved health since a high proportion of the fellahin are chronically weakened by bilharzia, ankylostomia, tuberculosis, and malaria, not to mention eye diseases. To be effective, all three major problems — health, education, and income — must be tackled simultaneously. But the most striking feature of the program is that these benefits are not to come in the form of manna from Heaven, that is, through the activity of the Government alone. Initiative in inaugurating such a program in a particular area must come from the people; they must contribute money, land, and labor to put it into operation; and as the Center becomes more firmly established, the direction of its activities becomes more and more their exclusive responsibility.

To those who may have accepted the view that the Egyptian fellah is incapable of showing initiative or of accepting responsibility, such a scheme seems foolhardy. Yet the Fellah Department has never wavered from its rule that the people will be helped best if they help themselves. In practice this meant that before the establishment of the first experimental Centers in 1941 each agricultural-social worker went to the area where it was

proposed to set up a Center and explained to the villagers how it would help them and what they would have to do to have one. Subsequently, this approach has often not been necessary since the Centers are their own best advocates. In fact, the Ministry of Social Affairs has received in recent years more requests for Social Centers than it can meet. These requests come largely from communities adjacent to already established Centers.⁹

ESTABLISHING A CENTER

The steps for setting up a Rural Social Center are simple and clearly defined. A community wishing such a Center sends in an application to the Ministry of Social Affairs. In reviewing the application the Ministry takes into consideration (a) whether there is an agricultural cooperative society in the community, (b) whether there are any serious conflicts between families which might obstruct the smooth running of the Center, and (c) whether there is such an inequality of wealth and land-ownership in the area to be served that the Center might be dominated by one or two wealthy landholders, thereby preventing its functioning as a democratic institution. Since the principle of widespread community participation is fundamental to the whole program, the community wishing a Center must be prepared to provide two acres of land for permanent buildings and grounds as well as £E1,500 toward the initial costs of construction and operation. Sometimes contributions to this sum are made according to financial ability and sometimes according to acreage owned, while in other cases the local cooperative society loans a substantial proportion. Occasionally one landowner contributes a large part of the initial £E1,500, but as a rule such a step is avoided since it runs the danger of reducing fellahin participation and the widespread pride of ownership basic to the entire program.

Once the application for a Center has been approved, the Government will contribute £E10,000 the first year. Of this £E6,000 is for buildings and £E3,000 for equipment and operat-

⁹ In 1948 there were 260 applications for the establishment of Centers, but the budget allocation limited the number to be set up to 30 for that year. Dr. Ahmed Hussein Pasha, "Rural Social Centers in Egypt," *Second Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States of the Middle East* (Cairo, 1950), p. 264.

ing expenses, while £E1,000 represents subsidies to the committees set up to run the Center. Its construction is discussed with the members of the community by a Fellah Department architect on the basis of a standardized, low-cost plan used by the Ministry. Meanwhile, during the period of construction, the community must provide temporary quarters so that the agricultural social worker may start his work. Frequently community buildings, such as those of the local cooperative society, are used during this period; a wealthy person may donate his property; or the community may rent spare rooms. Temporary agricultural demonstration work is conducted on the land of various farmers. When actual construction work begins on the Center, the members of the community donate their labor in addition to the initial financial contribution.

PERSONNEL OF A RURAL SOCIAL CENTER

On the Ministry's decision to establish a Rural Social Center, a young man and young woman are selected by the Ministry of Social Affairs to act as agricultural-social worker and health and welfare nurse respectively. Since the success of the Center depends, in large measure, on these two young people, their selection and training are extremely important. To be eligible for selection as an agricultural-social worker, the young man must be a graduate of one of the agricultural colleges. Upon application to the Cairo School of Social Work, he is chosen on the basis of personality and ability by a special committee composed of an educator, a psychologist, and a field worker delegated by the Ministry of Social Affairs. He is then sent for four months' specialized training to the Cairo School of Social Work, a private institution cooperating with the government, and at the same time receives field training at one of the already established Rural Social Centers. Upon completion of this special course, he is then sent out to set up a Center in one of the recently approved areas.

Usually the agricultural-social worker is twenty-one or twenty-two years of age and himself comes from a rural family, generally of modest means. If possible, he will be appointed to that part of the country from which he comes on the assumption that

he already knows much about the needs of the area but will not be sent to his immediate home town in order to avoid possible conflicts of loyalties. Since it is difficult to encourage the educated young Egyptian to live in the country, even though it may have been originally his home, special incentives are offered him to make life in the country more attractive. For instance, in addition to his regular salary as an Egyptian civil servant of his particular rank, the agricultural-social worker receives a free house in the Center and a special village allowance. Recently particular provision was made to pay him for overtime, since his duties are so heavy and of such a varied nature that it is virtually a 24-hour-a-day job. The provisions applying to the advancement of other civil servants are applicable to him also and at present advancement is fairly rapid due to expansion of the work of the Fellah Department. To keep his interest stimulated and to prevent his becoming stale on the job, he receives frequent visits from experts from the Ministry and attends regional and national conferences where he may compare notes with his fellow-workers. Every two years he is sent to the Cairo School of Social Work for additional study.

Nevertheless, there should be no illusion that the life of the agricultural-social worker is a particularly attractive one. In fact, it may be a dangerous one if the young man has the misfortune to arouse the ire of a wealthy landowner or a group of villagers, as has happened in one or two cases. Even with a pleasant little government bungalow as a refuge from the primitive conditions of an Egyptian village, isolation from the pleasures of the city must frequently seem complete, and only great enthusiasm for the work in hand can make such an existence seem worthwhile. In fact, it is his enthusiasm for the job as well as his determination to make a success of it that is one of the most striking features of the young agricultural-social worker. Also, it is his ability to transmit that enthusiasm to the people with whom he works, plus patience and tact in dealing with them, which will determine the success or failure of his particular Center.

The second key figure in the Rural Social Center is the health and welfare nurse. Unlike the agricultural-social worker, the

nurse usually comes from an urban family of modest means, since rural girls are customarily not allowed to work. After graduation from Kasr el-Aini Hospital in Cairo, the nurse receives special training in rural social services. It is a big step for a young woman of only twenty or twenty-one to leave her family and move to a village to take up a job which will involve a great deal more than nursing. Consequently special inducements similar to those offered the agricultural-social worker are also offered the nurse — living quarters in the main Center building, a special (though smaller) village allowance, and overtime pay. As a government servant, of course, she is eligible for advancement under civil service regulations. The nurse gives to the women in the village the leadership which the agricultural-social worker gives to the men. It is she who, under the program of education in health and sanitation, goes into the homes to see the women and encourage them to improve their surroundings as well as to use more modern methods of child care. Moreover, in addition to her duties involving the care of pregnant women, mothers, and children, she helps in training the women to do needlework and other handicrafts which will supplement the family income and tries to stimulate them to take a more active part in the work of the Center and the life of the community. Admittedly, upon her initial success as a nurse depends her influence upon the women in social affairs, since timidity in venturing beyond the confines of the home is still strong among the village women. However, once the first step has been taken in order to receive medical assistance, the next step of going to the Center for other forms of help and advice is not so difficult. Here, too, it is the nurse's enthusiasm for and devotion to her task which will determine how successful she is in overcoming prejudice and winning cooperation.

It is also the aim of the Rural Social Centers program to have a full-time doctor, graduate of an accredited medical college, permanently attached to each Center. However, the severe shortage of doctors in Egypt plus the inability of the Government to offer salaries at all commensurate with what can be earned in private practice in urban areas has meant that this goal is far from being fulfilled. However, where a full-time doctor is not

available, arrangement is made by the Center's Health and Cleanliness Committee for the services of a local doctor on a part-time basis, his salary being paid by the Committee with financial assistance from the Ministry of Social Affairs. In addition to the doctor there is a qualified laboratory assistant who is responsible for the medical supplies of the Center and the filling out of prescriptions and also does the Center's clerical work, including bookkeeping. A fifth important personality is the club leader, a young man of between twenty and twenty-five years of age from the local community. He must have completed at least four grades of primary school and, upon selection as club leader, is sent to Cairo for special training in club activities. He is paid by the Center's Education Committee and is responsible for work with the boys and young men in the community.

SELF-GOVERNMENT IN RURAL SOCIAL CENTERS

These five individuals at each Rural Social Center form the hub around which all the Center's activities revolve. However, theirs is by no means an autocratic rule, since it is one of the first duties of the agricultural-social worker to stimulate the setting up of a form of selfgovernment for his Center. All of the male members of the community who have contributed financially to the Center constitute the Assembly, which meets once a year and elects a Council for the coming year. The Council, in turn, represents a cross-section of the community, being composed of heads of families and delegates from schools, religious institutions, local government, and the various economic and occupational groups. This body is the local governing authority for the Center, combining both semi-legislative and semi-executive functions. It appoints members for five committees to do the immediate work and meets monthly to act on their reports and requests. In addition it takes up problems not handled by the committees and decides the annual budget on the basis of committee proposals.

The committees themselves cover all phases of the community's life and the Center's activities. For instance, the Conciliation Committee works with the village *'umdah* (mayor) to settle disputes between families, while the Charity Committee is responsible for helping the widowed and orphaned, unemployed and

unemployable. The Economic and Agricultural Committee has for its principal objective raising the economic level of the community. It works closely with the local cooperative society,¹⁰ if one exists, or establishes one if none has yet been set up. It encourages the establishment and growth of small industries and handicrafts to supplement agricultural income and works with the agricultural-social worker in trying to increase agricultural production through the use of more advanced techniques of cultivation, breeding of better livestock, employment of superior grades of seed, etc. The Education and Recreation Committee is composed of teachers and individuals with some educational background. Part of its program is to decrease illiteracy in the community by the establishment of a school, if none has yet been set up, and by adult education classes in the evening. It is also responsible for providing the Center with a radio,¹¹ setting up a small library, bringing films to be shown in the Center's lecture hall, and in general trying to help the villagers to a more constructive use of what spare time they have. The Health and Cleanliness Committee is composed of the most advanced members of the community, whose homes will set an example to others for cleanliness, sanitation, and healthfulness. It has the truly tremendous task of trying to turn the Egyptian village into a healthy, clean, attractive community. One of its first tasks is, under the guidance of the agricultural-social worker, to arrange for a supply of clean water for the villagers and to fill in the village pond, which is almost without exception a breeding place for malarial mosquitoes and a source of bilharzia and other diseases. It has also as its objective the establishment of a sanitary system of waste disposal and the extermination of flies and other disease-carrying insects by the use of DDT in the houses and by whitewashing the walls. It issues soap at the Center's baths and

¹⁰ The cooperative movement in Egypt was initiated privately as early as 1908 and received government recognition in 1923 with the first cooperative legislation. The movement has progressed steadily, until by the end of 1948 there were 2,009 cooperative societies with 774,106 members, of which 1,654 were agricultural cooperatives with 527,073 members. See Royal Government of Egypt, Ministry of Social Affairs, *Social Welfare in Egypt 1950* (Cairo, 1950), p. 40 ff.

¹¹ The Egyptian State Broadcasting Corporation has this year started a program of special broadcasts to the fellahin, offering programs of special interest to the rural population and employing Egyptian colloquial Arabic rather than the customary classical Arabic for the radio, which many fellahin did not understand.

laundries. It is also responsible for a program of lighting the village streets and gradual beautification of the village by planting trees, creating public gardens, etc.

THE CENTER'S ACTIVITIES

These committees correspond directly in their functions to the most pressing needs of the community they serve. It is through them that the Center must realize its aims since they both represent the wishes of the community and carry to the community the plans suggested by the agricultural-social worker for self-betterment. What, exactly, does the Center do for its community? First of all, its economic and agricultural services include a demonstration plot at the Center with the object of showing the farmer how he can increase his crop production. It also distributes improved seed and educates the farmers in the control of plant insect pests and diseases. In the field of livestock improvement, the farmers are taught to improve their stock, particularly the water buffalo (*gamussa*), by selection, breeding, and feeding to increase both milk and meat production. To this end the Ministry of Social Affairs supplied each Center, on loan, with two improved sires. The Center also engages in a campaign of poultry improvement by the purchase and distribution of improved chicks for the dual purpose of producing larger eggs and better birds for the table. On the demonstration plot it has modern beehives to show the fellah how he can improve both the quantity and quality of honey by abandoning the old mud hive and using a better strain of bees. The farmers are also encouraged to grow fruits and vegetables, which may both add to their income by sale in a local or urban market and improve their diet by consumption of any unmarketed surplus. In the same sphere of increasing income by new or improved lines of production, the Centers have engaged in a program of silk-worm rearing, distributing mulberry seedlings, cuttings, and boxes of eggs, particularly to the poorest families in the community.

In addition to projects for adding to the fellah's income in the field of agricultural production, it is part of the program of each Center to encourage and promote rural and home industries, utilizing local materials and enabling the fellah to make

beneficial use of his unemployed time, which is estimated at between four to six months of each year. Rug and carpet weaving, hand spinning and cloth weaving, mat weaving and date palm leaf industries are all occupations which are encouraged for the men while the girls are taught needlework and clothes-making under the supervision of the nurse and with the assistance of a handicrafts teacher attached to the Fellah Department of the Ministry of Social Affairs. In some Centers the making of bottled fruit juices has been encouraged. Depending upon the imaginativeness and ingenuity of the agricultural-social worker and upon local conditions, the possibilities of developing home and rural industries are numerous and have been accepted by the fellahin with an alacrity surprising to those accustomed to think of the Egyptian peasant as opposed to any change.

The health services of the Rural Social Centers are one of their most important functions and represent an attack upon the truly appalling problem of disease among the rural population of Egypt, both from the standpoint of cure and that of prevention. Each Center has its out-patient clinic with attached laboratory and dispensary as well as an examination room and small maternity ward for lying-in mothers. A small fee is collected for medicines and treatment from those coming to the clinic. This fee is based upon the person's ability to pay and ranges from 2 to 10 piastres (5¢ to 28¢). For the destitute the Charity Committee will pay this fee. As already indicated in discussing the role of the health and welfare nurse, great emphasis is placed in each Center upon the care of pregnant women, mothers, and children. In these activities the nurse is assisted by the village midwives, whom she directs and supervises. After a period of observation she selects two of the most promising young village women for a year's training in child welfare at the nearest hospital. These girls subsequently become her assistants in the clinic.

One of the aims of the Center is to persuade the women of the community to have their children in the clinic, where conditions are clean and proper care can be given. As inducements the mother is provided with free food for one week after childbirth and the baby is given two sets of free clothing. Moreover, each child born in the clinic may have regular medical supervision up to two years of age. The success of this program has

been astonishing. Eighty percent of the births in communities possessing Centers now take place in the Center's clinic, the remaining 20 percent being under the supervision of the Center's nurse. One of the striking features at each Center daily is the large number of women and children gathered in the nurse's and the doctor's waiting rooms for medical treatment. In fact, on an average 70 women and children come to each Center daily for medical services.¹² The nurse also makes regular visits to the schools to educate the children in cleanliness and organizes campaigns for both personal cleanliness and cleanliness in the home among women and children. Here the public baths and laundries at each Center are of material assistance. Moreover, by vaccinations and inoculations of children deathrates in some of the older Centers have dropped by almost two-thirds and the number of young men accepted for military service has doubled.¹³

The work of the Centers in combating endemic diseases absorbs a great deal of the time of the doctor, nurse, and agricultural-social worker. Fortunately modern medicine has provided cures for most of the diseases which debilitate the Egyptian fellahin. However, the problem is to prevent him from becoming reinfected once he has been cured. Therefore, in each Center there are posters depicting the parasites causing the most common diseases and how those parasites are acquired. The people are reminded constantly not to bathe in or drink impure water, particularly irrigation water, and are urged not to go barefoot. Small water projects have been established and pure water pumps introduced, and many Charity Committees donate shoes to needy children. Moreover, the disease-carrying potentialities of flies are emphasized and the people are urged to take every precaution against them. To those already familiar with the general Middle Eastern indifference to flies, it comes as a revelation to walk through a village, such as Sandyun, and see the babies' faces covered to protect them and youngsters brushing away the flies almost by reflex action. It is also surprising, in such a village, to observe how many of the children and young people are free of the more obvious eye-diseases.

It need scarcely be said that the same attention is given to

¹² Royal Government of Egypt, Ministry of Social Affairs, *Social Welfare in Egypt 1950* (Cairo, 1950), p. 27.

¹³ Dr. Ahmed Hussein Pasha, "Rural Social Centers in Egypt," *loc. cit.* p. 265.

epidemic diseases, and with marked success. One outstanding example was the very few cases of cholera in communities with Rural Social Centers during the epidemic of 1947. Thanks to prompt action in these communities, many were spared altogether, and in others where cases did occur, the situation was rapidly brought under control.

In contrast to the Center's economic and medical services, its social and cultural services are to a certain extent more preparation for the future than fulfilment of a present need. Nevertheless, this in no way detracts from their importance. It is characteristic of the vision of the organizers of the program that they were not content to try to alleviate only the most crying needs of the fellahin but realized that as these were met, others would develop on a less physical and materialistic level. Moreover, the economic and medical objectives of the Center could be achieved more rapidly if a higher percentage of the community were capable of reading literature made available to them or could be reached through lectures and other Center activities. Despite the fact that Egypt was the first Arab country to introduce compulsory elementary education (in 1925), still at the present time only 35.5 percent of the men and 13.4 percent of the women are literate.¹⁴ Basically the campaign against illiteracy falls within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, but by agreement the Rural Social Centers are responsible for elementary education of rural males between 12 and 25 years of age and rural females between 12 and 15 years of age, the Ministry of Education assisting with funds and school equipment. Moreover, at the suggestion of the Fellah Department, the Ministry of Education is now carrying on a program of setting up rural schools in conjunction with a Rural Social Center, these schools to direct the students' education along channels which will be most useful to them as breadwinners in a rural community.

Each Rural Social Center also sets up its own clubs; in some Centers Boy and Girl Scout groups have been formed. The popularity of the Center among the younger generation is manifest to any visitor. Whatever the time of day there are always some boys playing games on the Center's playing field or reading in the Center's small library, and invariably there are several young

¹⁴ Dr. Matta Akrawi, "Fundamental Education in the Arab World," *ibid.*, p. 88.

girls in the nurse's section of the building employed busily at their needlework. Clearly this ability to attract the young people of the community must be a very potent factor in advancing the Center's program.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS

The success of the Rural Social Centers cannot as yet be measured statistically. For one thing, the Centers themselves have been in existence for such varying periods that an over-all statistical analysis would present a misleading picture, understating attainments in some cases and overstating them in others. In addition an answer to the question, "Have the Centers succeeded in raising the net income of the fellah families in their areas?", will probably be wanting for some time. The fellah is still to wary of anything which might have a bearing on taxes to be willing to divulge accurate figures of such a nature. However, it is known that where silk-worm rearing was introduced, farmers were able to make an extra £E3 to £E7. Modern methods of beekeeping have doubled the output and improved the quality of honey so that the first year's produce sells for £E7 and the second for £E8. The use of improved cotton seed at one Center meant that the income per acre was £E13 more than from acreages planted with the poorer quality seed previously used. Vegetable and fruit cultivation at one Center added an average of £E10 to the incomes of the families engaged in this activity, with the result that other members of the community began putting part of their acreage to vegetables the following year.¹⁵

In the realm of medical services, statistics are equally elusive as an indication of what the Centers are doing for the people. The only over-all figures indicate the extent to which various types of diseases are treated monthly in the clinics.¹⁶ However,

¹⁵ For such facts and figures as are available on the attainments of Rural Social Centers, see Dr. Ahmed Hussein Pasha, "Rural Social Centers in Egypt," *ibid.*, pp. 266-68, and Royal Government of Egypt, Ministry of Social Affairs, *Social Welfare in Egypt, 1950* (Cairo, 1950), pp. 15-30.

¹⁶ The average number of cases frequenting each clinic monthly is as follows:

Internal diseases	242
Skin diseases	129
Ankylostoma	30
Eye diseases	227
Minor operations	15
Bilharzia	48

Ibid., p. 27.

this still leaves unanswered the question, "To what extent have the various diseases been permanently reduced?" In some Centers this can only be guessed at by the decline in the number of cases of a specific disease treated by the Center since its establishment. In others, the agricultural-social worker may have kept a running statistical check. In one Center visited by the writer, the agricultural-social worker stated that in the three years the Center had been in existence the incidence of bilharzia in the village had been reduced from 78 percent of the population to 24 percent and trachoma from 80 percent to 10 percent. One can only hope that statistics of a similar nature will be available in the near future for all the Centers.

However, statistics alone are only an approximate indication of the success of the Rural Social Centers. The most significant fact is that where a Center has been established surrounding communities are soon asking if they also may have one, despite the fact that such an institution cannot be had without some sacrifice on their part. Where improved methods of cultivation have been demonstrated by the Center, the farmers have been quick to adopt them. The same is true of the various means of supplementing family income. The health services of the Center are in constant heavy demand. In almost every phase of the Center's work the degree to which the fellahin have been quick to cooperate has been a source of astonishment to workers and observers alike.

Nevertheless, in recognizing the tremendous benefits of the Rural Social Centers, no one should be deluded into thinking the program a panacea for all the fellahin's ills. Certainly the members of the Fellah Department and the Ministry of Social Affairs do not consider it so. Nor should the rough spots and loopholes in the program be overlooked.

In the realm of day-to-day administration of the program the problem of coordination and cooperation between the various governmental agencies and their representatives in the field has not yet been entirely solved. Many of the activities of the Rural Social Centers overlap those of other government agencies in the field — Health and Education being the most obvious. In some places the agricultural-social worker has achieved a smooth-running working arrangement with his governmental colleagues.

In others this has not been the case. During the past year an interesting experiment was commenced at Sirs el-Layan, the largest village in Egypt, in Minufiya Province, the most overcrowded province in Egypt. Here the various government agencies have set up a cooperative venture to conduct activities similar to those of the Rural Social Centers on a regional, rather than a village, basis. The large hospital will come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health, the school under the Ministry of Education, agricultural work under the Ministry of Agriculture, and social welfare under the Ministry of Social Affairs. Though the buildings are now completed, personnel has not yet arrived to put the project into action. Needless to say, such a project can never take the place of the Rural Social Center in a small area, and the problem of governmental cooperation, both in Cairo and in the field, will always mean a process of constant adjustment.

Another aspect of the Rural Social Centers program which is under constant consideration by the Ministry of Social Affairs is its inability to reach many of the rural population who stand in need of its services. By its own terms the program is not available to a community so poor that it cannot make the necessary initial contribution. Likewise by its own terms the program is inapplicable to the large number of persons who live as tenants or laborers on the big estates (*exbas*) owned by wealthy landowners. The Ministry is fully aware of both these omissions. The first it has tried to meet by the formation of rural reform societies. These societies set up committees, similar to those at Centers, which carry out many of the same projects under the supervision of and with financial assistance from the Ministry of Social Affairs. This same arrangement has also been used in communities which requested Rural Social Centers but whose requests the Ministry was unable to grant due to budgetary limitations. Similarly, on government projects setting up new communities of poor families on recently reclaimed State land, rural reform societies are established until such time as the community is sufficiently prosperous to afford a Rural Social Center. At present there are approximately 35 such societies in existence, serving a population of 200,000.

With respect to assistance to those living on the big estates the problem is being tackled through special legislation. In 1950 a law was promulgated requiring the owners of large estates to provide certain sanitary conditions and improved housing for their workers. Among other things they must provide pure drinking water; a special area for the storage of organic manure and fuel stalks; first aid facilities; and housing which meets certain minimum standards of size, lighting, and sanitation.¹⁷ Other projects which the Ministry has in mind and which would serve particularly to improve the condition of the workers on *ezbas* are: (1) the establishment of minimum wage rates for rural workers in different provinces; (2) regulating the employment of migratory agricultural labor; and (3) regulation of the terms of land tenancy in rural areas. In 1950 legislation was passed authorizing the new Social Security Scheme,¹⁸ which provides pensions and allowances for widows with children, orphans, totally disabled persons (including the blind), and persons over 65 years of age. These provisions are applicable to the rural as well as the urban population and will cost the government about £E6 million annually. The first payments under this scheme were made by King Farouk in a special ceremony in May 1951.

One further comment of considerable gravity remains to be made with respect to the Rural Social Centers program. While it is of obvious immediate benefit to the fellahin, it carries within itself the seeds of future dangers. By improving health conditions and reducing mortality, it will in the long run tend to increase a population which is already dangerously high in relation to currently exploited national resources. Nor will the program of small rural and home industries alone be able to keep up with the ever-growing problem.

Many Egyptian agricultural economists argue that to solve the problems of population pressure in Egypt and the depressed condition of the fellahin, the Government must take measures considerably more fundamental and drastic than the Rural Social Centers program. It has long been popular to suggest rapid industrialization as a solution for the problem of population pres-

¹⁷ Law No. 118 of August 10, 1950, Imposing Social and Health Services on Certain Agricultural Land Owners.

¹⁸ Law 116/1950 on Social Security.

sure in predominantly agricultural countries, such as those of the Balkans. However, while admitting that much could be done along this line in Egypt, Egyptian experts point out that industrialization can solve only part of the problems of the country since Egypt is lacking in significant sources of power other than possible electricity from the great barrages and its important natural resources are essentially agricultural. Consequently industrialization beyond a limited degree would have to be based upon the importation of most of the materials employed in the manufacturing process and would therefore probably be unable to compete successfully with those countries which have natural advantage in mineral resources, raw materials, or highly skilled manpower. The answer to Egypt's problem, say these experts, lies in a large increase of the land available for cultivation since this is the sphere in which Egypt has long had natural advantage. Moreover, good land is available and lacks only water to make it blossom like the proverbial rose. Admittedly the projects suggested to date for bringing water to the desert areas of Egypt would involve very heavy expenditures initially but, it is believed, would be completely self-liquidating over a period of years. The land reclamation schemes being prosecuted by the Government at the present time should by no means be ignored, but they are subject to criticism for being small and cautious in relation to the need. Doubtless with the evergrowing pressure of population on the land larger-scale schemes will be undertaken in the near future.

No one in Egypt is more aware of the weaknesses in the Rural Social Centers program than those responsible for it. What seems, to foreign observers, the achievement of a major miracle in areas where Centers have been established is regarded by those responsible as only an approximation of what they hoped, and hope, to do. Nevertheless, no one previously familiar with Egypt will forget the workers at cooperatively owned handlooms pointing proudly to their first-aid box; the fresh water pump in a mudbrick house where the chickens and goats still share quarters with the family; the boys in *galabiyas* playing basketball with those in jerseys from the boys' club team; or the mothers sitting patiently with their babies in the nurse's waiting room.

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

HOPE FOR A settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis was kept alive during the summer by the success of the Harriman Mission in persuading the British and Iranians to reopen negotiations. Mr. Harriman, speaking as President Truman's special envoy, impressed upon the British the importance with which the United States viewed the political aspects of the dispute. He also assured them that the U.S. had no desire to see an American company fall heir to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's interests and operations in Iran. At the same time, Mr. Harriman's petroleum specialist, Mr. Walter Levy, made clear to Iranian Government officials why only AIOC could handle Iran's production at peak efficiency. For one thing, the Abadan refinery was of such hodge-podge construction that newly-arrived operators would have a difficult time trying to unravel its workings without coaching from the old hands. Because of the manner in which the world oil trade was organized, no American company would be willing to take over AIOC's operations, even if it had technicians available. Most important of all, without AIOC's co-operation no regular supply of tankers could be found to take away Iran's daily production of 700,000 barrels, and the Abadan refinery could not be turned on and off to accommodate an occasional tanker on a spot-purchase basis.

Despite U.S. pressure, the British Government (representing the AIOC) was reluctant to reopen negotiations without some assurance that the Iranian Government would interpret its nationalization law in practical terms. The Iranian Government was equally reluctant to negotiate without assurance that the British Government in accepting the "principle" of nationalization would also recognize it in practice. Given, however, the basic mutual interest in a settlement, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Levy were able to overcome these scruples

and negotiations reopened in Tehran on August 4. Discussion centered on four points: (1) Who was to manage the production of oil? (2) How much were the crude oil and products to be sold for? (3) Who was to buy and take away these products? (4) What compensation was to be paid AIOC for the surrender of its properties to the National Oil Company of Iran?

Early in the negotiations, Mr. Richard Stokes, the head of the British delegation, submitted an 8-point proposal for the settlement of these matters. In brief, the Stokes proposals suggested that an Operating Organization be set up under the authority of the National Oil Company of Iran to take charge of exploration, production, domestic transportation, refining, and loading. The make-up of this organization would be determined by agreement between the National Oil Company and a proposed Purchasing Organization, the justification for this being that the Purchasing Organization as a "normal commercial practice" would require assurance of a continuous flow of oil. There would be, as a matter of course, Iranian representation on the board of the Operating Organization, and the Organization would employ non-Iranians only to an extent necessary for efficient operation.

The oil and products produced by the Operating Organization would be sold at cost plus 50% of the difference between that sum and the normal commercial price, f.o.b. Mr. Stokes argued that the proposed Purchasing Organization would require this reduction from the commercial price before it would be willing to enter into a long-term (say, 25 year-) contract and commit large-scale transportation facilities. The Stokes proposals went on to suggest that this Purchasing Organization be the transportation and marketing agencies of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The National Oil Company would be free to sell as it wished

any surplus oil production not contracted for by the Purchasing Organization. As for AIOC's properties in Iran, Mr. Stokes proposed that they be transferred to the National Oil Company in return for an agreed compensation figured into production cost.¹

The British delegation felt that its proposals were as liberal an offer as could be made within the framework of an efficiently operated oil industry. But the Iranian negotiators were not viewing the problem from this point of view. Prime Minister Mosaddaq's chief concern was to remove any chance of British interference in Iranian affairs, and he sensed its continued presence in Stokes' proposal for an Operating Organization. It appeared to him that Britain's acceptance of the "principle" of the nationalization of Iran's oil merely meant agreement that the National Oil Company of Iran should take title to AIOC properties, but not that it should assume operation of the industry. The National Oil Company would thus become nothing more than a holding company with general supervisory powers, while the proposed Operating Organization played the role of the AIOC in a new guise.

Nor did Prime Minister Mosaddaq appreciate the justice claimed for the proposed 50-50 split in profits with the Purchasing Organization. Would it not, rather, be "normal commercial procedure" for the Purchasing Organization to depend for profit on the difference between the f.o.b. price and the final delivery price? Finally, Prime Minister Mosaddaq was not at all convinced of the wisdom of signing a long-term purchasing contract covering almost all of Iran's production. AIOC's former customers would be given priority, but let them designate their own carriers. Difference of opinion on this point was partially overcome, as were differences on the matter of compensation, although the method of determining compensation was not gone into with any thoroughness. But on balance, the Iranian reaction to the Stokes proposals was that Britain's interpretation of "nationalization" merely as the relinquishment of AIOC's properties did not change the previous picture very much: the British still intended to dominate the production of oil through the pro-

posed Operating Organization, to monopolize its distribution and sale through the proposed Purchasing Organization, and to exploit its profits through the proposed 50-50 split.

The Iranian Government did not delude itself into thinking that it could run the oil industry, at least for the time being, as efficiently as the British. But on the basis of its previous agreement with AIOC, it estimated that even if the National Oil Company operated with only 25% efficiency, the Government would be as well off financially as before — and free at the same time. No one can determine accurately the extent of Anglo-Iranian's annual profits, but estimating from a proportional comparison with Aramco's production figures and payments to the Saudi Arabian Government (representing 50% of profits), a sum approaching \$450 million or even \$500 is arrived at. The Iranian Government was formerly receiving a grand total of possibly \$100 million a year from AIOC, taking into consideration not only royalty payments but also profits on artificially set exchange rates. There was no question but that the new Stokes proposals would have more than doubled Iran's income from its oil, realizing for it perhaps \$200 million to \$250 million. But to the Iranians this was not the only, nor even the prime issue, which was rather freedom from foreign interference and exploitation, even at temporary financial loss.

The negotiations thus broke down because of a basic difference of approach and absence of mutual confidence. The British Government attacked the problem from the point of view of how to protect the AIOC investment and at the same time maintain an efficient oil industry. But in doing so, it betrayed its lack of confidence in Iran's ability to manage its own affairs — both its technical capacity and its administrative integrity. The Iranians, on the other hand, attacked the problem from the point of view of how to get rid of British exploitive concessionary rights and yet not lose their all-important oil income. Their approach, at least in this stage of the crisis, was primarily political. Here lay the reason for their seeming obstinacy when confronted with the facts of oil operations.

When the British delegation did view the political scene, it exhibited an equal obstinacy

¹ For the complete but unofficial text of the Stokes' proposals, see p. 488.

in clinging to tried but outworn tactics. Even while talks were continuing in Tehran British spokesmen indicated that they would gladly come to an agreement with Prime Minister Mosaddaq provided certain more troublesome figures were removed from the political scene. After the breakdown of negotiations the British Government made no secret of its desire to see the Mosaddaq Government fall in favor of its old-time favorite, Seyyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai.

At the end of September, Prime Minister Mosaddaq was indeed in a weakened position because of the prolonged absence of Iran's oil income. Opposition in the Majlis was again becoming vocal despite continued fears of assassination. Nevertheless, the Government's policy still had strong backing—and not from those upon whom financial considerations weighed the heaviest. It was to be found in an ill-assorted "middle-class" group: lesser bourgeoisie, industrial workers, religious fanatics, the professions, students. Nationalization of the oil industry was not a matter in which the Government's policy could be reversed merely by the forced removal of a prime minister.

Iran gained time by withdrawing a portion of the excessively high (90%) currency cover in order to meet operating expenses, but a renewed pinch for cash would soon compel action of one sort or another. At the same time the British Government, faced with the loss of its income from Iran and with the need of buying dollar oil to keep supplying AIOC's markets, was feeling the pinch as well. While the two protagonists parried for the showdown, the Soviet Union was adopting a "soft" policy toward Iran to heighten the contrast with the British tactics, the Communist Tudeh Party used every means to capitalize on the threatening period of anarchy, and the United States Government continued its efforts to find a compromise solution. On October 1 Great Britain asked the Security

Council to study the case; the Council, however, at Iran's request and with the Soviet Union concurring, decided to postpone consideration for ten days. On October 3 the AIOC withdrew from Abadan and Iran its last remaining 350-odd technicians in compliance with an Iranian Government order and despite a previous British official warning that force would be used to keep them there if necessary.

Repercussions of the Iranian crisis were to be seen elsewhere in the Middle East. The most direct was a sudden increase in production from Kuwait, which now touched 700,000 barrels a day from its single field and rivaled Arabian American as the largest producer in the Middle East. The Kuwait Oil Company (jointly owned by AIOC and Gulf) was reconsidering its agreement with the Shaykh of Kuwait, to whom it had previously been paying a mere 9¢ a barrel. The Shaykh's petroleum adviser was reported on August 6 to have indicated dissatisfaction with an offer of 50¢ a barrel, stating that he wished to review the whole matter afresh. The Iranian crisis also put an edge on the dispute between Egypt and Israel with regard to Egypt's refusal to service tankers passing through the Suez Canal en route to Haifa. The AIOC's major loss from Iran was in refined products rather than in crude, since the latter was now being largely made up by the increased production from Kuwait and elsewhere. The capacity of the Haifa refinery was hardly more than 10% of that of Abadan, but nevertheless its operation to capacity now became more of a necessity than a convenience. At the same time, Egypt had a dual interest in the Canal: the removal of British occupation troops as well as the stopping of Israel-bound tankers. The oil question thus became an additional ingredient in the prolonged skirmish over Anglo-Egyptian treaty relations.

Chronology¹

JUNE 1—AUGUST 31, 1951

General

1951

- July 14:** The Beirut Arab Medical Conference, attended by doctors from 10 Arab countries, concluded a week's meeting with the announcement of an 8-point plan to improve the health of the peoples of the Arab world. (*Arab News Agency [ANA]*, July 14.)
- Aug. 28:** The Mideast Regional Congress of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization opened at Bludan, Syria. (*ANA*, Sept. 1.)
- Aug. 31:** The Inter-Parliamentary Congress opened its conference at Istanbul, Turkey. Arab delegations met on the eve of its opening to decide on a unified policy. (*ANA*, Sept. 1.)

Afghanistan

1951

- June 18:** A group of discontented young Afghans—former army officers—were reported to have organized in Pakistan an underground movement calling itself the "Afghan Republican Army." It aimed at setting up a free, democratic government in Afghanistan. Sponsors of the movement said they had links with tribal elements which were opposed to the ruling family and wanted to stage a rebellion.
- Aug. 9:** The Kabul radio reported that the Government had signed treaties of friendship with Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

Arab League

(See also Palestine Problem, Suez Canal Problem.)

1951

- June 4:** Secretary General Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha visited King Abdallah of Jordan at Amman at the latter's invitation. Azzam Pasha reported that they discussed the possibility of closer relations between the Arab states and Turkey.
- June 5:** The chiefs of staff of 6 Arab states concluded a 4-day conference in Damascus. The Arab League Council had called the conference in order to set up machinery to implement the Inter-Arab Security Pact and to prepare for

immediate joint action by the Arab armies should the need arise before the ratification of the Pact. (*ANA*, June 9.)

- June 13:** Secretary General Azzam Pasha arrived in Turkey for a visit at the invitation of the Turkish Government. He said that he hoped to cement Turko-Arab relations. (*ANA*, June 16.)
- June 23:** Plans for tightening the economic boycott of Israel were discussed by Syrian Prime Minister Khalid Bey al-'Azm and Wahid Shawki Bey, Director General of the Egyptian Coastguard Service and Chairman of the Arab League Committee supervising the boycott. (*ANA*, June 23.)
- July 28:** An office was opened in Damascus to direct the economic boycott of Israel, in accordance with the Arab League decision. (*ANA*, July 28.)
- Aug. 20:** The Arab League Cultural Committee began its 6th session in Alexandria. (*ANA*, Aug. 20.)
- Aug. 27:** The Arab League's Political Committee met in closed session in Alexandria.

Egypt

(See also Suez Canal Problem.)

1951

- June 9:** Great Britain formally rejected Egypt's latest proposals for a revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty. Egypt's main demand was for immediate British evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone.
- June 18:** The International Bank announced that it was sending a mission to Egypt to examine projects for which Bank aid "may be requested."
- July 1:** A sterling agreement was signed with Great Britain. It stipulated that Britain would immediately release £25 million in sterling and \$40 million in dollars. During the period of the agreement, from January 1, 1952, until January 1, 1960, £10 million would be released annually by Britain and an additional £5 million would be released whenever the free No. 1 account balance was less than £45 million. (*ANA*, July 8.)
- An Egyptian corvette stopped and searched the British supply ship *Empire Roach* in the Gulf of Aqaba.
- July 2:** The Senate approved the Inter-Arab Defense Alliance which had been endorsed in principle by the Chamber of Deputies on June 11. Foreign Minister Dr. Muhammad Salah al-Din

¹ In general, items in the Chronology are drawn from the *New York Times* or the *New York Herald Tribune* unless otherwise indicated.

Pasha said that under the pact the other Arab states "would be obliged to come to Egypt's aid if Egypt found herself at war with Britain." (ANA, July 7.)

July 3: It was reported that the Government had completed a study of economic and social projects estimated to cost £E200 million. The major portion of the money would be allocated as follows: £E100 million for irrigation schemes; £E42 million for improving communications; £E20 million for improving the supply of drinking water; £E15 million for the construction of an iron and steel factory at Aswan; and £E10 million for the building of electric generators for the Aswan Dam.

July 9: Egypt and the USSR signed a barter agreement for an exchange of grains and cotton. Egypt would export 30,000 bales of cotton and 50,000 tons of rice to the USSR and the satellite countries; the USSR would supply Egypt with 150,000 tons of wheat.

July 10: Great Britain instructed its ambassador in Cairo to protest to Egypt over its search and detention of the British freighter *Empire Roach* in the Gulf of Aqaba.

July 14: Great Britain decided to send 4 destroyers of the Mediterranean Fleet to Aqaba, presumably to protect British shipping from Egyptian interference. The captain of the Egyptian Navy corvette *Al-Nasr*, which searched the British freighter *Empire Roach* in the Gulf of Aqaba on July 1, was called before a board of inquiry at naval command headquarters.

July 22: Foreign Minister Salah al-Din explained Egypt's refusal to attend a conference on African defense called for August by stating that Egypt would not cooperate with Britain so long as British troops occupied the Suez Canal area.

Aug. 1: The Egyptian Press Syndicate called for a general strike of all newspaper workers on August 8 to protest against press law amendments that had been proposed by the Wafdist party leaders. It was stated that the proposed bills would give the Government wide powers in controlling and banning newspapers.

Aug. 2: It was reported that the Wafdist party had withdrawn the proposed press legislation.

Aug. 5: All newspapers suspended publication for 1 day in protest against proposed "arbitrary press controls."

Aug. 6: Foreign Minister Salah al-Din declared in a speech to Parliament that British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison, in a speech during a House of Commons debate on July 30, had "closed the door" on Anglo-Egyptian discussions. The Foreign Minister also affirmed the Government's previously declared intention to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 before the end of the year.

Aug. 16: British Ambassador Sir Ralph Stevenson denied that Mr. Herbert Morrison had "closed the door" on Anglo-Egyptian discussions.

Aug. 19: The Government reported that it had declined a proposed goodwill visit to Alexandria by 8 British warships.

Aug. 26: The 15th anniversary of the signing of the British-Egyptian treaty of 1936 was marked by rioting and demonstrations in Cairo during which the police fired on an anti-Western mob outside the United States and British Embassies.

Aug. 28: A treaty of friendship was signed with Pakistan.

Eritrea

1951

June 16: Eritrea's police received wide powers, including special courts authorized to pass the death sentence, to deal with acts of terrorism perpetuated by the Shifta bandits.

June 20: The British Administration of Eritrea declared a general amnesty for members of Shifta gangs provided they surrendered arms within a month.

June 23: A state of emergency was declared in the southern half of Eritrea in an effort to stamp out age-old tribal feuds that had caused 40 deaths and an unknown number of wounded.

July 22: The British Administration reported that 1,086 Shifta bandits had surrendered under the amnesty proclamation of June 20. (ANA, July 28.)

July 26: It was reported that U.N. consultations with inhabitants of Eritrea on the form for a constitution had been completed.

Aug. 4: It was reported that Tekheste Haile, one of the most notorious Shifta leaders, surrendered to the authorities. (ANA, Aug. 4.)

India

(See also Kashmir Problem.)

1951

June 2: Parliament passed a bill giving Prime Minister Nehru power to curb the Press. Officials said that the curb was aimed at publications agitating violence in behalf of India's Communists and some religious elements.

June 3: 25,000 people demonstrated against the Government because of acute shortages of food, clothing, and housing. The demonstration was organized by the Socialist party; its leader, Jai Prakash Narain, personally led the procession.

June 6: It was reported that 1,498 Communists had been arrested so far in the Assam area.

June 11: A U.S. Congressional bill to lend India \$150 million to buy 2 million tons of food grains was passed and submitted to President Truman for signature.

June 12: U.S. Congressional action to loan India money for wheat led to the restoration of the 12-ounce ration of grain from the austerity ration of 9 ounces of grain per person per day.

June 13: India informed the U.N. that it could not earmark any troops for duty with U.N. forces.

June 16: 1,000 delegates to a convention called by J. A. Kripalani, a former Congress Party president, founded a new political party to be called the Praja (People's) Party. It would oppose Prime Minister Nehru's Congress Party in the fall elections. Delegates approved a manifesto outlining a middle-way policy for India which called for a decentralized economy "that is neither capitalist nor Communist" and a foreign policy of strict neutrality.

Prime Minister Nehru pledged India's support to Nepal in maintaining its integrity and independence.

June 18: Chandulal Trivedi, Governor of East Punjab, informed President Rajendra Prasad that constitutional machinery had failed in his state. He recommended a declaration of a state of emergency to enable him to take over the administration.

June 20: President Rajendra Prasad, by proclamation, suspended the functioning of the Legislature of East Punjab. He directed Gov. Chandulal Trivedi to administer the state directly.

June 23: India and the Soviet Union concluded a bilateral trade agreement to cover the latter's sale of 100,000 tons of wheat to India.

July 2: Panna Lal Dasgupta, sought for two years as leader of the Revolutionary Communist party of India, was arrested.

July 9: India announced a 5-year economic plan to give India economic and social stability. The plan included proposals for birth control.

July 11: Pres. Rajendra Prasad issued an ordinance empowering the Government to prohibit strikes in essential services for 6 months.

Aug. 2: Communications Minister R. A. Kidwai resigned his office in line with his decision to leave the Congress Party and join the newly formed opposition Praja (People's) Party.

Aug. 11: Prime Minister Nehru asked to be relieved of membership in the Congress Party's executive and general election committees. It was reported that the resignation was due to his differences with President Tandon of the Congress Party, also to his feeling that the Tandon group, which now appeared to dominate the party councils, was likely to select candidates with whom Mr. Nehru did not wish his name to be coupled.

Aug. 13: The Congress Party Working Committee ended a 3-day session with an appeal to party president Tandon and Prime Minister Nehru to confer in an effort to patch up their differences.

Aug. 21: Prime Minister Nehru won a vote of confidence in Parliament when he explained that he had resigned from the Congress Party high command in the hope that the shock created by his resignation would "shake it out of its complacency."

Aug. 25: India formally notified the U.S. that it would not attend the Japanese peace treaty conference at San Francisco scheduled for September.

Aug. 30: In a note submitted to the U.S. Government explaining its decision not to attend the San Francisco Japanese peace conference, the Government asserted that, contrary to U.S. statements, the people of Japan did not approve of the treaty. At the same time Prime Minister Nehru pledged his Government not to sign a separate pact with Japan whose terms would contradict provisions of the American-sponsored treaty.

Iran

1951

June 1: President Truman sent personal messages to the British and Iranian Governments urging an "amicable settlement" of the oil dispute.

June 2: Prime Minister Mosaddaq, in a closed session of the Senate, declared that a British Government Mission would be received only if its terms of reference were clearly defined in advance; and that Iran was willing to discuss one subject only—the future sale of oil to Britain. Iran was not willing, he said, to discuss nationalization.

June 3: The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company [AIOC] notified Iran that it was going to send representatives "as soon as possible in order to hold full and frank discussions" on the oil controversy. Deputy Prime Minister Hosayn Fatemi said Iran considered the offer "an acceptance of Iran's taking over" the Company under the nationalization law.

Navab Safavi, founder and titular head of Fadayan-i-Islam, was arrested. He was accused of ordering at least four murders, including that of Prime Minister Ali Razmara on March 7.

June 4: Some 3,000 British paratroopers left for duty at Cyprus, purportedly in readiness for possible action in Iran.

June 5: 500 members of Fadayan-i-Islam demonstrated in protest against the arrest of its leader, Navab Safavi. Police reported that documents in their possession established that Safavi had planned to assassinate Prime Minister Mosaddaq and Ayatollah Kashani, nationalist mullah and spiritual pillar of the Mosaddaq regime.

June 8: A British spokesman said that the whole purpose of sending an AIOC delegation to Iran was "education": that the British hoped to convince the Iranians that they could not possibly operate the enormously complex oil industry.

June 9: Iran signed a supplemental agreement with UNESCO for technical assistance in secondary education, agricultural education, etc.

June 10: The Government's "take over" mission arrived in Abadan and was enthusiastically welcomed by the Iranian workers.

The Iranian Army reported that the USSR had accused Iran of trying to annex a portion of the Soviet Union by changing the course of a border river.

June 11: Basil R. Jackson, Deputy Chairman of AIOC, accompanied by an AIOC director, arrived at Tehran for talks with Iranian officials.

The Finance Ministry issued a statement that Finance Minister Muhammad Varesteh would "demand at the very outset unconditional acceptance of nationalization as an accomplished fact."

Iranian officials at Abadan notified the British General Manager that all income from oil exported after March 20 would have to be refunded; 25% would be set aside in the Bank Melli against British claims.

The Iranian delegate to the U.N. charged that whereas the Iranian Government received from AIOC royalties of £1,204,000 in one year, AIOC taxes to the British Government alone amounted to £28,000,000.

June 12: Two more directors of AIOC arrived in Tehran for the conference between the Company and the Government.

June 14: Immediate surrender of 75% of the revenues of AIOC was demanded by Iran as a condition for the commencement of talks between the Company and the Government.

June 19: AIOC made proposals including payment of £10 million "as an advance against any sums which may become due to the Government as a result of eventual agreement between the Government and the Company." The offer was rejected by the Government.

June 20: The Government issued instructions for the immediate takeover of AIOC properties.

June 21: Prime Minister Mosaddaq received a vote of confidence from the Majlis.

The Government directed Eric C. Drake, British General Manager of the AIOC, to declare in writing whether he was prepared to serve under the new National Oil Company of Iran.

Masters of oil tankers were ordered to sign receipts for oil in the name of the projected National Oil Company of Iran.

Great Britain applied to the International Court of Justice for an injunction to prevent Iran from taking over the properties of AIOC.

June 22: The British oil delegation returned to London.

The Iranian Government proposed death penalties for sabotage in the oil industry.

Representatives of the National Oil Company of Iran distributed receipt forms to the masters of tankers loading at Abadan. The AIOC General Manager ordered tankers loading oil to pump it back into storage tanks after a disagreement with National Oil Company of Iran directors over the wording of receipt forms.

June 24: 12 tankers were held up at Abadan pending solution of the receipt dispute.

June 26: AIOC ordered its tanker fleet to unload oil taken on board and to leave Abadan immediately.

The British Government ordered the 8,000-ton cruiser *Mauritius* to the vicinity of Abadan.

Eric Drake, General Manager of AIOC, left Iran for Basra, Iraq, on the advice of British Ambassador Sir Francis Shepherd, because of charges of sabotage brought against him by the Government for his refusal to authorize masters of tankers to sign receipts for oil.

June 28: Prime Minister Mosaddaq sent a personal message to President Truman concerning the oil controversy and Iran's stand on issues at stake.

June 29: Prime Minister Mosaddaq told U.S. Ambassador Grady he would withdraw or pigeonhole the proposed anti-sabotage law unconditionally.

Iran submitted a statement to the International Court of Justice declaring that the oil controversy did not come under the jurisdiction of the court.

July 5: The International Court of Justice recommended that the AIOC be reinstated to full control of its properties with revenues to be frozen in bank accounts pending a final decision in the oil controversy. This recommendation was rejected by Iran.

July 9: The Government sent a letter to the U.N. announcing its withdrawal from the International Court of Justice.

President Truman, in a personal letter to Prime Minister Mosaddaq, offered to send W. Averell Harriman, his personal adviser on foreign affairs, to Tehran as his representative to discuss the oil crisis with the Iranian Prime Minister.

July 11: Prime Minister Mosaddaq accepted President Truman's offer to send W. Averell Harriman to confer with him on the oil controversy.

July 12: Prime Minister Mosaddaq requested Parliament's authorization of a Government bond issue of 2 billion rials (\$40 million) and parliamentary acceptance of a \$25 million loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank.

July 15: Anti-Communists attacked members of the Tudeh Party who were demonstrating in Tehran in an anti-American rally against the arrival earlier in the day of U.S. Ambassador Harriman. As a result martial law was declared in Tehran for a week and a roundup of Communists was started.

July 24: As a result of the efforts of Mr. Harriman, the British Government received an offer from Iran to enter into negotiations for a settlement of the oil controversy.

July 30: The British Government agreed to send a mission to Iran to be headed by Richard Stokes, Lord Privy Seal and Minister of Materials.

July 31: The Abadan refinery shut down because of lack of storage space.

Aug. 2: The U.N. and Iran concluded an agreement providing for the assignment of 11 technical experts to Iran.

Aug. 4: The British Mission, headed by Richard Stokes, arrived in Tehran to begin talks with the Government.

Aug. 13: Richard Stokes submitted the following 8 proposals to the Iranian Government:¹

1. AIOC will transfer to the National Oil Company of Iran the whole of its installations, machinery, plant, and stores in Iran. As regards the assets in southern Iran compensation by the National Oil Company to AIOC would be included in the operating costs of the oil industry in the area. Compensation for the assets used in the past for distribution and marketing in Iran will be dealt with under the separate arrangements suggested in paragraph 7 below.

2. A Purchasing Organization will be formed in order to provide the assured outlet for Iranian oil which is the only basis upon which an oil industry of the magnitude of that of Iran could hope to maintain itself. This will be done by means of a long term contract, say 25 years, with the National Oil Company for the purchase f.o.b. of very large quantities of crude oil and products from southern Iran.

3. Apart from this arrangement the National Oil Company would be able to make additional sale of oil subject to the normal commercial provision that such sales should be effected in such a way as not to prejudice the interests of the Purchasing Organization.

4. The Purchasing Organization under the agreement will be placing at the disposal of the National Oil Company a world-wide transportation and marketing service, including one of the largest tanker fleets in the world, and will be entering into firm commitments with its customers for the fulfillment of which it will be relying on Iranian oil. It will, therefore, as a matter of normal commercial practice, have to assure itself that oil in the necessary quantities and qualities will come forward at the times required. In order to secure this objective the Purchasing Organization will agree with the National Oil Company on an Organization which, under the authority of the National Oil Company, will manage on behalf of the National Oil Company the operations of searching for, producing, transporting, refining, and loading oil within the area. The Purchasing Organization will arrange from current proceeds the finance necessary to cover operating expenses.

5. In order that the proposed Purchasing Organization can be induced to commit itself to the purchase of large quantities of Iranian oil over a long period of years, the commercial terms must be not less advantageous than the Purchasing Organization would secure elsewhere either by purchase or development. In effect this means that the Purchasing Organization would buy the oil from the National Oil Company at commercial prices f.o.b. Iran less a price discount equal in the aggregate to the profit remaining to the National Oil Company after allowing for the discount and for the costs of making the oil available to the Purchasing Organization.

6. In the event of the foregoing suggestions being accepted by the Iranian Government as a basis for the future operation of the oil industry in southern Iran it is suggested that they should be expanded into the Heads of an Agreement which could later be developed into a detailed purchasing arrangement between the Iranian Government and the proposed Purchasing Organization. The Heads of Agreement would also provide for the immediate resumption of operations in southern Iran on an interim basis.

7. It is suggested that all the assets owned by the Kermanshah Petroleum Company, Ltd., which produces and refines oil for consumption in Iran, together with the installations, machinery, plant, and moveable assets of AIOC which have been used in the past for distribution and marketing of refined products within Iran, should be transferred to the Iranian Government on favorable terms.

8. There will be Iranian representation on the board of directors (or its equivalent) of the Operating Organization, which will, of course, only employ non-Iranian staff to the extent that it finds it necessary to do so for the efficiency of its operations. It will also offer its full cooperation to the National Oil Company of Iran in any program of training on which the latter may wish to embark.

Aug. 15: The Government rejected the British plan for a settlement of the oil controversy.

Aug. 18: The Government submitted the following points for the consideration of the British mission: (1) Iran was willing to sell oil to Britain, but only for British domestic needs and not for resale to other countries; (2) Iran would be willing to consider compensation claims, but only if Britain accepted counterclaims amounting to more than £100 million (\$280 million); and (3) the British technical staff might remain at Abadan only under certain detailed conditions. These counter proposals were unacceptable to the British.

Aug. 21: Mr. Stokes put forward a proposal that a British general manager be appointed to take charge of day-to-day operations and technical affairs of the oil fields and the Abadan refinery under the direction and authority of the National Oil Company of Iran, as an answer to Prime Minister Mosaddaq's request that provision for a predominantly British operational agency be eliminated from the 8-point plan. Prime Minister Mosaddaq countered this proposal with a suggestion that there should be two general managers—one for the British staff and one for the Iranian staff and labor. Mr. Stokes replied that the managing director had to be a Britisher, for otherwise the British staff would not stay on in Iran. He then verbally informed the Prime Minister that the 8-point plan was withdrawn.

Aug. 22: The Government officially rejected the British 8-point plan for running the oil industry of Iran. Its written statement contained three

¹ Unofficial text.

major points under which the interests of Iran and the purchasers would be protected "according to law": 1. Former purchasers of Iranian oil would in future have priority. Oil products would be sold f.o.b. at Iranian ports. Individual contracts would be signed with each purchasing country, which would be free to appoint its agent or carrier. 2. Foreign technicians would be retained under individual contracts guaranteeing their present salaries and advantages. The regulations and administrative structure of the "former" company would be maintained so as not to disrupt operations. The board of directors of the National Oil Company of Iran would include foreign members from countries "which do not have political aims in Iran." The department chief would have sufficient authority and freedom of action to ensure efficiency. 3. The Government would be prepared to examine "just claims" of the "former" company with a view to its indemnification.

Iraq

1951

June 2: The United Popular Front Party decided to merge with the National Democratic Party, and a joint pact between the two was signed. They would cooperate to publish a journal named *Jabha (Front)*. (ANA, June 2.)

June 17: The police announced that they had seized a large cache of machine guns, bombs, and ammunition at the home of former Jewish advocate Salim M. Abdallah, which they described as a Zionist "sabotage and spying center." The police alleged that he and others arrested were responsible for recent bomb outrages at the library of the U.S. Legation and at other buildings in Baghdad.

June 18: The police reported that they had discovered large quantities of weapons and explosives in Izra Daoud Synagogue, Baghdad.

June 23: Former Prime Minister Salih Jabir applied to the Ministry of the Interior for permission to form a new political party. The party's platform would be a foreign policy aimed at the consolidation of the country's international position, the realization of its full independence, and the promotion of friendly relations with other Arab states "on the basis of eventual federation which may be established voluntarily through the Arab League." (ANA, June 23.)

June 27: The Government announced that negotiations for a new oil agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) had been suspended.

July 10: It was reported that the Government and the IPC had reached an agreement.

Aug. 13: The terms of the new oil agreement between the Government and the IPC were released. Retroactive to Jan. 1, 1951, it provided that the Iraqi Government would receive 50% of the Company's profits before deduction of for-

eign income taxes. A minimum of 22 million tons of crude oil would be produced by IPC and the Mosul Oil Co. annually by 1954 and thereafter, and 8 million tons by the Basrah Oil Co. annually by 1955 and thereafter. Iraq's oil royalties were expected to amount to about ID 15 million (\$42 million) in 1951, rising to ID 59 million (\$165,200,000) by 1955.

Aug. 23: Iraq's Independence Party attacked the new oil agreement and repeated demands that the oil industry be nationalized.

Israel

(See also Palestine Problem, Suez Canal Problem.)

1951

June 24: The names of 1,285 candidates were submitted to the Central Elections Committee for parliamentary elections to be held July 30.

July 17: The Knesset adopted legislation granting equal rights to women.

July 22: A third of Israel's merchant marine — about 350 seamen — went on strike following a wage dispute.

July 30: General elections to the Knesset were held with the following results: Mapai — 45; General Zionists — 20; Mapam — 15; Mizrahi Workers — 8; Herut — 8; Communists — 5; Mapai Arabs — 5; Progressives — 4; Agudat Israel — 3; Agudat Israel Workers — 2; Mizrahi — 2; Sephardim — 2; Yemenites — 1. A total of 687,000 valid votes were cast.

Aug. 15: President Chaim Weizmann called on Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to form a new Government.

Aug. 23: A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation was signed with the United States.

Aug. 27: Hundreds of immigrants demonstrated in Tel-Aviv, demanding wooden huts to replace the tents in which they were living.

Aug. 29: The General Zionist and Mapam, the two major opposition parties, submitted to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion the conditions under which they would join his Mapai party in a broad new coalition government.

The 23rd World Zionist Congress concluded its convention in Jerusalem by passing a resolution which asked the Israel Government to give the World Zionist Organization legal status.

Jordan

(See also Arab League, Lebanon, Palestine Problem, Syria.)

1951

June 5: The Government signed an agreement with the U.S. Government for technical assistance in locating water for agricultural purposes. (ANA, June 9.)

June 9: The Government announced the establishment of a Bank of Reconstruction which would be set up with the aid of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency [UNRWA]. It was understood that the capital will be JD 500,000 (\$1,400,000), of which JD 400,000 (\$1,120,000) would be contributed by UNRWA. (ANA, June 16.)

June 30: Palestine coinage ceased to be legal tender. (ANA, June 30.)

July 20: King Abdallah was assassinated at noon as he entered al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem to perform Friday prayers. His assassin was Mustafa Shukri 'Ashu, a 21-year-old Jerusalem tailor, said to have been a member of the "sabotage corps" of a political group called "The Sacred Struggle Organization" associated with the former Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni.

The Cabinet, meeting in emergency session at Amman, proclaimed Amir Na'if, King Abdallah's second son, as Regent, in view of the fact that Amir Talal, the heir apparent, was in Switzerland.

July 24: Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i resigned. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda Pasha was charged with the task of forming a new Cabinet.

July 25: Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda Pasha announced his new Cabinet as follows:

Tawfiq Abu al-Huda Pasha — Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs

Sa'id Mufti Pasha — Vice Prime Minister, Interior

Sulayman Bey Tuqan — Defense

Shaykh Muhammad Amin al-Shanqiti — Chief Judge

Salah Khalifah Pasha — Finance

Sulayman Sukkar Pasha — Commerce and Industry, National Economy

Dr. Jamil al-Tutunji Pasha — Health and Social Affairs

Ruhi 'Abd al-Hadi Pasha — Education

Hashim Bey al-Ghushah — Communications

Anistas Bey Hananiya — Development and Reconstruction, Agriculture

Falah al-Madadiah Pasha — Justice

Aug. 11: Prime Minister Abu al-Huda Pasha announced the names of 10 persons charged with having conspired against King Abdallah. Three cousins of the former Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni, two of whom were linked closely to his organization in Palestine, were on the list. The accused included: Musa al-Husayni, former head of Abdallah's foreign bureau in Jerusalem; 'Abd al-Mahmud 'Ukkah, noted terrorist and a Husayni ally during the Palestine conflict; 'Abd al-Qadir Farahat, who was associated with 'Ukkah; Zakariya Mahmud 'Ukkah, brother of 'Abd al-Mahmud 'Ukkah; Tawfiq Salih al-Husayni; Dr. Dawud al-Husayni; Rev. Ibrahim Ajad, Secretary of the Latin Patriarchate in Jerusalem; and Kamil Abdallah Qaluti.

Aug. 18: The trial opened, before a specially convened 3-man military court, of the 10 persons

accused of complicity in the assassination of King Abdallah. The prosecution charged that Col. Abdallah al-Tall, the Arab Legion commander who drove the Israelis out of the old city of Jerusalem, was the chief conspirator in the assassination of the King. The Government requested the Government of Egypt to extradite Col. al-Tall.

Aug. 20: The prosecution presented to the military tribunal the purported confessions of Musa al-Husayni and of 'Abd al-Mahmud 'Ukkah. Both confessions deeply implicated Col. Abdallah al-Tall and Musa Ayyubi (former officer of one of the sections of the terrorist organization of the former Mufti of Jerusalem during the Palestine conflict of the 1930's), both of whom were in Egypt.

Aug. 21: Maj. Gen. John Bagot Glubb, commander of the Arab Legion, testified that Col. al-Tall had favored an understanding with Israel and that he had been a friend of Moshe Dayan, Israeli commander in New Jerusalem.

Aug. 25: The prosecution asked for the conviction of the following 6 men: Col. Abdallah al-Tall, being tried *in absentia*; Musa al-Ayyubi, also being tried *in absentia*; Musa al-Husayni; 'Abd al-Mahmud 'Ukkah; Zakariya Mahmud 'Ukkah; and 'Abd al-Qadir Farahat.

Aug. 27: Musa al-Husayni's lawyer stated that his client had made a last minute decision to confess.

Aug. 28: The special military court sentenced the 6 men — 2 *in absentia* — to die on the charge that they had plotted the assassination of King Abdallah. The prosecution charged that the assassination had been plotted in Col. Abdallah al-Tall's home in Cairo and that he had contributed financially to the plot. It also charged that Musa al-Ayyubi was the liaison between Col. Abdallah al-Tall and Musa al-Husayni in Jerusalem, and that the latter had carried out in Jerusalem the plans made in Cairo.

Egypt refused to surrender Col. Abdallah al-Tall and Musa al-Ayyubi to the Jordan Government.

Aug. 29: A new Chamber of Deputies was elected.

Kashmir Problem

1951

June 6: Prime Minister Nehru of India responded to a Security Council request for moderation in the Kashmir dispute by stating that India's position was already on record. In sending the request the Council had hoped that India would refrain from encouraging creation of a constituent assembly in India-controlled Kashmir which, according to reports, presumed to speak for all Kashmir on whether to join India or Pakistan. Prime Minister Nehru's reply confirmed the Indian position that the assembly, probably to be convened in the autumn, was legal and might declare its position on any question, including accession.

June 27: The Indian-sponsored Kashmir Government indicated that it would not talk to U.N. Mediator Frank P. Graham because it had rejected the U.N. resolutions under which he was working.

July 1: U.N. observers reached the Uri sector, west of Srinagar, to investigate the latest alleged violation on the part of Pakistan of the cease-fire agreement.

July 3: Prime Minister Nehru officially complained to the Security Council that Pakistan had violated the cease-fire line in Kashmir five times within the past few weeks.

July 8: U.N. Mediator Graham and his 11-man staff arrived in Srinagar for a 10-day inspection visit of the cease-fire area. He discussed border violations with Maj. Gen. Robert Nimmo, chief U.N. military adviser.

July 15: Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan asserted that 90% of India's army was on the borders of Pakistan.

July 16: Prime Minister Nehru admitted that Indian troops were being concentrated on the Pakistani border. He stated that the action "had been necessitated by the recent organized preparations by Pakistan for raids and sabotage in Indian territory."

July 24: Prime Minister Nehru, in a note to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, disclaimed that aggressive intentions were behind the massing of Indian troops on the Pakistani border.

U.N. Mediator Graham conferred with Prime Minister Nehru after conclusion of talks with Kashmir officials.

July 26: Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan invited Prime Minister Nehru to visit Karachi to discuss a 5-point peace formula. He said that the discussion would begin "as soon as . . . the withdrawal of the concentration of forces [on the Pakistani borders] has been carried out." The Pakistani proposal contained, among other things, measures for the holding of a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir, and the suggestion that both governments should make a declaration that they would on no account attack or invade the territory of the other.

July 30: Prime Minister Nehru declined Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's invitation to Karachi for a conference. Taking up the 5-point peace plan proposed by the latter, Nehru indicated that he and Liaquat Ali Khan were in full accord on all points except point one (concerning the withdrawal of Indian forces from the Pakistani border) and point two (which touched on the preconditions for a plebiscite). However, he invited the Pakistani Prime Minister to New Delhi to discuss the issues that had raised talk of war between their countries.

Aug. 2: Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan renewed his invitation to Prime Minister Nehru for a discussion to be held at Karachi on Kashmir, dropping his former condition that India should first withdraw its troops from Pakistan's borders. He

also assured Nehru that the Pakistani proposal had not referred to Indian troops only, but that he had also intended to cancel the Pakistan troop movements he had been obliged to make after the concentration of Indian forces at the Pakistan border.

Aug. 5: India rejected Pakistan's proposal for discussions to be held at Karachi. Prime Minister Nehru declared that Indian "defensive" troops sent toward the Pakistani border were stationed at least 20 miles from the line in order to obviate border incidents.

An experimental blackout was held at Karachi. Similar measures were reported to have been taken in towns along the border with India.

Aug. 6: It was reported from Pakistan that Indian troops were stationed within 10 miles of the border and not 20 as stated by Prime Minister Nehru. It was also reported that India had moved military units into the area opposite Pakistan's Sind Province in the south, completing a troop line from Kashmir in the north to the Gulf of Kutch.

Aug. 9: Prime Minister Nehru rebuked the Hindu Mahasabha organization for a meeting at which hundreds of members signed a fighting pledge with their blood. He acknowledged in the same speech that relations with Pakistan had become "very grave," but said that war would mean the destruction of both countries and that "we won't fight Pakistan unless Pakistan attacks us."

Aug. 14: Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan declared in a speech that Pakistan would never accept Kashmir as a part of Indian territory, and that he would shed his own blood to defend Pakistan.

Aug. 16: Indian Muslim leaders presented a memorandum to U.N. Mediator Graham in which they declared that Pakistan's policy on the Kashmir dispute was "fraught with the gravest peril to the 40 million Muslims in India."

Aug. 18: Pakistan asserted that India was seeking to gain time in the dispute so that it could complete dams and irrigation schemes in Kashmir that would divert the waters of the five rivers vital to the agricultural economy of West Pakistan.

Aug. 27: U.N. Mediator Graham arrived in Karachi for new talks with Pakistani officials on demilitarization of the border area of Jammu.

Lebanon

1951

June 7: The new cabinet of Prime Minister Abdallah al-Yafi was announced as follows:

Abdallah al-Yafi — Prime Minister, Interior
Charles Hilu — Foreign Affairs
Rashid Baydun — Defense
Philip Bulus — Deputy Prime Minister, Public Works
Emile Lahud — Education

Philip Taqla — Finance, Economy
 Yusuf al-Harawi — Agriculture
 Muhammad Sayf al-Din — Posts, Telegraph,
 and Information
 Rashid Karamah — Justice
 Bashir al-Awar — Health, Social Affairs

Press censorship was abolished, except for those dispatches dealing strictly with military matters.

June 9: Some 4,000 Syrian workmen employed in Lebanon were ordered out of the country and transported to the border. The Syrian Government, which had had no previous notice of the move, closed the frontier in retaliation. The matter was finally resolved when Prime Minister Abdallah al-Yafi apologized by telephone to the Syrian Prime Minister for the action, which had been the result of a misunderstanding. (*ANA*, June 16.)

July 2: The police, assisted by troops, at order of the Government, destroyed hashish plants over a total area of 259,055 square meters.

The police, in trying to disperse a Communist demonstration, were attacked by several hundred Communist Partisans of Peace at Beirut.

July 16: Former Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulh was assassinated as he was motoring to Amman airport following a visit to Jordan as King Abdallah's guest. The assassins were believed to have been members of the illegal Syrian National Socialist Party. Riyad al-Sulh had incurred their enmity when, under his administration in 1949, their leader Anton Saadeh was condemned to death and shot for revolutionary activities.

July 17: At least 1 person was killed and 9 seriously injured in demonstrations touched off at Beirut by news of Riyad al-Sulh's murder.

July 9: Prime Minister Abdallah al-Yafi conferred with the Syrian Prime Minister concerning steps to be taken for the settlement of their countries' economic differences. (*ANA*, July 14.)

Aug. 9: It was announced that 16 persons had been arrested in connection with the assassination of Riyad al-Sulh.

Aug. 18: Three men suspected of directing one of the biggest Communist cells in Lebanon were arrested during a police raid in al-Biq'a district.

Aug. 19: Shaykh Muhammad Alay, Vice-President of the Shari'ah Court of Appeal of Beirut, was elected Grand Mufti of Lebanon in place of the late Shaykh Muhammad Tawfiq Khalid. (*ANA*, Aug. 25.)

Aug. 30: The Ministry of Education asked the Department of Public Security to prepare a list of school teachers suspected of Communist leanings. It was understood that the Ministry was systematically rooting out Communist teachers, and already a number of Communist sympathizers found in possession of subversive propaganda had been dismissed.

Libya

1951

June 15: An agreement with the British administering authorities to provide \$200,000 in Point Four aid for Libya and Eritrea was concluded. In each country the funds would be used to start a technical assistance service to carry out health, education, soil reclamation, and other projects. The service boards would be headed by U.S. specialists with the assistance of the French and British administrators and local relief agencies.

July 9: A special agreement to help Libya establish its first national health service was signed by representatives of the United Kingdom, the World Health Organization, and the U.N.

July 18: The U.N. appointed 3 jurists to serve as members of the U.N. tribunal for Libya in accordance with the General Assembly resolution adopted Dec. 2, 1950. The tribunal's main work would be to adjudicate claims regarding property belonging to Italian or former Italian nationals.

July 23: UNESCO announced an agreement with the U.K. under which additional technical assistance in the field of education would be given to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

Aug. 25: The Libyan Coordination Committee concluded a series of meetings under the Chairmanship of U. N. Commissioner Adrian Pelt. In a report to the Provisional Government of Libya, the Committee recommended that the transfer of governmental powers from the administering nations (Britain and France) should begin on Sept. 15, 1951. (*ANA*, Aug. 25.)

Aug. 30: An agreement with the U.N., the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the International Labour Organization to provide a team of 18 experts to formulate an economic and social development plan for Libya was signed by the British Resident, Mr. T. R. Blackley, and Mr. Thomas Power, the principal secretary of the U.N. Mission in Libya. (*ANA*, Sept. 1.)

North Africa

1951

June 11: It was announced that France would spend about \$28 million in an industrial plan for Algeria, Morocco, French West and Equatorial Africa, and the Cameroon. Irrigation, electrification, coal mining, the drilling of oil wells and building of refineries, highway and railroad construction, and harbor modernization were included in the program. The money was in the form of credits from the Marshall Plan counterpart fund.

June 28: France's education systems in North Africa and Morocco were criticized at a UNESCO meeting. The Iraq delegation cited a message from 4 political parties in Morocco asking for an intensified fight against illiteracy. France ad-

sured that the educational system was France's business.

July 12: The U.S. announced an agreement with France for the U.S. Air Force to develop 5 air bases on French Moroccan territory.

July 14: The first U.S. Air Force base was opened in French Morocco when Nouaceur Air Base, 20 miles south of Casablanca, received its first planes from the United States.

Aug. 5: José Luiz Archer, the new Administrator of the International Zone of Morocco, arrived at Tangier to take up his duties.

Aug. 8: 1,000 U.S. Air Force personnel arrived for duty at Nouaceur Airfield.

Aug. 26: 1,100 further U.S. Air Force personnel arrived at Casablanca to man air bases under construction.

Pakistan

(See also Kashmir Problem.)

1951

June 3: The Government protested to India for allowing the Afghan Ambassador to India to deliver a strongly anti-Pakistan speech over the All-India radio.

June 9: The Government's drive against Communists resulted in the arrest of two editors of the leftist newspaper *Pakistan Times*. (ANA, June 9.)

June 14: A secret trial opened of 13 military officers and 3 civilians accused of plotting to set up a pro-Communist military dictatorship in Pakistan.

June 16: Pakistan informed the U.N. that it could not "earmark" any of its troops for duty with the U.N. because of the long dispute with India over Kashmir.

June 21: All 14 persons accused of having conspired for the violent overthrow of the Government pleaded not guilty.

July 21: Shawkat Ali, Secretary of the Punjab Communist Party, was arrested in a police drive to clean up Communists who had gone "underground."

A new agreement was reached with Britain with regard to the release of part of Pakistan's sterling balances. The total release over a period of 6 years would amount to £54 million: £30 million for currency backing and £24 million for the financing of the 6-year development program (which would involve expenditure of £280 million, of which £160 million would be expected to come from abroad). Of the £30 million made available as currency backing, £4 million would be paid by the United Kingdom in gold. (*Financial Times*, July 21.)

Palestine Problem

(See also Suez Canal Problem.)

1951

June 6: Maj. Gen. William Riley, Chief U.N. Truce Supervisor, reported that at his request the Israel Government had stopped work on the

Lake Huleh drainage project in the disputed demilitarized zone along the Syrian frontier. Gen. Riley also reported that Israel had agreed to allow Col. Samuel Taxis, American chairman of the Israeli-Syrian Joint Armistice Commission, to interview the 800 Arabs evacuated by Israel from the demilitarized zone to the village of Shaab near Haifa. Gen. Riley said Israel agreed to allow any of the evacuees who wanted to return to the demilitarized zone to do so.

June 9: It was disclosed that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, [UNRWA] was granting interest-free loans up to \$5,000—repayable in 3 years—to Arab refugees so that they could resume their former trades in the countries in which they were then living. About \$100,000 had already been distributed.

The U.N. Security Council authorized Israel to resume drainage work in the non-Arab-owned sections of the demilitarized border zone.

June 11: Syria and Israel agreed to order their aircraft not to cross each other's defense zones or demilitarized areas.

June 12: Syria protested to the Security Council against its decision to grant permission to the Israelis to resume draining of the Huleh marshlands before settling the dispute as a whole. Syrian Prime Minister Khalid Bey al-'Azam denounced the decision as being contrary both to the letter and the spirit of the Security Council resolution of May 18 calling for a cessation of the drainage and the return of Arab inhabitants of the demilitarized zone to their homes.

Mr. Hulger Andersen, director of the U.N. Refugee Compensation Office in Jerusalem, began talks with Syrian and Lebanese officials regarding property lost by refugees in Palestine and the question of "frozen" Arab funds in Palestine banks. Dr. Tewfik Rüshtü Aras, Turkish member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, likewise discussed with Syrian Prime Minister Khalid Bey al-'Azam the formation in Beirut of a special committee to estimate the value of property left by refugees so that they might receive proper compensation. (ANA, June 16.)

June 19: John B. Blandford, U.S. member of UNRWA's advisory commission, was appointed director of UNRWA to succeed General Howard Kennedy. The new director said that the relief agency would concentrate on building small villages for the refugees, on helping create small enterprises in the cities, and on rural development projects. The Arab League later endorsed this program on the following conditions: (1) that the Arab states would contribute lands and services as their share, but not large sums of money; (2) that the international community, through the U.N., would continue to support refugee programs; and (3) that the Arab refugees who participated in the programs would not thereby in any way prejudice their claims to repatriation or compensation. (ANA, June 23.)

June 22: The headquarters of the UNRWA refugee camp at Sidon, Lebanon, were dynamited.

Reasons offered for the action included Communist propaganda in Arab refugee camps, local charges of inadequate rations, and unjust treatment.

June 23: The Jordan Government sent protests to Britain, the United States, and France because of Israeli diversion of the waters of the River Jordan, which it held to be a violation of international law. A British power expert, Mr. George Walpole, declared that tests taken during May showed that the flow passing through Jordan to the Dead Sea dropped suddenly from the normal 14 cubic metres to 8 metres a second and that the salinity of the water had increased considerably. (*ANA*, June 23.)

June 25: Mr. Hulger Andersen reported to the U.N. that Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel had pledged their cooperation in obtaining a speedy evaluation of Arab refugee property abandoned in Israel so that just compensation might be made to Arab refugees.

June 30: UNRWA reported to the U.N. that there were 879,542 Arab refugees in the Middle East in April 1951, distributed as follows: Jordan, 466,572; Syria, 83,881; Lebanon, 106,440; the Gaza area, 198,691; Israel, 23,958. (*ANA*, June 30.)

July 5: About 260 of the 785 Arabs who were expelled by Israel from the demilitarized zone between Syria and Israel were allowed to return to their ruined villages by the Israeli authorities.

July 9: Major Jacques Rousset resigned from the U.N. Palestine Truce Commission. He was reported to disagree with Israeli proposals that Arab landholders in the Huleh swamp area be moved to Arab lands in the demilitarized zone.

Gen. Riley reported to the Security Council that Israel opposed his decision that 115 Arabs who fled into Syria be allowed to return to their villages in conformity with the Security Council resolution of May 18. He also reported that Israeli authorities refused to let him brief an assembly of Arabs on their right to return to their villages.

July 10: The Jordan Government reported to the Joint Jordan-Israeli Truce Committee that 10 Israeli troops clashed with Jordan National Guardsmen when they entered the village of Hassan near Bethlehem, in Jordan-held territory.

July 11: Jordan called the attention of the Security Council to the diversion of the River Jordan by Israel.

Aug. 2: Gen. Howard Kennedy, former head of UNRWA, declared that only about 250,000 of the 850,000 Arab refugees in states bordering Israel could be absorbed by the countries sheltering them.

Aug. 4: The Israel Government denied any illegal interference with the natural flow of the water of the River Jordan, as charged by Jordan to the Security Council.

Aug. 10: The U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine, meeting in Geneva, extended an invitation to Israel and the Arab states of Egypt,

Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria to meet in Paris beginning Sept. 10 to "discuss with the Commission solutions to the problems outstanding" between them.

Aug. 12: Israel accepted the invitation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission to discuss problems with the Arab states in Paris on Sept. 10.

Aug. 20: Gen. Riley submitted a report to the Security Council detailing ways in which Israel had obstructed U.N. efforts to resolve the dispute between it and Syria. The report also listed 7 practices continued by Israel that created a "problem" in the demilitarized zone. It stated, as well, that a total of 785 Arabs were removed by Israel from the Huleh swamp area and their villages destroyed and that despite a Security Council order to Israel to permit them to return to their homes, less than half were back.

Aug. 26: Israel requested the Security Council to reopen its consideration of charges that regular Syrian army forces participated in border fighting on Israeli territory in May.

Saudi Arabia

1951

June 18: The Government signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and an agreement regarding Dhahran Air Field with the U.S. Government.

July 5: The Arabian American Oil Company announced the discovery of oil in a wildcat well drilled about 12,000 feet offshore in the Persian Gulf.

July 10: The Government announced the allocation of \$1,578,400 for the improvement of roads and water supply at Mecca.

Aug. 7: Foreign Minister Amir Faysal arrived in London for a 10-day visit as the guest of the British Government.

Aug. 24: The Amir Faysal announced that he had reached "agreement in principle" with Great Britain on settling the future status of 9 islands and several shoals, and on some undefined frontier adjustments.

Somaliland

1951

June 7: The Petitions Committee of the Trusteeship Council considered petitions charging that Italy was using strong-armed tactics to suppress the Somali Youth League, one of the principal political parties of Somaliland.

June 8: In its first report as administrator of Somaliland to the U.N. Trusteeship Council, Italy stated that foreign investments were the only means of developing this "extremely poor" region fast enough to make it self-supporting in 10 years. To this end it proposed that the International Bank should investigate the possibility of a loan to Somaliland.

Sudan

1951

June 6: Around 1,000 Khartoum policemen went on strike, primarily for higher wages. (ANA, June 9.)

June 14: A state of emergency was declared in Khartoum because of the police strike. (ANA, June 23.)

June 15: 700 policemen returned to duty. (ANA, June 23.)

July 1: The Khartoum High Court confirmed the sentence passed on June 20 on the President and Secretary of the Sudan Workers Association for "abetting the Khartoum police to strike." (ANA, July 7.)

July 18: The Sudan Workers Association's General Assembly decided to serve the Government with a 7-day notice to give its final word on the workers' demands for improved working conditions. (ANA, July 21.)

July 19: Egypt dispatched a 4-man mission led by Senator Ahmad Fattuh to the Sudan in an attempt to reunite the pro-Egyptian Ashigga Party, which had split into two rival factions. (ANA, July 21.)

July 26: The Egyptian Mission returned to Cairo and reported that it had failed in its mission to end the split in the pro-Egyptian Ashigga Party. (ANA, July 28.)

Aug. 26: A general strike was launched by the Sudan Workers Unions Federation for better working conditions and a 75% increase in wages. (ANA, Sept. 1.)

Aug. 30: The general strike ended. (ANA, Sept. 1.)

Suez Canal Problem

1951

June 12: Maj. Gen. William E. Riley, chief of staff of the U.N. Egyptian-Israeli Truce Committee, ruled that the Committee had no authority to call on Egypt to end the blockade through the Canal of goods destined for Israel.

July 11: The British Government protested to the Egyptian Government against "illegal and unwarranted interference with the movement of shipping through the Suez Canal."

July 12: The Israeli delegation to the U.N. asked the Security Council to take action against Egypt's blockade.

July 17: The Secretary General of the Arab League, 'Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, told newspapermen at a press conference that Egypt, in maintaining surveillance over shipping using the Canal, was merely abiding by decisions taken by the Arab states to prevent Israel from using Arab lands or waters to strengthen itself militarily. (ANA, July 21.)

July 31: A British Embassy official at Alexandria stated that Britain had informed Egypt that it recognized Egypt's "normal right" to search ships in Egyptian territorial waters, but did not recog-

nize Egypt's claimed right to search ships in connection with the Arab blockade of Israel.

Aug. 16: Great Britain, France, and the U.S. introduced a resolution to the Security Council calling on Egypt to "terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal, wherever bound, and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force."

Aug. 30: The Arab League Political Committee agreed unanimously that the Canal blockade was "not only the concern of Egypt but is also the concern of all the Arab states, and that steps taken by Egypt in regard to it merely represent the implementation of the decisions taken by the Arab League for the security of each of the Arab states." (ANA, Sept. 1.)

Syria

1951

June 4: The Chamber of Deputies approved an appropriation of LS 5 million, (\$2,275,000) for the Ministry of Defense. (ANA, June 2.)

Torrential rains caused serious floods along the Barada River near Damascus. Damage to fruit trees was estimated at \$500,000.

June 7: Prime Minister Khalid al-'Azm announced that Syria had rejected U.S. technical aid under the Point Four program.

The Prime Minister also announced that negotiations with Lebanon for an economic agreement to permit the resumption of normal trade relations between the two countries had broken down.

June 12: It was reported that Syria had granted permission to numerous French banking concerns and business firms to open branches in Syria.

June 14: No accord was reached as a result of discussions held in Damascus between Syrian and Jordanian officials regarding the exchange of diplomatic representatives. (ANA, June 23.)

July 9: Prime Minister Khalid Bey al-'Azm held new discussions with Prime Minister Abdallah al-Yafi of Lebanon concerning steps to be taken for the settlement of their countries' economic differences. (ANA, July 14.)

July 19: Members of the Syrian National Socialist Party rioted in the town of Tartus. They were reported to have fought with Communists and members of the People's Party.

July 30: 17,500 civil workers went on strike for more pay.

July 31: Prime Minister Khalid al-'Azm's cabinet resigned, bringing to a crisis the conflict on the issue of civilian rule versus the military's demand for veto power over the processes of government.

Aug. 1: President Hashim al-Atasi asked Faris al-Khuri to head a new coalition cabinet.

Aug. 2: Faris al-Khuri agreed to try to form a coalition cabinet if government employees would end their strike. He personally conferred with strike leaders in the hope of persuading them to call off the strike.

Aug. 3: University students in Damascus demonstrated in favor of annexation of Jordan to Syria.

Aug. 4: Faris al-Khuri informed President Hashim al-Atasi that since the strike had continued, he could not continue his efforts to form a new government.

Workers and Palestinian Arab refugees demonstrated in Aleppo urging unification of Jordan with Syria.

Aug. 5: Civil workers ended a 6-day general strike.

Aug. 6: President Hashim al-Atasi asked Hasan al-Hakim, an independent, to form a new Cabinet.

Aug. 8: The landowners of northwest Syria in the Aleppo area met under the chairmanship of Raf'at al-Ghuri, acting chairman of the Agricultural Chamber, to oppose the bill introduced in Parliament that would cut down landholdings to a few hundred acres depending on whether the area was a dry farming section, rain-fed, or irrigated.

Aug. 9: Prime Minister Hasan al-Hakim announced the formation of his Cabinet as follows:

Hasan al-Hakim (People's Party) — Prime Minister, Finance

Faydi al-Atasi (People's Party) — Foreign Affairs

Rashid Barmada (People's Party) — Interior
Shakir al-'As (People's Party) — Economy, Agriculture

Fathallah Asyun (People's Party) — Health
'Abd al-Wahhab Mawmad (People's Party) — Education

'Abd al-'Aziz Hasan (Republican-Democratic bloc) — Justice

Hamad al-Khuja (Republican-Democratic bloc) — Public Works, Communications

Col. Fawzi Silo (Independent) — Defense

Aug. 13: Landlords of the Homs area met to discuss the defense of their interests against the Government's agrarian reform movement.

Aug. 15: The Parliament gave the new Government of Hasan al-Hakim a vote of confidence, 18-4.

Turkey

1951

June 5: A contingent of 1,800 Turkish troops left for Korea to replace 1,500 troops returning home.

June 10: 'Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, arrived on an official visit. At the end of his visit he declared that the joint aim of both Turks and Arabs was to bring stability to the Middle East, and that he had "taken an important step forward with this aim in mind." He also asserted that there should be a neutral Islamic bloc as a barrier between the Soviet Union and the United States.

July 26: An agreement was reported with the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration to release some \$1,304,000 in counterpart funds to help equip 3 new privately-owned industrial installations at Istanbul and Izmir. (*News From Turkey*, July 26.)

Aug. 1: Legislation to encourage foreign investments was passed by the National Assembly. The law provided special privileges for foreign capital to be invested in the fields of hydroelectricity, industry, mining, public works, research, and travel contributing to the economic development of Turkey. Foreign investors were guaranteed in advance the right to take out of Turkey (in the original currency of investment) annual profits, dividends, and interest; also the original invested capital and/or 'wound-up' assets of foreign-financed enterprises. (*News From Turkey*, Aug. 9.)

Aug. 13: At least 44 persons were killed in an earthquake in the northern part of the country, between Cankırı and Zonguldak.

Yemen

1951

June 7: The first foreign legation in the country was opened when the Egyptian Minister presented his credentials to the Imam Ahmad. (*ANA*, June 9.)

June 16: The Imam gave permission to the American Foundation for the Study of Man to send an archaeological expedition to excavate in the region of Sirwah, the first capital of the Queen of Sheba. (*ANA*, June 23.)

July 22: U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Minister to Yemen, Mr. Raymond Hare, presented his credentials to the Imam. (*ANA*, Aug. 4.)

ECONOMIC REVIEWS

Experimental Village in the Jordan Valley

Cecil A. Hourani

WEST OF THE River Jordan, between Allenby Bridge and Jericho, and intersected by the Amman-Jerusalem road, lies a tract of land some 5,000 acres in total area. On this land is taking place the only attempt which has so far been made to rehabilitate Arab refugees from Palestine and to provide them with employment and housing. The project was initiated and is being conducted by the Arab Development Society, under the Presidency and guiding spirit of Musa Alami.¹ On land officially registered as "dead and waste" (*maywat*), and considered by the former Government of Palestine as devoid of water resources and therefore uncultivable, an experimental village has been built consisting of some 50 buildings, and 500 acres of land are being cultivated intensively with water provided by 15 wells. Bananas, citrus fruits, grapevines, vegetables, cotton, and forest trees have been planted and are flourishing.

The experimental village built by the Arab Development Society is the product of the convergence of two main ideas: first, that of raising the standards of rural life of the Arab villagers in Palestine; and secondly, that of providing the Arab refugees with more than relief or temporary employment on public works. The first idea was propounded by Musa Alami, in his capacity of representative of the Arabs of Palestine, to the Preparatory Committee of the Arab States which met in Alexandria in the fall of 1944, and which laid the foundations of the Arab League in the docu-

ment known as the Protocol of Alexandria. On October 5 of that year Musa Alami suggested to the Preparatory Committee the creation of a Fund (*Sandūq al-Umma al-Arabiyya*) to be contributed to by the Arab Governments and peoples with the object of safeguarding Arab lands in Palestine. This idea was accepted by the Preparatory Committee and included in a special Annex to the Protocol of Alexandria. A detailed report on the implementation of the idea was further presented by Musa Alami to the Economic Committee of the Arab League in July 1945.²

This latter report constituted a detailed analysis of the causes which led to the alienation of land from Arab to Jewish hands in Palestine, and of the methods which might be adopted to prevent it. It proposed the creation of a Society in Palestine composed of Palestinian Arabs to improve the conditions of village life by offering the villagers the following services: (1) interest-free loans to be repaid in instalments to be offered to enable the villagers to get rid of the deep-rooted evil of indebtedness to money-lenders; (2) agricultural productivity to be increased by the loan of machinery and by the provision of advice and instruction in modern techniques of cultivation and marketing; (3) village crafts and industries to be encouraged and improved; (4) health standards to be improved by the provision of clinics and hospitals and advice on hygiene and sanitation; (5) where necessary,

¹ For a biographical note on Musa Alami and his analysis of the causes for the Arab defeat in Palestine, see "The Lesson of Palestine," *Middle East Journal*, III (October, 1949), pp. 373-405.

² For full text of this report, and for details of the constitution and program of the Arab Development Society, see the Arabic brochure *Mashru' al-insha'i al-arabi* [*The Arab Development Project*] (Jerusalem, 1946).

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modern and hygienic houses to be put up in place of old and unhealthy ones; (6) educational and cultural standards to be raised by building schools, mosques, and churches, and by providing teachers. In short, everything would be done to improve the conditions of the villagers who constituted 70 percent of the Arab population of Palestine, to increase their prosperity, to educate them in self-help and cooperation, and thus to strengthen them in the face of the Zionist designs on their country.

All these activities the Society would be able to conduct if provided with money by the Arab Governments and by the contributions of the Palestinian Arabs themselves. A yearly total contribution of £1 million was suggested by Musa Alami.

These recommendations, although strongly endorsed by a report presented to the Arab League in December 1945 by two experts appointed to study them, were nevertheless not adopted by the League.³ However, Musa Alami went ahead with the creation of the Society, which was formed and registered in Jerusalem under the name of The Arab Development Society as a non-profitmaking organization with the object of raising the standards of rural life in Palestine. Apart from voluntary subscriptions raised in Palestine, the only money contributed by outside bodies was a sum of £250,000 given by the Government of Iraq.

In the troubled state of Palestine during the last two years of the British Mandate very little constructive work could be accomplished. The Arab Development Society, however, laid the groundwork for an experiment to be conducted in a village in the neighborhood of Jenin. All this preliminary work, together with £150,000 expended for the purchase of the land, was lost as a result of the hostilities in Palestine in the summer of 1948. The village concerned fell into the hands of the Israelis.

As a consequence of the fighting a totally new and far more urgent problem now presented itself: that of the Arab refugees who had left their homes and lands behind them, and were now destitute and living for the most part

in camps or caves. With the money remaining to it, the Arab Development Society could have done one of two things: it could have spent the money on relief, and then have dissolved itself; or it could have embarked on a new project, preserving the basic ideas of its original purpose, and aiming at the rehabilitation of a small number of refugees as an example of self-help which might be followed on a larger scale by some wealthier organization. It chose the latter course as the one more fruitful and closer to its first aim.

In taking this decision the Arab Development Society showed itself realistic and far-sighted. The Arab Governments saw the problem in terms of a choice between settlement and repatriation, and insisted on the latter. To Musa Alami and the Arab Development Society this was a false dichotomy: the rehabilitation and settlement of the refugees did not preclude their eventual return to their homes; on the contrary, unless rehabilitated they would inevitably die off or decay physically and morally, and be useless to themselves or any other community. The important thing was to return them as far and as quickly as possible to the conditions of normal, stable life which alone could restore their dignity as human beings and their usefulness as members of society.

In choosing a site for its project the Arab Development Society was influenced by a number of considerations. It wished to set an example of self-help to the refugees, and it was therefore essential that its experiment should take place, not in some remote area, but in the heart of the refugee population. It wished to open up the possibility of large-scale land reclamation, and therefore it had to choose a site surrounded by terrain offering equal possibilities of cultivation. Above all, it wished to demonstrate the possibility of settlement within the boundaries of Arab Palestine and of Jordan, believing it to be both morally and politically wrong to entertain projects of settlement in other countries, such as Syria or Iraq, so long as the potentialities of the refugees' own country had not been fully explored. All these considerations led the Society to choose the Jordan Valley for its project.⁴

³ See, *ibid.*, report presented to the Arab League Council by Professor Sa'id B. Himadeh, of the American University of Beirut, and Raja'i Husayni.

⁴ According to the *Report of the UN Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East* [Clapp Re-

In a memorandum presented to the Government of Jordan in May 1949, the Arab Development Society asked for permission to enter and make cultivable state lands on the western side of the River Jordan, and to create thereon model villages "to give an example of what can and should be done in this field. These villages would become a sort of experimental station for the tremendous problem of settling the best part of a million homeless people." On June 29, 1949, the Prime Minister of Jordan, in his reply, stated that the Council of Ministers had considered the memorandum submitted by Musa Alami as President of the Arab Development Society, and had decided to allow the Society to take possession, "free and without return," of the land lying west of the River Jordan in the vicinity of Allenby Bridge, in an area of about 20,000 dunams (5,000 acres) "for the purpose of reclaiming it and making it cultivable and establishing model villages for the settlement of refugees." He went on to state that, when the final status of Arab Palestine had been determined,⁵ the land would either be leased to the Society on a long-term basis for a nominal rent, or would be finally transferred to the name of the Society.

The site thus chosen by the Society was not one which on the face of things appeared to be very promising. An average yearly rainfall of only 6 inches makes irrigation farming the only kind possible. If water is to be pumped from the Jordan, it must be raised to a head of 300 feet and pushed to a distance of about 8 kilometres to reach the site. Neither pumps nor power nor pipes were available. On the other hand, most of the "experts" called in by the former Government of Palestine to report on the water resources of this area had reported that no subterranean water existed, and the Government had registered the land as "dead and waste."

However, there was one test which the so-called experts omitted to make, and that was to dig. The necessity of finding underground water if work was to proceed forced the Arab Development Society to go ahead. No well-

boring machinery was available, nor were casings or pipes, but a group of refugees working under the direction of Musa Alami constructed a primitive rig. After about three months of hard labor, and at a depth of little more than 100 feet, they struck sweet water. "Now," one of the refugees told Musa Alami, "you may die: you have found water."

In spite of the water being found at a very shallow depth, its extremely low salinity, and its copious quantity, there were still sceptics. The experts of the Clapp Mission wrote in their Report that "the possibilities of developing sub-surface water supplies, which are under examination at present, do not appear to be exceptionally good"; that "it is possible that the Wadi Qilt may be found to have a better source of water"; and that "it is considered that the irrigation water for this tract of land can better be obtained by conserving the surplus waters of the Wadi Qilt."⁶ (What would happen to cultivation in years like 1951, when there has been *no* surplus water in the Wadi Qilt, was not suggested.)

Since those words were written the Society has dug 15 wells, at an average depth of about 120 feet. All give a steady and so far undiminished flow of sweet water. Six of the wells are operated with Diesel engines and Peerless pumps, giving an average each of 100 cubic meters per hour, and the others are being operated with smaller pumps until larger equipment can be obtained. With the exception of two motors donated by the Arabian American Oil Company, all pumping equipment has been purchased out of the Society's original capital. It still possesses no well-boring machine, and has been obliged to hire one from the Iraq Petroleum Company. The source of this water has not been ascertained, but there is some evidence that it may come from the Judean hills to the west.

With the water obtained from the wells, 500 acres of land have been reclaimed and planted. It is an interesting fact that no traces of previous cultivation from any period in history have been found on this site, unlike neighboring Jericho. Before cultivation could begin, the soil had to be washed free from salt; so far, no resalting of the land has occurred. Ten

port] (December 1949), "the Jordan Valley is by far the greatest land asset in Jordan for development under irrigation farming." Part I, p. 96.

⁵ The incorporation of Arab Palestine into the Kingdom of Jordan took place on April 24, 1950.

⁶ *Clapp Report*, Part I, pp. 99, 78, 28.

thousand banana trees, 12,000 forest trees (eucalyptus, casuarina, and cyprus), and 16,000 grapevines have been planted. Also 100 acres have been planted in cotton, and nearly the same extent in vegetables, such as potatoes, onions, eggplant, and spinach. Barley and wheat have also been planted, and a nursery for citrus and forest trees started. The area of cultivation is being continuously extended.

On this land an experimental model village has been built, consisting of 45 houses and 5 other buildings, including schoolrooms, a clinic, and offices. A public oven has recently been completed, and a public bath is under construction. The houses are of two sizes: the larger consist of two living-rooms, kitchen, lavatory, shower, and a small veranda, covering 82 square meters of floor space; the smaller have the same facilities, but only one living-room. In all houses there is running water, sanitation, and cross-ventilation to catch the prevailing north-south winds. The building material is mud, baked in the sun to give hard bricks; these provide excellent insulation against heat. Cement, timber, and plumbing material have all had to be purchased at very high prices. The average cost of each house works out at JD280 (\$784). Other construction in the village includes fences, leveling of land and construction of bridges, irrigation canals and pipes, reservoirs to collect water from the wells, and dirt roads. Construction is continuously in progress.

Social services provided include a school for children up to the age of ten, a clinic with a trained nurse permanently in residence, and regular visits by a doctor. In addition to attendance at the clinic the nurse visits each house regularly to give instruction in hygiene and housework.

The project is providing employment for approximately 175 heads of families, including 25 families settled in houses. The remaining houses will be filled before the end of 1951 with orphans, for whom a school is being established. Those employed on the project, but not yet settled on it, receive a daily wage of 20 piasters (56 cents); all are refugees living in camps near Jericho. The families settled in houses have the use of 2 dunams (.5 acre) of land around their houses, on which they may grow what they please, and of 10 dunams of

land on the project, which they must cultivate in common with each other. When crops large enough for sale are available, the Society plans to organize a system of co-operative marketing.

In order to give the refugee families settled on the project a feeling of responsibility for their future, they are required to pay a yearly contribution to the Arab Development Society of an average of JD24. (\$67.20). This covers their house rent, social services, and share in the agricultural machinery and equipment. Decisions affecting the life of the village are taken by public meetings, at which the Society attempts to guide and counsel. The final status of the families settled on the project will depend on the arrangements which the Jordan Government makes with the Society for the lease, gift, or purchase of the land.

Taking into account all the expenses involved in the discovery of water, land reclamation, the purchase of machinery and agricultural equipment, the construction of buildings, and the provision of social services, the figure which the Arab Development Society has reached pragmatically as the average cost of settling one refugee family is \$2,245. This figure is considerably lower than the \$3,000 per family which the Director of UNWRA is reported to have estimated as the cost of settlement where considerable irrigation and desalting of the land is necessary.⁷

The Society has now worked out a 2-year project to extend its experiment. This project includes the drilling and operation of at least 50 more wells, the installation of an electric power plant to drive the pumps and run light industries and mechanical workshops, the erection of 200 more houses, the establishment of an industrial training center and of separate boys' and girls' communities to be run entirely by themselves, the cultivation of the remaining land at its disposal, and the employment of from 600 to 700 heads of refugee families. To what extent this project will be carried through depends on the funds and equipment made available to the Society.

Whether the Society will be able to expand its work or whether it will have to crystallize its present achievement at the stage at which it exists today, the importance and significance

⁷ *New York Times*, July 16, 1951.

of the experimental village still stand. It is first and foremost an example of what persistence and self-reliance can do. The project was conceived and executed entirely by Palestinian Arabs who took as their guiding principle self-help, or the idea that if they did not look after their own interests, probably no one else would.

Secondly, the creation of a village with water and fertile land on a site which had always been regarded as uninhabitable and uncultivable has pointed the way to the reclamation and development of wide areas hitherto neglected and empty. It has been estimated that there are 250,000 dunams of land on the west bank of the River Jordan and 350,000 on the east bank, of which not more than 200,000 dunams are now under cultivation. The full development of the Jordan Valley, by irrigation from the river and from underground sources, would go a long way toward settling a considerable proportion of the refugees. It would seem far more reasonable to exploit all the potentialities of settlement on both sides of the Jordan than to toy with the idea of transplanting the refugees to northern Syria, as some who are thinking about this problem appear to be doing.

Thirdly, the figures arrived at by the Arab Development Society as the cost of refugee settlement provide a pragmatic basis on which estimates of the total cost of rehabilitating the entire Arab refugee community may be built.

These figures are indeed the only ones which are founded on experience rather than on paper-work, since the Society is the only organization which has so far attempted refugee rehabilitation.

Fourthly, the Society has laid down standards of housing and of living which it believes should guide any large-scale attempt at settlement of the refugees. It has kept before it its original object of raising the standards of rural life of the Arab villagers of Palestine, and it has provided living conditions in its experimental village better than those from which the majority of the refugees came. It believes, furthermore, that any large-scale attempt at resettlement should aim at setting standards which will help to raise the level of rural life in all Middle East countries.

Musa Alami and the Arab Development Society do not claim to be able to solve the refugee problem, or even to be able to rehabilitate any more than a comparatively small number of refugees. But they do claim that they have done pioneer work and provided a demonstration of what can be done with small resources and hard work. And they are confident that sooner or later any serious attempt to tackle the problem of the Arab refugees which may be made by the U.N. or any other agency will have to follow the pattern they have laid down in their experiment in the Jordan Valley.

U.S. Petroleum's Response to the Iranian Shutdown

C. Stribling Snodgrass and Arthur Kuhl

THE ANGLO-IRANIAN CRISIS of the past year has been heavy from the first with impending tragedy. The most imminent danger was the blow to be dealt the world's supply of oil should Iranian production be cut off. A foretaste of what this would mean came in April 1951 when striking Iranian employees of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company forced a drastic curtailment of Abadan refinery operations. The Abadan refinery is a huge operation,

almost twice the size of the largest refinery in the United States. It employed 40,000 persons. It turned out over 500,000 barrels of petroleum products every day. In addition, 150,000 barrels of crude were exported daily from Iran. This was about 6% of the total of world oil, or some 700,000 barrels a day—close to the total estimated production of the Soviet Union and its satellites behind the Iron Curtain.

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Even the brief curtailment of refined products from Abadan, where operations were reduced to about 20% of normal at the strike's height, had an impact on the world oil trade. Up to 7 million barrels of petroleum products were lost to that trade during the strike. And petroleum has not within recent years, particularly since World War II, been in such abundant supply that that sort of loss was at all easily made up.

This April loss has, however, been made to seem almost insignificant by the losses that have occurred since as a result of the continued struggle over "nationalization" of the Iranian oil fields and the refinery. Since June 22 the masters of tankers directed to Abadan to load crude or products have been instructed by the Company to refuse to sign the receipts demanded by the Iranian Government. These were receipts that would have acknowledged that the product loaded was the property of the National Oil Company of Iran rather than of Anglo-Iranian. Since agreement could not be reached as to wording of the receipts, no additional cargoes were loaded and several tankers which had already taken products pumped them back into shore storage. As a consequence, since June 22 shipments of both crude oil and oil products from Iran have ceased.

As the storage tanks at Abadan filled with refined products that could not be loaded into tankers, the refinery was progressively shut down until on July 31 it was completely stopped. Anglo-Iranian has indicated that it will keep some 350 technicians at Abadan. But for all practical purposes this great refinery has been lost — for the time at least — to the free world. This means that the world trade in oil has daily been losing some 485,000 barrels of petroleum products, while the closing of the terminal at Bandar Shapur has caused the loss of 150,000 barrels a day of crude oil.

As of October 1, the total accumulated loss is some 64 million barrels of crude and products. Each week the shutdown continues the loss will increase by another 4,445,000 barrels. Worse, even should Great Britain and Iran manage to reach an agreement tomorrow, the loss would continue for some months ahead. It would, for instance, take three or four weeks

to restore the refinery to full operation, for a refinery is a rather delicate operation, not to be turned on and off like a kitchen faucet. It would take at least several months to reassemble the tanker fleet that previously called for the crude and products from Abadan, for it has now been diverted to other ports all over the world. And even when the refinery is in operation and the tankers again on their old routes, there would still be the need for filling storage tanks in other parts of the world that have been depleted because of the Iranian cut-off. All of this would have to be done before the world oil trade could truly be said to be back to normal.

If the results have been in their way extremely far-reaching, at least the Iranian situation has provided a striking demonstration of two facts:

1. That the world-wide oil industry is an integrated unit whose every part is closely dependent on every other part. What happened in Iran has had its repercussions throughout the free world. Unessential flying already has been banned east of Suez for lack of aviation gasoline, which is now being rationed in India, Pakistan, and Malaya. Stocks of bunker fuels east of Suez have been reduced to about half normal levels. Kerosene has come into acutely short supply in such countries as India, which use comparatively large quantities of this particular product. Even the United States and Canada have felt the impact of the Iranian shutdown, for Middle East crude oil which was formerly shipped to refineries on the Eastern seaboard of these nations is being diverted to eastern hemisphere refineries as rapidly as replacement supplies of domestic crude can be made available.

2. That there is a need for a high degree of government-industry cooperation in the solution of any such problem as that which Iran now so strikingly presents.

Oil is an essential to the successful maintenance of the peacetime economy of any modern nation; it is even more essential in time of war, for then oil becomes a weapon of prime importance. But in this present period that lies uneasily somewhere between war and peace, oil is perhaps more essential than ever before. For now national economies must, in a sense, be prepared to jump with the cat,

and no one can ever be sure which way the cat will jump. It is essential to keep the civilian economy as healthy and as near peak as possible. The alternative could all too easily be the civilian unrest and dissatisfaction which breed revolution's violence and invite Communist infiltration. It is essential at the same time to keep the guard of military defenses high. The alternative in that field could all too easily be the sort of unpreparedness that invites outright attack. There is, then, a double demand on all a nation's resources, not least of all on petroleum.

The U.S. itself has to face the dilemma, delicately balancing civilian demands against military needs. In Europe the problem is much more acute, for if its simultaneous recovery and new defense efforts are to go ahead at all, they will have to go ahead on oil. These facts demonstrate the U.S. Government's vital interest in a continued flow of sufficient oil in the whole of free-world trade. Yet patently the Government itself can do nothing to ensure such a flow on its own. It cannot sink new wells. It cannot build new refineries. It cannot lay new pipelines. It cannot commandeer the oil tankers. But it can allocate steel where it would do the most for increased production.

Because the U.S. is erected on a foundation of free enterprise, these many operational activities are entrusted to the petroleum industry itself. Nonetheless, the industry cannot afford to be independent of the Government, and that on several counts. Petroleum operations of American companies abroad face many complications that are not usual in domestic fields. Not the least of these is the fact that almost universally abroad oil reserves are the property of the various governments in whose areas they are located. The United States is, in fact, one of only a few producing areas where underground minerals are the property of private citizens. What that means in practice is that the operating companies cannot rely abroad, as they can in the United States, on any relatively simple rules of competition with only minor governmental supervision. Instead they must rely constantly on negotiations with the governments that control the mineral resources. Obviously the backing of their own Government plays an important, even a vital part in such negotiations.

In fact one of the few possibly beneficial results to come from the Iranian crisis is that the U.S. Government's relations with American oil companies have been more clearly defined. "Voice of America" broadcasts have protested, not the right of Iran to nationalize the industry, but rather the crude expropriation of oil properties without adequate compensation. Those broadcasts may well have served to make American policy on the subject clear. If so, the definition of policy, too long lacking in the past, may itself serve as a sort of safeguard against threatened future crises.

Further, it is obvious that individual oil companies acting entirely on their own are in no position to solve the sort of complex problems that present themselves with the Iranian situation. They are by their nature competitive and consequently reluctant to enter into cooperative arrangements that might give one company long-range benefits over another. And even if they wanted to do so, they could not enter such arrangements on their own initiative without running the risk of violating anti-trust laws.

In the Iranian situation, then, it was imperative for continued defense of the free world that the loss of petroleum and its products from Iran be somehow made up. Government could not do the job by itself; nor could industry. So it was that Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman, who is also Petroleum Administrator for Defense, recommended to Charles E. Wilson, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, that American oil companies doing business abroad should be brought together to advise the U.S. Government on steps that could be taken to assure a continued full supply of oil to the free world. Other agencies of the Government concurred in this suggestion, and a formal organization was established on June 25, 1951, when a joint voluntary agreement was approved.

Nineteen American companies with operations abroad are participating in this organization, known as the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee: American Independent Oil Company, Arabian American Oil Company, Atlantic Refining Company, Barber Oil Corporation, Caltex Oil Products Company, Creole Petroleum Corporation, Conorodo Petroleum Corporation, Gulf Oil Corporation, Pacific

Western Oil Corporation, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Standard Oil Company of California, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, Superior Oil Company, The Texas Company, Tide Water Associated Oil Company, Union Oil Company of California, Venezuelan Petroleum Company, Sinclair Oil Company. This is a committee of companies with foreign oil holdings and a common interest in protecting the free world. They are working under PAD's direction to devise means of best using the resources available with a primary regard for defense rather than just for usual peacetime activities.

On August 2, this committee was authorized to proceed with a Joint Plan of Action which it had devised under PAD's guidance to meet at least part of the shortage that has been building. This plan would provide for:

1. Increases of crude-oil production in some or all of the following 11 countries — Bahrein Island, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.

2. Increases in the manufacture of refined petroleum products in some or all of the following 27 countries — Argentina, Australia, Bahrein Island, Belgium, British West Indies, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Norway, Netherlands West Indies, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Trieste Zone, Trinidad, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

3. Arrangements among the participating companies for the purchase, loan, sale, or exchange of crude oil, petroleum products, and blending agents for distribution in foreign countries.

4. Arrangements for the most efficient use, without regard to ownership, of terminal and storage facilities, tankers, pipelines, and other transportation facilities to minimize duplications, multiple loadings and dischargings, split cargoes, cross hauling and back hauling, and idle time in port.

The purposes of this plan are simple enough. It is designed to ensure that there will be no waste of vital facilities in this time of extreme stress. That, for instance, one company does not have a tanker tied to the dock, empty and useless, while another company is searching

for tanker space. That one company does not reduce a refinery run because its storage tanks are filled while another company has idle storage facilities ready and available. Yet simple though it sounds, the plan and the detailed schedules of operation that have issued under the Plan would have been impossible without close cooperation between government and industry.

That cooperation does not stop, though, in the foreign field. It has of necessity been extended to the domestic field as well. On August 24, for example, representatives of 14 domestic oil companies met with PAD officials to discuss the crude-oil problems raised by the Abadan shutdown. Some 230,000 barrels a day of Middle East crude are normally shipped to East Coast refineries of the United States and Canada. It obviously would be desirable to divert as much of that crude as possible to Eastern Hemisphere refineries, where additional capacity of 190,000 barrels of crude oil a day has been located through the Committee's efforts. Government and industry are presently engaged in trying to ensure that additional crude oil is supplied to fill this capacity, both through diversions of existing supplies and through increases in the crude production of this country. In effect, and in short, the loss of Iranian oil is being made up from other sources.

Aviation gasoline has presented another problem for the industry and the government. Abadan was the major source of high octane number aviation gasoline in the Eastern Hemisphere: during the week of July 23 the Petroleum Administration for Defense informed refiners in the U.S. that they would be called upon to make up the 18,000 barrels of aviation gas a day that previously had been supplied from Abadan.

The shutdown of Abadan has merely highlighted what is a continuing fact: in a mobilization effort such as the U.S. is now engaged in, safety can be assured only if government and industry work constantly together with tolerance, understanding, forbearance, and self-sacrifice. Prompt recognition of this principle and the success of its application have brought the only positive results so far in solving the issues raised by the Iranian nationalization move.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Recent Books on the Interpretation of Islam

Nicola A. Ziadeh

ALMOST A QUARTER of a century ago two books were published in Egypt which caused a sensation. The first was *Al-islam wa-usūl al-ḥukm* [Islam and the Principles of Government], by Shaykh 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq (now Pasha). The second was *Fi al-shī'r al-jāhili* [Of Pre-Islamic Arabic Poetry], by Dr. Taha Husayn (now Pasha). The first dealt with the basic factors and pillars of the state and concluded that the caliphate was not an essential part of Islam; that it grew out of expediency; and that the abolition of the caliphate did not constitute an act of apostacy. Shaykh 'Abd al-Rāziq was tried by the Society of the Learned of al-Azhar, of which he was a member, and was expelled from the group. His book was confiscated. Taha Husayn's book did not deal directly with Islam, but it contained some casual remarks which were considered irreligious. In discussing Arabic poetry of the pre-Islamic period, he argued that most of this poetry was produced later but attributed to the earlier age for linguistic, political, and social purposes. This predating of the poetry was essential for the support of many linguistic problems appearing later, and especially in connection with the Qur'an. It was in this slippery field that Taha Husayn skidded and made remarks which conservative Muslims could not accept. He was tried and convicted, and his book was confiscated and destroyed.

A number of books and articles were written in refutation of the arguments forwarded by each in his own field. Seven books appeared analyzing Taha Husayn's theory and attacking his attitude toward Islam. Some, like *Al-naqd al-tahlili* [Analytical Criticism]

by al-Ghamrāwī, and *Al-shahāb al-rāyid* [The Watching Meteor] by M. L. Guma', were balanced books which threw some light on the subject and argued calmly. Others were just vehement attacks on the author. So far as I am aware, 'Abd al-Rāziq was less fortunate than Taha Husayn in his opponents. They came mainly from conservative or reactionary circles, probably supported by interested parties.

These two books were neither the first nor the last to cause a stir in the learned circles of the Muslim world. Nevertheless, they were a landmark in its intellectual history, coming, as they did, shortly after World War I, when the Arab and the Muslim world as a whole was facing new problems. Atatürk had just abolished the caliphate and was being attacked right and left for the serious step he had taken. Since then numerous books have appeared in Arabic dealing with a variety of topics relating to Muslim life and thought. In some cases a balanced re-examination and reinterpretation has been put forward. Of such is the work of the late Shakib Arslan, *Limādha ta'akhhara al-muslimūn?* [Why Did Muslims Degenerate?]. A more sober work is that of al-Qusaymī, *Hadhihi al-aghlāl* [These Fetters], published in 1937. Only this year appeared two large volumes refuting his arguments on the basis of an extremely conservative approach.

The Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), both in Cairo and Damascus, has published many pamphlets dealing with similar questions. The trend in these discussions may be summed up along the following lines: Muslims at present are degenerating

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because they have forsaken Islam; the solution for the numerous problems of the Muslim world lies in understanding Islam properly and following its teachings to the letter; Islam is the only means and way to bring peace into the troubled world at large.

Although there is some agreement among these discussions, there are many points of difference. Thinkers differ as to how Islam should be understood, reinterpreted, and developed. Thus, while a few wish Islam to grow to meet new needs of a changing world, others, probably more numerous, would rather see the world stand still to have its problems solved through Islam. Again, a few recognize some good in the experiences, spiritual and material, of other creeds and civilizations, while others insist on the self-sufficiency of Islam and its all-containing ability to lead to happiness and goodwill. There are also a small number of thinkers who are inclined to believe that Islam should abandon politics and be satisfied with a deep spiritual leadership and with becoming a personal religion, while a much larger group think that Islam should keep up its traditional and historical role of being a religion and political system as well. Such differences are far from being matters of minor importance. This was made especially clear when the Syrian Constituent Assembly was discussing the Syrian Constitution of 1950. The inclusion, in the Constitution, of a provision that Islam must be the religion of the President of the Republic and that Muslim jurisprudence was to be the guiding principle of state legislation was a victory for the more conservative elements.

II

It is within this general framework that two books published in Egypt in 1950 should be discussed. These two books are *Min huna nabda'* [*From Here We Start*], by Khalid Muhammad Khalid, and *Al-'adāla al-ijtima'ya fil-islam* [*Social Justice in Islam*], by Sayyid Qutb.

Khalid's book was considered by the Fatwa (Opinion) Committee of al-Azhar as a vehement attack on Islam, undermining its spiritual, cultural, and political structure. The author, in addition, was accused of commu-

nistic leanings. The book was confiscated by the authorities and the author was prosecuted and tried. It is to the credit of the judge that he saw the book in its real meaning and understood its spirit, so that Khalid was acquitted (May 27, 1950), and the book has since been allowed to circulate. It has already run into three printings, plus one which appeared without the author's permission and is full of errata and twisted sentences.¹ Sayyid Qutb's book may be considered, although the author does not say so, an answer to Khalid's arguments.

What are, after all, Khalid's opinions and suggestions? He has divided *From Here We Start* into four chapters: Religion, Not Witchcraft; Bread Is Peace; The National State; and The Unused Lung. In his brief introduction, Khalid states that Egypt, as well as other countries of the Arab world, is trying to catch up with the progress of civilization behind which it now lags. This makes it imperative that those whose weight counts in these matters realize that openings into the new world are needed, and that the people must be freed from fear before they can advance. (pp. 41-42.) The author believes that a social change is badly needed; that the only solution for the problems of Egypt is a just socialism; that there is a definite need for a spiritual consciousness based on a sound understanding of the spirit of religion, so that "witchcraft" will be discarded by a people aware of its needs. These things will all produce peace within the country and thus allow for the development of the people.

Khalid is convinced that what has been so far the guiding force in Egypt and other Muslim countries is not religion but a set of teachings and practices created by "witches" — fake religious heads — and guarded by them in their own interest. For while religion grows as the needs of men grow, keeping its intrinsic character and aiming at securing happiness for humanity (p. 46), the witchcraft which prevails today defends continued poverty, the interests of the rich, and almsgiving. It opposes any social change because this may open the eyes of the people and thus lead to the de-

¹ The 4th printing is the one to which the references in this article apply.

struction of witchcraft and its supporters. Khalid deals fully with these matters (pp. 48-58) and criticizes especially the traditional interpretation of *sadaqāt* (almsgiving) accepted by many Muslims. This view considers almsgiving an economic system which aims at granting the poor the riches of the wealthy. While Khalid accepts almsgiving as an occasional relief, his view is that it could be turned into begging and thus cause more injustice to men than benefit. Khalid strongly believes that the realization of a healthy spiritual life can be achieved only through a sound economic system which will grant each individual a minimum of decent living. This should be backed by a sound system of education which will provide for the nation a thorough and free understanding of its needs and problems. (pp. 59-68.)

Summing up his arguments, the author says that religion is essentially democratic and humane, a supporter of the freedom of the mind, whereas witchcraft opposes democracy, is selfish, and denies the mind its freedom. (pp. 77-82). It seeks to control literary, intellectual, and social life, and thus kills society and divides and poisons the nation.

Khalid proceeds next to deal with the economic-social aspect of life. Discontent is the tone of Egyptian society, as well as of other societies. This discontent is essentially due to the existence of two greatly different groups of people living side by side. One, a small minority, has more wealth than it can manage and enjoys all the luxuries of life, while the other, by far the larger, lacks even the bare necessities for decent living. This state of affairs is producing bitter feeling — a hatred of the needy for those who have plenty, who in turn are contemptuous of the poor. This is class struggle, pure and simple. It is dormant now but may burst out at any minute. (pp. 104-14.) The rich own the land — large stretches of land — and the poor toil for the owners. Of the people of Egypt, almost 17 million own no land at all, while 12% of the land is owned by 198 individuals. (pp. 115-16.) Not only that, but the farmer has to pay high rent for the land which is supposed to support him. In addition, the worker and the small employee, whether in government service or otherwise, are in no better

position than the farmer. They all earn far too little to cover the necessary expenses of mere existence, let alone provide for the amenities of life.

The means of solving this complicated problem lies, according to the author, only in socialism. Only through socialism can social justice — the sole guarantee of security, freedom, and prosperity — be realized. (pp. 128-29.) The various methods adopted by the present government, such as allowances, combatting the rise of prices, etc., may ameliorate conditions. But the situation cannot be fundamentally improved through such half-measures and "patching." What is needed is something totally different. The changes recommended by Khalid are radical. There should be a levelling in wealth. This can best be achieved through the raising of taxes, redistribution of land ownership, limiting of rents on land, and nationalization of the big industries. (pp. 133-46.) Anybody acquainted with the economic and social structure of Egypt and other Arab countries can appreciate how extreme are these changes suggested by Khalid. He asks, besides, for strict measures of contraception, so that the population of Egypt may cease to increase as rapidly as it has during the last few decades.

Startling as Khalid's social suggestions, as so far given, may be, his views on government, presented in the chapter entitled "The National Government," are still more shocking to many Muslims. He says: "An idea which enjoys popularity in our society nowadays is that of clamoring for a theocratic state which will see that God's orders are carried out and punishments (*ḥudūd*) imposed by Islam are enforced. This view includes among its supporters a group of our finest men. . . . But as we believe that theocratic states proved to be a failure and a revival of such an institution [would establish] an autocracy and be detrimental to religion itself . . . we feel it our bounden duty to argue such views down." (p. 158.) Khalid proceeds to demonstrate that the theocratic state relies on an ambiguous source of authority and lacks constitutional grounds. Thus its responsibilities and duties toward the public are neither defined nor binding. (p. 184.) It is omnipotent, with neither opposition nor check on its behavior. (p. 190.)

It has no confidence in man or his intelligence, and therefore allows no scope for free expression of any kind. (p. 176.)

The arguments of those who cry for a theocratic state are that (a) such a state is by its nature capable of destroying all vices; and (b) it aims at enforcing all punishments. Khalid's refutation, which in the opinion of the present writer is one of the best parts of his book, is marshalled with sagacity and wisdom, supported by historical incidents and quotations from the most sacred religious sources. As for point (a), he thinks that this is the paramount aim of religion when it touches the heart and purifies it. Man's conscience, when aroused, is capable of ousting evil and becoming a holy of holies for virtue. Religion without the support of the state can do this. But when religion tries to force its way into men's hearts supported by the sword and whip of the state, it ceases to be a moral force. As for point (b), Islam has legislated for the punishment of many moral crimes. Adultery, theft, and wine-drinking are the most obvious. Yet the legislation itself contains so many restrictions, such as witnesses (4 in the case of adultery) or confession, that the assigned punishments cannot be easily applied. Theft itself was not punished by 'Umar, the second caliph, when it was committed in time of famine. Wine-drinking is as difficult to prove as adultery. It is thus clear that the supposed justification of a theocratic state along this line is unfounded. (pp. 170-73.) The author then cites numerous examples of modern Muslim theocratic states and discusses the lamentable conditions under which the people live. (pp. 182-89.)

The conclusion Khalid reaches is that religion should be left to perform its duty alone and along moral, spiritual, and social lines (pp. 195-96), while the state should be completely secular, leaving religion aside and looking after its own duties and obligations of securing to the nation at large its needs.

In his last chapter, Khalid deals with the position of women in Egypt. His cry here is for the granting of full civil and political rights. Khalid repeats the usual arguments for the need of cooperation between the two sections of the nation (men and women), and for the betterment of family life, social con-

ditions, and morality. This chapter is a loud cry — probably the loudest written by a Muslim for some time past.

Khalid concludes his book with the following points:

(1) Our intellectual world is in need of a change, an education and a training so that it may allow every concept to pass through it.

(2) We have to throw aside our fears . . . we have to infuse into the conscience of the individual, the state, and society the courage necessary for facing our problems and solving them.

(3) We need tolerance, feeling, and steadiness. . . .

(4) We must begin, even if we encounter failure. . . . We must take the first step.

The road Khalid trod was thorny. He plodded through a conservative society possessed of a strong reactionary element. His style is harsh because of the nature of his theme. His remarks are pungent because he touches the most painful spots in the life of his people. The importance of his views may not be immediately apparent to people living in the West, but when they are viewed in the perspective of the situation in which they were written their real value becomes clear.

The Fatwa Committee of al-Azhar accused Khalid of publicly attacking and insulting Islam when he denounced the theocratic state, defended the stoppage of religious punishments, supported the restriction of the work of religion to the realm of spiritual guidance, and considered almsgiving a limited function. This reading of the al-Azhar Committee is, in my opinion, far-fetched. Khalid exhibited great respect for Islam and in no way can be considered to have trespassed or insulted it. He attacked organs and people who have misinterpreted and abused Islam in their own interest. It is significant to recall again that the judge who tried the author could find nothing to support the accusations: Khalid might have committed minor mistakes, but there was no ill-intention in his book.

III

Sayyid Qutb, author of *Social Justice in Islam*, takes a fundamentally different attitude. His viewpoint is best presented in his own words (pp. 89-90):

Islam presents humanity with a perfect institution the like of which the world has never known,

neither before nor since. Islam neither attempts, nor has it attempted, to imitate any other institution, or effect with it any connection or resemblance. It chose its unique and singular path, and presented humanity with a complete solution for all and every one of its problems.

It might have happened through the process of their development that human institutions came near to Islam or differed from it. It is, however, an independent and perfect institution, which has no relation whatever with such [human] institutions, neither when they meet it nor when they separate from it. Such meeting or separation is purely accidental, and only partial. . . .

A Muslim scholar, when discussing Islam as an institution, has no business trying to discover similarities or otherwise between it and other systems and ways. . . . The proper method to be followed by them [Muslims] is to expound the grounds of their religion, with the unshaken belief that they are perfect, irrespective of whether they agree or disagree with other institutions or systems. . . . The very attempt at gaining support to Islamic institutions from similarities with other systems is in itself a feeling of defeat.

It is in this belief that Islam is self-sufficient and capable of solving any problem that Qutb wrote his book. The first part (pp. 1-136) discusses theories and principles which help explain social justice in Islam. The second part (pp. 137-267) is a pageant of events in which Islam has been the force behind various kinds of development.

Qutb gives, in his first pages (pp. 5-21), an account of the historical development of Christianity and Islam in relation to society. His argument is that Christianity was born in an empire, it adapted itself to its new environment, and later when the church and the empire contested authority, there grew up a struggle which eventually led to the separation of state and religion. Islam, on the other hand, came into a world which had no fully-developed empire. It grew up with an empire of its own. It legislated for life in almost every aspect. It was the force, spiritual as well as material, which pushed Muslims to great and exalted deeds. "There is not one single argument which may support the separation of Islam from society." (p. 18.)

Here Qutb exaggerates, consciously or otherwise, the separation of state and religion in Western civilization, for in the West Christianity has not ceased to be a force in society. On the contrary, since its separation

from the state, religion has become more influential. No one among the Muslim writers who advocated a similar separation in Islam has suggested an "isolation" of Islam. What they suggested is a national state in place of the theocratic state.

In Islam, according to Qutb, the universal idea found its first expression. God is the sole creator of the world; He keeps a watch over the world; it is His will that cooperation should be enforced. In all this complete and full unity in realized (pp. 22-26); within this all-embracing framework social justice falls. Its purposes are clear: the freeing of the conscience, full equality in every sphere, especially equality between man and woman, and full social cooperation. The means are fully expressed, too: they are the human conscience and the Law. (p. 73.) The former is a vague and ambiguous term, which may mean anything. The second, the legal pillar of social justice, includes *zaka* (almsgiving); the prohibition of interest, of wine-drinking, and of gambling; and the good and wise administration. Qutb proceeds then to describe statecraft (pp. 88-100) and financial policy in Islam. (pp. 101-36.) Here the author is polemic and marshals the facts in the traditional way.

In more than one place Qutb is keen to inform his readers that looking at the West or trying to adopt systems and institutions which were experienced by other nations is the result of ignorance on the part of those who cry for such a step. Only Muslims with a defeatist spirit call for such procedure.

IV

The two books under consideration represent, as has become clear from this brief survey, two totally different schools of thought. The one wishes for the world of Islam a growth based on the experiences of the human race at large, while the other thinks that Islam, and Islam alone, can solve the race's worries and troubles. The one sees that the historical development of the Muslim theocratic state ended in failure and the experiment should not be repeated. It recognizes that such a state succeeded once only under the

Prophet and his immediate successors. The other school believes strongly that because the experiment was successful fourteen centuries ago there is no reason why the same thing may not succeed at any time in history,

when the right people become masters of the nation. The most that Qutb suggests the Muslim world may take from the West is its sciences and techniques — but nothing of its philosophy, literature, or legislation.

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GENERAL

Both Sides of the Curtain, by Sir Maurice Peterson. London: Constable, 1951. 305 pages, 7 illustrations. \$4.00.

In a suave and readable style, one more British diplomat narrates a distinguished career in the British Foreign Service covering thirty-six years of momentous world history (1913-49). He skips through it all with Scots brevity, for in some 300 pages he takes us to Washington, Prague, Tokyo, Cairo, Spain (twice), Sofia, Baghdad, Ankara, and Moscow, with intervals at the Foreign Office in London. It has not been British practice to leave diplomats long in one country or even in one region of the world, but need this be reflected in a book?

The link that joins these chapters is the author's personality, and while this is agreeable and able, it naturally does not fascinate like a Churchill or a Schweitzer. We are given glimpses of many countries, but in most of them Sir Maurice gives us no chance to settle down. The chapter on Spain is an exception, and its very length makes it the most interesting and valuable in the book. Peterson was the first British Ambassador accredited to Franco Spain, and in spite of his desire to be helpful he makes it clear that his position at Madrid in those critical months of February 1939 to June 1940 was not an easy one. The chapter which narrates his final three years (1946-49) as Ambassador to Moscow contains shrewd observations of Russian ways, but is insufficient to justify the title of the book.

Peterson was First Secretary to Lord Lloyd in Egypt between 1927 and 1929 and head of the Egyptian Department of the Foreign Office in London from 1931 to 1936, including four months in Egypt in 1934 as Acting High Commissioner. These were the years of fruitless treaty negotiations; they must have been trying years but Peterson presents them in good humor, with some entertaining anecdotes. There are personal recollections of Lloyd and a fair estimate of the man, but too little about Egyptians although he loved their country. On one important issue the author's political judgment may be questioned. He writes that in 1936 he did not favor the negotiation of an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty because in any case "Egypt would have held to us against the Axis. . . . After the Abyssinian war at the very least and latest it was, for me, impossible to believe that the Egyptians could fail, despite a certain entrenching of the Italian influence in Cairo, to be on the side of the lesser evil they had known so long — the British — against the incomparably greater evil, now revealed with equal clarity, which Mussolini's ideas of Italian colonization held for them." (p. 75). Further, an independent Egypt seemed to him then both unnecessary and shackling to the military in the war which was approaching. These judgments surely underestimated both the latent strength of Egyptian national sentiment, which might not always pull the same way as a far-sighted estimate of national interests, and the value of friendly Egyptian cooperation with the Allied armed forces which would be based on Egyptian territory.

In the chapter on Baghdad, 1938-39, we should have liked more detailed portraits of King Ghazi, von Grobba, and other key persons in that tense situation. The extent of British influence in Iraq at that time is clearly shown. The chapter on Turkey, 1944-46, looks thin by the side of Knatchbull-Hugessen's diplomatic memoirs, *Diplomat in Peace and War* (1949), on the preceding years.

GEORGE F. HOURANI
University of Michigan

Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle East, 1915-1950, by Jon Kimche. London: Secker and Warburg, 1950. 326 pages. 15s.

Jon Kimche's *Seven Fallen Pillars* is a heated indictment of Great Britain's Arab policy from 1915 to 1950. His "fallen pillars" are those of the "seven-pillared worthy house" which, in T. E. Lawrence's dream, would bring freedom to the Arab world but is now — in Kimche's opinion — a total ruin.

Lawrence and his contemporaries were endowed with vision, but none except him were endowed with the rarer gift of re-vision. They built Arab (and British) future in the Middle East with imagination but on what proved to be a foundation of sand, and they were unable to adjust to the new postwar forces. In the course of his story Kimche brings out a number of points at which British policy struck out in the wrong direction and assigns a variety of reasons. In the first place, he says, Britain's approach to the Middle East in World War I and after was based on an antagonism toward France which was already outdated by a generation. This made it impossible for Britain to carry through a straightforward policy toward the Arabs. Secondly, British planners recognized, but failed to evaluate correctly, new forces in the postwar world: the strength and character of Arab nationalism; the tremendous pressure gathering behind Zionism; the eventual impact of the Soviet revolution. After their success with the Arab revolt in 1916, for example, they failed to realize that the force which they had liberated would not continue to be one which they could promote, direct, divert, or even crush at will. This failure to appreciate realities led Britain into divergent paths whose contrary objectives it

eventually could not bridge — as, most notably, in its Palestine policy. Thirdly, Britain failed to appreciate the new Arab psychology and needlessly offended it, as in the ultimatum handed Egypt following the murder of Sir Lee Stack in 1924. More recently one witnessed Britain's failure to understand Jewish sensibilities, as was illustrated by the Barker letter following the Irgun's dynamiting of the King David Hotel in 1946.

Kimche blames these failings on poor intelligence as much as on willful perversions of the truth to fit traditional patterns of policy, although he comes close to making this accusation in his condemnation of the "Middle East Club" — the exclusive circle of "old hands" attached to the Foreign Office. As prime examples he cites the contrast between Britain's concept of an Arab League (powerful but pliant) and the realities of inter-Arab politics, and the long series of miscalculations with regard to Palestine which culminated in the undignified anarchy preceding Britain's withdrawal in May 1948.

Kimche devotes almost half his book to a detailed account of events in Palestine from 1944 to the creation of Israel in 1948, events which he himself witnessed as a reporter. Indeed, his investigation into the background of British policy arose from a need to uncover the reasons for the Palestine debacle. His research and observations lead him to the conclusion that the pattern of British mistakes is present in other Arab countries, and it merely needs a movement approaching Zionism in force to expose the basic weakness of Britain's position. The Palestine story is told in fairness, is extremely illuminating in spots, and is generally accurate.

The author does not presume to say what he thinks British policy should have been during the inter-war period. Since, in discussing the Arab governments, he uses terms as black as he does in discussing British policy, one is led to conclude that the whole business was doomed to failure. Even if the British had followed a straightforward policy toward the Arabs in the Lawrence tradition it would not have helped much, if we are to take Kimche's estimate of the Arab governments at its face value. He does not come out and say that

Israel is the only reliable force in the Middle East (leaving Turkey out of the picture), but the reader is left with that impression. However, this is no answer to Britain's problem. A major power which wishes to maintain a position of prestige in the Middle East *must* have a positive Arab policy, and there are powerful, independent forces in the Arab world around which such a policy must be shaped. Britain's retirement from the position it had envisioned for itself at the end of World War I may have been inevitable. But this did not mean that the British would have to leave in the manner in which they did from Palestine in 1948. As early as 1920, Kimche points out, Lawrence wrote that the new imperialism was not how to remain in an area, nor yet simply withdrawal and neglect. What mattered was the manner of withdrawal and what was left behind, and it is in this that British policy has failed. It has failed to find in the Arab picture (as Kimche also seems to fail to find) those elements on which sound relations can be built.

HARVEY P. HALL

The Middle East Institute

Middle East Oil in United States Foreign Policy, by Halford Hoskins. Washington: The Library of Congress, 1950. 118 pages. 85¢.

This brief review of the impact of our oil needs and supplies upon our attitudes and policies vis-à-vis the Middle East is a useful summary of the pertinent facts. Inevitably it suffers from dating. The historical and statistical data, with few exceptions, do not go beyond the end of 1949, and therefore to some extent events have outrun them. There are certain other minor imperfections, but in general the book is informative and useful.

The author's principal conclusion, after he has reviewed the major known facts about our domestic production potential and probable future requirements, is that the best line of policy to pursue is: (1) to proceed systematically to shut in "substantial" (not quantitatively specified) domestic production areas; (2) to hold these fields as a "natural stockpile" against future emergencies and as an excess producing potential to be activated in time

of need; and (3) during the period when this stockpile is not needed, to import from the Middle East whatever quantities are required to meet peacetime consumption demand.

Dr. Hoskins makes a persuasive case that this policy is the best among several alternatives available to us. Unfortunately, his proposal (which is not new but has been heretofore insufficiently explored) raises problems primarily in the field of domestic oil politics and economics with which the author is not exceptionally well qualified to deal. It is both too sweeping and too narrow to say, as he does on page 112, that "the principal drawback to a solution of this kind lies in the hardships which the independent American companies would suffer, or which they would believe themselves to suffer, from the limitations placed on the exploitation of domestic oil resources in favor of Middle East imports." On the facts readily available, it is not evident who would suffer, since presumably the fields to be shut in would be the flush production fields which are not necessarily owned or controlled by "independent American companies." Furthermore, the assessment of the hardships entailed, if any, would depend upon what was presumed to happen with respect to the domestic oil price structure—a conjectural area which Dr. Hoskins does not explore at all.

Apart from these unresolved issues surrounding this book's main conclusion there are a few minor blemishes. For example, the discussion of various possibilities in the use of synthetics and shales fails to mention that of underground gasification of coal with which some really impressive experimental results have been achieved and which is perhaps the most promising possibility in the whole range of synthetic processes. At several places in the course of the text it is stated or implied that sterling devaluation in 1949 was accompanied by an oil price war. This is hardly an accurate way to describe a situation in which the sterling price of oil on world markets was instantaneously and completely adjusted to offset the effects of devaluation. It would be interesting to know what "American capital did make its appearance in the form of support for the Iranian Seven-Year Plan." (page 70.) In the same sentence it is inaccurately stated that the Seven-Year

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Plan was "financed through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development." The Bank considered a loan but did not in fact make one, and the Bank never gave serious consideration to a loan of anything like the financial magnitude of the Plan. Nor is it correct to imply, as the text does on page 74, that the Red Line controversy of 1946 was settled by a British "ruling" which was "accepted by French interests." In point of fact the matter was settled out of court and on a basis which leaves the future status of the Red Line agreement somewhat ambiguous.

While no one phrase or sentence is exceptionable, the entire discussion of Turkey and Egypt on pages 84-88 leaves the reader with the impression that Turkey, both actually and prospectively, is more important in the Middle East oil picture than Egypt. This, of course, is not so. There is no known reason to expect that Turkey's production will rise in the foreseeable future from the present level of a few hundred barrels a day to exceed the approximately 40,000 barrels a day of Egyptian production.

JOHN A. LOFTUS
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A History of the Crusades. Volume I: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, by Steven Runciman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1951. xiii + 377 pages. \$5.00.

Although French scholars from Michaud to Grousset have devoted themselves to the history of the Crusades as a whole, there has been almost no attempt by Britishers or Americans to do so. Mr. Runciman, already known for his *Byzantine Civilization*, has set himself the task of tracing the mass migration of crusaders from its origin to its end in three volumes, of which this, the first, takes us to Christmas 1100 and the coronation of Baldwin as the first mundane king of recaptured Jerusalem.

Mr. Runciman succeeds in presenting, tersely and accurately, the western origins of the movement, from the political planning of popes and eastern emperors to the mass response which tended to visualize in Palestine the New Jerusalem of the peoples' salvation, and in the Muslim peoples the "legions of Antichrist."

But his notable achievement is the presentation of the east of that day, where Arab peoples even more than the barbaric westerners were heirs of Hellenic and Roman civilization, where the eastern Christians — viewed as schismatics if not heretics by medieval Rome — had drawn close to Islam in understanding. Mr. Runciman's chapters on the growth of pilgrimage, the virtual protectorate established by Constantinople over the eastern Christians, the situation of the Armenians, and the general *modus vivendi* established — there were more Christian churches than Islamic mosques in Jerusalem — contain much that is fresh and vital to the understanding of scholars as well as laymen. His viewpoint is laid, and rightly so, from the east toward the west. It becomes all-embracing as he follows the extraordinary journey of the crusaders through the Byzantine dominion. He understands the responsibility of Alexius Comnenus for the political well-being of the east, and shows with clarity the factors that divorced the disputatious leaders of the Crusade from their tenuous alliance with Byzantine power.

The chapters dealing with the siege and countersiege of Antioch, the finding of the holy relic there, the centrifugal departure of the leaders from Crusade concept and the subsequent breakdown of the near-amity with the tolerant Arab lords of many Syrian towns are masterly and decisive. With the death of Adhemar de Puy, who held all others to the spiritual purpose of their endeavor, the great Crusade broke down into material quests — the search of the leaders for landholdings, rivalry with Byzantine authority, near-conflict with the Armenians and eastern Christians, and the overwhelming desire of the common folk to occupy Jerusalem itself.

Perhaps because they deal with this conflict of secular and ecclesiastical claims between eastern and western churches and between leaders and common folk, the chapters telling the story of the journey's end and capture of Jerusalem lack the conviction and decisive clarity of the earlier narrative. The massacre that followed the capture of the city "recreated the fanaticism of Islam. When, later, wiser Latins . . . sought to find some basis on which Christian and Muslim could work to-

gether, the memory of the massacre always stood in their way."

In this first volume Greek and Islamic sources — scanty for the first Crusade — are used to the full; medieval mentality activates the people, as it should, and the only touch of modern "determinism" appears in the author's restrained irony. The actual geography of the lands underlies the narrative. Names of towns and ports appear, as is often the case, in mixed biblical, classical, Arab, or crusader forms.

This reviewer, for one, looks forward with anticipation to Mr. Runciman's final volumes. If he can trace the establishment of the crusaders' states in the east, "beyond the sea," the advent of the military Orders, and the withdrawal before the Islamic counter-crusade as decisively as in this beginning, he will have accomplished a major work, one of timely aid in the understanding between eastern and western scholarship.

HAROLD LAMB
Beverly Hills, Cal.

Child Problems Among the Arabs, by Hilma Granqvist. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1951. 336 pages. 30 Danish kr.

This is the third major study to emerge from Dr. Granqvist's three intensive years of field work in the Palestinian village of Artas, but unfortunately it will not greatly increase the stature of the author of *Marriage Conditions in a Palestinian Village* (1931 and 1935) and the matchless *Birth and Childhood Among the Arabs* (1947). Moreover, the title, *Child Problems Among the Arabs*, is somewhat of a misnomer, for this book is not a study of "childhood problems" in the usual sociological sense of areas of childhood maladjustment. It is rather a description of certain aspects of the child in relation to the normal Arab village family.

Dr. Granqvist would be the first to recognize that no social phenomenon can be studied in isolation without overlooking or distorting its relationship to the whole social framework. This is particularly true of childhood; and yet the essential setting — the family — is not included in this book but in the author's earlier studies. In fact, the most significant things which the author has to say about the parent-

child relationship and the process of growing up in an Arab village have been said in *Birth and Childhood*, in the chapters on "Play and Work" and "Education and Character." The present work is an interesting but relatively less important miscellany of names and naming, child mortality, children's ailments and their treatment, protection from demons and other dangers, vows and vow children, and the relative values which the patriarchal society assigns to boys and girls and to motherhood. The resulting effort to keep this additional material in its proper frame and context has resulted in an unusual amount of reference to passages in *Birth and Childhood*, and some repetition of case materials. A minor but irritating flaw is the illogical presentation by which a long introductory statement on the value of the child in Old Testament society is separated by two chapters from the related chapter on "Value of Children." An extensive table of Biblical parallels, bibliography, and index (which also cover the author's previous book), a breakdown of vital statistics and tables identifying the families in the author's numerical system (which apply to all four volumes of the Artas studies), form too large a part of the work.

However, despite its superficial defects of structure, *Child Problems* has much that is of value in the wealth of new source material, the penetrating allusions and comparisons, and the remarkable and always sympathetic insight that we have come to expect in Dr. Granqvist's work. It is a tribute to her warm skill in writing that, without any sacrifice of scientific integrity, the Artas folk who people her illustrative cases have become living individuals, old friends whom we are pleased to meet again. *Child Problems* deserves a place as companion-piece on any shelf where *Birth and Childhood* is found; both should be required reading for any Point Four technician, missionary, or educator who heads for an Arab country with the aim of framing a program for the young.

There is still need for a study which will explore those child "problems" which the Arab child himself feels, as they are seen by him and by the adults who make up his world. Although the sections on education in *Birth and Childhood* have made more than a beginning

in this direction and suggest several lines of inquiry, no one has as yet defined the successive levels of accomplishment and self-awareness, self-discipline, and social responsibility that the Arab village removed from Western influence demands of the growing child. It is against this pattern, still so vague to Western eyes, that we must learn what success or failure means to an Arab child and has meant to generations of Arab adults. At what points in the expanding arc of development and adjustment are there pitfalls? Where is the Arab child most often unable to live up to the expectations of his adult world? Except for sexual infractions, which in theory are punished by death, we know too little about how the adult group receives or corrects a child's failings and how the child in turn responds. There is an urgent need for this knowledge in view of the wider exposure of Arab village children to the disciplines of modern education. One has only to look back to American experiments with American Indian education a generation ago to see the heartbreaking and potentially destructive impasse, the mutual misunderstanding and frustration that can come about when, in the name of advancement, a new and inflexible set of demands is imposed on the child of a less complex social order. Even more must the modern Arab educator and innovator applying Western methods and ideas realize the necessity of taking into account these deeply-rooted customs and values.

CHARLOTTE M. MOREHOUSE
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EGYPT AND THE SUDAN

Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt, by J. Heyworth-Dunne. Washington: Published by the author, 1950. 126 pages. \$3.00.

Dr. Heyworth-Dunne, formerly Reader in Arabic in the School of Oriental Studies at the University of London and Professor of Arabic and Middle East Civilizations in the School of Foreign Service at Washington's Georgetown University, is well-known as an authority on Egypt, particularly its educational system and contemporary literature.

With this essay, he embarks upon the first of a projected series of monographs on a variety of Middle Eastern topics.

The title, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt*, is something of a misnomer. Essentially the book is a study of the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, the Muslim Brotherhood, and of its assassinated leader, Hasan al-Banna', whose murderers have curiously never been found. Dr. Heyworth-Dunne is to be complimented on his courage in tackling this subject, for it has been completely ignored not only in the West but also in Egypt itself — for obvious reasons. Hasan al-Banna's career from 1928 to 1949 is steeped in controversy and is too close to our time to receive the attention of more timid writers. Though written material on Hasan al-Banna' exists and Dr. Heyworth-Dunne uses it to the full, it is far from being completely reliable. Much of the significance of this story could in any event only be appreciated by one who, like Dr. Heyworth-Dunne, knows his Egypt, and who is ready and able to collect his material "by observation and study in the field during the past twenty years." To say, therefore, that this volume fills a gap is an understatement. It would be nearer the truth to say that the study of contemporary Egypt is a yawning void and that this monograph begins the process of filling it. Both in content and as a guide to source materials it will be indispensable to all serious students of modern Egypt.

Dr. Heyworth-Dunne's thesis is that Hasan al-Banna' was a link in a chain, one whose career explains modern Egypt as Arabi's or Sa'd Zaghlul's explains the Egypt of a generation or two ago. All are in the activist tradition of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Equally Hasan al-Banna' is in the tradition of the Mahdi, an advocate of an Islamic revival so pure and so un-Western that it has been difficult for westerners to treat it seriously. That fact, indeed, both in the West and in Egypt, hindered any serious reckoning with the Muslim Brotherhood in the first place, but in the end gave it a dynamic power that brought it very much nearer success than anyone has hitherto realized. Hasan al-Banna' lost, thinks Dr. Heyworth-Dunne, only "because he came out into the open too soon." But his death, he thinks,

is not the end of the story; and the story, as events are showing, is not confined to Egypt.

Dr. Heyworth-Dunne begins with three brief chapters on the growth of Muslim sentiment in Egypt. He rightly stresses the importance of the Dinshawai episode because of its effect on Egyptian sentiment. It could, of course, be argued that anti-Western feeling became a mass movement only with the sufferings — and the broken promises — of World War I. Equally, when Dr. Heyworth-Dunne speaks of Gorst being "obliged" to adopt an attitude of sympathy to Egypt, he is a little less fair to one infinitely more liberal than Cromer or Kitchener. But Dr. Heyworth-Dunne is trying in these pages to set a scene, and he does it with remarkable freshness. He makes an important point when he says that the very strength of Sa'd Zaghlul's nationalism prevented the free development of the party system in Egypt. It has not developed freely yet.

After a chapter on the Young Men's Muslim Association, the model which the Ikhwan was to follow and to distort, Dr. Heyworth-Dunne analyzes the origins of the Brethren, their interest in politics with the Palestine troubles of 1936, their close links with Ali Mahir Pasha (in discussing whom Dr. Heyworth-Dunne shows great skill and not a little discretion), their organization, their program, and their final thwarted bid for power. In East and West the combination of mob oratory, religious zeal, and superb organization has perpetual menace to society. The only solace in the story is the reflection that Hasan al-Banna' in Egypt, Husni al-Za'im in Syria, and the Mufti in Palestine all failed.

This book is worth reading for its reconstruction of the career of a contemporary near-dictator in Egypt. It buttresses its conclusions by citation and reference in abundance. There is little to quarrel with. Dr. Heyworth-Dunne seems too severe on Amin 'Uthman, whose Anglophilism was not necessarily as inept or as blind as he suggests. In his chapter on the Ruling Classes he seems to lose sight of his theme; indeed, throughout the book he is stronger where he handles al-Banna's grass-roots politics than where he assesses his relations with the pashas. Or is it that the latter are more

skilled in destroying evidence? In places there are ambiguities of style, and there are one or two minor printing errors. But these are trifles. The book is a most useful guide to the last twenty years in Egyptian politics. Appendices give the rules of three similar Islamic societies; there is an excellent glossary and index.

ESMOND WRIGHT
University of Glasgow

No Woman's Country: Travels in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, by Michael Langley. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. 221 pages, 58 illustrations. \$4.50.

Its title, modest pretensions ("My comments," the author says, "should not be taken as authoritative"), informal style, and casual manner notwithstanding, *No Woman's Country* is no ordinary travel narrative. It is a purposeful and serious book. Its motivation, which only gradually becomes apparent as the account progresses, is that of revealing to the Western world the real nature of an important area. That is to say, it aims to give a not-very-well-informed audience a fair working knowledge of economic, social, and political conditions in this Anglo-Egyptian condominium as a basis for an understanding of current problems and trends indicative of the probable future of the country.

Although the author describes his observations as the impressions gathered during a nine-month tour of the Sudan (end-maps show the routes taken), he was not without preparation for the task. Various members of his family had previously served in the area and he himself had served in mandated Palestine. Having a good understanding of British imperial tradition and being fortified with a temporary assignment to the Sudan Government, Mr. Langley made the most of an opportunity to observe, to inquire into, and to reach conclusions, fortifying his observations with photographs and delvings into official reports and historical accounts. The method of presentation chosen for his findings deserves commendation. Basic fact is made attractive by narrative detail; statistics are employed subtly and never for their own sake. In order to obtain perspective, the author has not hesitated to make fre-

quent use of historical sidelights. These are not only interesting in themselves, as one joins the author at the site of the battle of Omdurman, or at the spot where Gordon was killed, or at the tomb of the Mahdi, or in the decayed ruins of Suakin, but they also go far toward making the present intelligible in terms of relations between British and Sudanese.

The more substantial parts of the book deal with the economic and social life of different sections of the Sudan, an area as large as the Mediterranean Sea. The author notes what possibilities there are for further material development and describes in detail the Gezira Scheme, which he thinks may be compared with the Tennessee Valley Authority. "Its weakness, if any," he says, "lies in lack of knowledge about the people who work under it." He remarks that the Sudanese need education, but he thinks there is danger in this direction of creating a class of unemployed and troublesome effendi with overemphasis on the arts, when the country's real need is for artisans, technicians, and farmers.

Throughout the book, as the author deals with social customs, agricultural conditions, traces of industry, and politics, runs as a connecting thread his interest in and concern for the future of the Sudan. He presumes that "Britain's task in the Sudan will, within ten years, be nearing completion," and he notes particularly the influences now at work to determine its political character. He is deeply impressed with the fundamental differences between the North Sudan, which is arid, Muslim, and oriented toward Egypt, and the South Sudan, inhabited by Nilotics who are, at present, well disposed toward Christianity and whose natural traits and interests suggest a central African grouping. "How was it possible to speak, as they did in Egypt, of the unity of the Nile Valley," he wonders. He believes, nevertheless, that there is every likelihood that subsidized Egyptian influence and the Muslim faith will continue to penetrate southward at the expense of some of the good work being accomplished under British supervision. He concedes that it is possible, at the expiration of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1956, that a tripartite treaty might make the Sudan politically independent. This he con-

siders to be the best basis for the future, but he adds, "I would say that, in independence, she [the Sudan] will . . . always gravitate towards the community of states known as the Middle East."

HALFORD L. HOSKINS
Library of Congress

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

India, Pakistan, Ceylon. Edited by W. N. Brown. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1951. xi + 234 pages. \$3.00.

This attractive volume, a symposium of articles written for the recent edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana*, exhibits careful American scholarship. Although addressed to the general reader, the chapters are so competently done and cover such a range of topics that even the specialist will find something of value somewhere in this book.

The peculiar requirement of an encyclopedia — namely, that each topic be covered comprehensively and yet in short space and in nontechnical language — has great value in a symposium for the public but some disadvantage for the scholar. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage is the necessity for a rather conventional division and treatment of topics. One way in which space can be conserved is by sticking narrowly to the topic and not getting into implications and interpretations. Doubtless these requirements are responsible for the predominance of the humanistic approach in the volume. The arts, language, religion, philosophy, and other expressions of human thought receive the main attention, with history getting most of the rest. Economics and geography receive short treatments (16 and 13 pages respectively), and most social science subjects are not adequately represented.

The topics are handled descriptively with little attempt at systematic interpretation. Art is art and architecture is artistic architecture. Virtually no attempt is made to use the newer techniques of psychological and sociological analysis (a 14-page chapter on "Anthropology and Sociology" is quite cursory). The interest lies heavily in the pre-modern periods and in what may be called classical canons of impor-

tance. Thus the section on architecture deals mostly with temples, ignoring the housing of the masses. Although literature, music, and the drama are treated, there is nothing on the media of mass communication — radio, movies, newspapers. In connection with the drama, the acting profession is not discussed. There is likewise nothing on popular education, demographic trends, public health, technology, and science. The main exceptions to the conventional and humanistic treatment are Daniel Thorner's chapter on "Economic Development" and Walter Clark's on "Two Thousand Years of History." Each of these manages to achieve originality of interpretation despite the severe limitations of the medium.

As one might expect, prepartition India receives major attention, with Pakistan getting brief references. Ceylon is given only one final chapter of 26 pages. The text does not contain citations, but each chapter is followed by a brief bibliography. In some instances, given the purpose of the volume, the bibliographies could have been longer and general works could have been substituted for obscure articles which the average reader will hardly be able to find.

Within the limitations of the medium, the dispassionate and meticulous scholarship of the chapters stands out. In view of the paucity of American literature on South Asia, the book is a valuable contribution. The editor deserves credit not only for his own lucid chapters but also for the competence of the other people selected as contributors.

KINGSLEY DAVIS
Columbia University

IRAN

Labour Conditions in the Oil Industry in Iran.

Geneva: International Labour Office, 1950.

87 pages, charts, maps, photographs. 60¢.

In 1950, at the request of the Iranian Government, the International Labour Office undertook a study of labor conditions in the concession area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in southern Iran. It is regrettable, perhaps, that the ILO study was not made several years before the crisis of this year arose, and that

the AIOC was not able therefore to implement one important over-all recommendation: ". . . the Company has various conditions to fulfill under the terms of its concession, as well as moral obligations towards the country and its people. But in a sound national economy it is necessary for progress to be general and not confined to favoured industries or areas. . . ."

The ILO Mission was composed of Mr. John Price as Chief; Mr. P. P. Fano; and Mr. A. Djamalzadeh. The report these experts have produced is competent and interesting, and in highlighting a major problem of AIOC's effect upon Iran, may provide a lesson for other exploiting enterprises in nations at similar stages of political and economic development. The more detailed suggestions of the report may as easily apply, for example, to the Iraq Petroleum Company, where relations between the Iraqi and the foreigner are subject to strain, though far from breaking as in Iran. The report advocates the establishment of joint safety committees, of the organization of cooperatives for workers, of trade unionism and collective bargaining, of workers' representation in labor councils — in short, of many measures that create an atmosphere of "jointness" with the native workers of the host country. There is, particularly during an era of social awakening in Asia, an element of statesmanship in seeing that this principle is a keynote of successful Western management.

Since the report concerns an enterprise operating in a relationship to the Iranian Government that, according to the Iranian legislature, no longer exists, much of it may be considered past history, particularly by Iranians. But it should be read at least as a record of the highest standard of labor conditions achieved in Iran. It should also, as an impartial survey, dispel some of the charges leveled against the AIOC by Iranian politicians. The Company, as the report shows, had many shortcomings, but any Iranian or successor management of the industry would be severely tested to equal the recent record. While AIOC may have been too slow in providing the "amenities" considered desirable by ILO for oil workers (notably housing), the report indicates that great progress has been made in the last ten years. These years correspond to a great expansion in

production by the refinery and fields, with corresponding gross profit margins for the Company that would have permitted a far greater expenditure for housing, health, and recreation facilities. Therein lies both a weakness and a strength of commercially-operated foreign investment in undeveloped areas.

There is little to criticize the report for, except that in view of the critical state of the Iranian industry now — nearly a year and a half from the date of the report's field work — many readers might wish for a more forthright evaluation of the frictions between Iranian authorities and the Company within the sphere of labor. But in citing the need for foreign enterprises of the size of AIOC to merge their local interest with that of the country as a whole, the report has made a contribution of merit.

E. A. B.

PALESTINE

Experiment in Anarchy, by R. M. Graves.
London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1949. 238
pages. 15s.

During the closing months of the British mandate in Palestine, Richard M. Graves served as Chairman of the Municipal Commission of Jerusalem. This was the appointive body which had governed the city since 1945, when Arab-Jewish dissension over the mayoralty had resulted in the suspension of local self-government. In the spring of 1947 what was judged to be necessary in Jerusalem was a person who had friends and acquaintances in both the Arab and Jewish communities and who was known to be neither an anti-Semite nor a Zionist. These qualifications Graves had. Recalled from retirement after years of government service in Egypt and a six-year period with the Palestine Labor Office, he remained in Jerusalem from June 1947 until the end of April 1948, two weeks before the mandate went out of existence.

During his tenure of office Graves kept an occasional diary or, as he terms it, a "mayor's log," devoted to political, administrative, and social affairs and to personal comment. It is this diary, edited for publication in the sum-

mer of 1948, that forms the backbone of *Experiment in Anarchy*. The book includes a foreword and several introductory chapters devoted to the city of Jerusalem and the situation of the municipality in 1947-48, and a concluding chapter containing a brief historical sketch of the Palestine problem and the major arguments of the Arabs and the Jews for the possession of the country. It is, however, for the diary that the volume will be read.

Graves, if a Jew, would (as he says himself) have been a follower of Dr. Magnes. He thought that the entire picture might have been different if Britain had worked "from the outset for the creation of a bi-national State with equal representation, whatever the numbers of the component communities, and no restrictions in respect of immigration." He agreed with the Jews that it was "unreasonable to expect that a progressive, industrious and well-organized minority containing about 40 per cent of the whole population of the country should be permanently dominated by a majority inferior to them in energy, education and administrative experience." He understood the Arab arguments and saw why they carried conviction to Arabs and to many non-Arabs. But he believed that "at certain moments in history dynamic movements occur, which cannot be checked by logic, convention or even the ordinary process of law. . . . The Zionist urge to possess their own home and State in Palestine is such a movement." Graves was, therefore, not entirely unprepared to acquiesce in the United Nations partition plan, though he had serious doubts of its real feasibility. He was thoroughly disgusted with the British Government's experiment in anarchy — its refusal to assist in implementing any plan, and its permitting and even encouraging the breakdown of government and the onset of civil war.

This is the background of opinion which makes the Graves diary intelligible. The author, however, had nothing to do with the making of policy. In most respects the municipalities (and particularly Jerusalem under the Commission) were thoroughly subordinate to the District Commissioners and the Palestine Government. Graves had to watch helplessly as Arab and Jewish "demonstrations" in De-

cember 1947 moved toward open warfare. He had to observe the passivity of the police and the military forces. He had to suffer the gradual, and then the increasingly rapid, breakdown of centralized Arab-Jewish municipal services. Finally, on April 28, 1948, he decided that his utility was completely at an end and left Jerusalem for England.

The diary makes absorbing reading to anyone who knew Jerusalem even casually in the closing days of the mandate, for it recalls vividly places and people — some important and many merely familiar or interesting. It has, of course, a greater significance than this, for it will be used by the historian in his attempt to understand the crosscurrents of British, Arab, and Jewish relations in Palestine and the contemporary impact of events such as the issuance of the UNSCOP report, the Creech-Jones declaration of British policy, the Ben Yehuda Street outrage, the Deir Yassin massacre, and the ambushing of the Hadassah medical convoy as viewed by a strategically located and surprisingly objective observer.

Even with the supplementary chapters and the editorial notes, many of the allusions and references in the diary are, or will soon become, meaningless to the general reader who lacks a quite detailed knowledge of recent Palestinian history. The book may still be read, however, for its revelation of the inconsequential as well as of the consequential activities and thoughts of a cultivated Englishman and a perceptive human being.

PAUL L. HANNA
University of Florida

TURKEY

The New Turks, by Eleanor Bisbee. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. xiv + 297 pages, appendices. \$5.00.

Concerning Turkey, a curious compartmentalization has long existed in the Western mind, thanks to some rather quaint scholarship and journalism. The Turkey of the Ottomans has been almost universally arraigned as unspeakable and depraved; the Turkey of the Republic has been acclaimed, pretty nearly without exception, as a miraculous composite

of all imaginable modern virtues. Eleanor Bisbee, onetime Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at Robert College and the American College for Girls, Istanbul, makes a brave effort here to do away with this manifestly improbable dialectic. She succeeds to the degree that her latter-day Turks finally emerge as a reasonable facsimile of their reality — but it takes her virtually the entire length of a very uneven book to divulge that even contemporary Anatolia, after all, is still part of Asia.

Dr. Bisbee endeavors briefly to demonstrate that Imperial Turkey was not as barbarous as the stereotype suggests — at least, not the ethnically genuine Turks in that conglomeration of nationalities. But her main thesis is that, no matter how bad the Ottomans, their successors under Atatürk and İsmet İnönü are “new” Turks and altogether different in their graces. To bolster this, she makes some startlingly facile equations: the “new” Turks, for instance, grew as remote from the “old” as the American colonists from their English forebears, (an extraordinary defiance of the influence of geography); the Turks are nationalistic, but no more so than “any nation”; some Turkish officials may be bribable, but “it is the same story in nearly every country,” and so on. Dr. Bisbee rightly believes that the proper way to review “a people’s achievements and prospects . . . is to survey their positive qualities [as well as the] weaknesses which handicap their progress.” But, wanting to be fair, she strains enormously to explain unfavorable matters away. I wonder if such an apologetics is even fair to the Turks, who are eager to benefit from valid Western criticism. It is certainly not fair to the readers.

Dr. Bisbee’s method is especially self-negating because, in the end, she manages to confirm practically all the critical points over which she has previously glided. Thus she implies that Ankara, with its handsome architecture and sewage system, is “representative” of Turkey — yet many pages later we learn that the capital is a showpiece totally unlike vast underprivileged regions of the neglected hinterland. She first seems to be excusing the lack of highways in Turkey because of the limited amount of motor vehicles available to drive over them, only to admit further on that primi-

tive communications are one of modern Turkey's major deficiencies. At one moment she hedges on the iniquity of the Varlık, (Capital Levy of 1942-43); at another she admits its infamy. It is permissible to suggest, in the interests of clear exposition and ultimate enlightenment of the student, that a more forthright approach would have done the subject better service. The evidence is sufficiently in Turkey's favor, on the basis of the straight facts, without requiring the author's benevolent but confusing gloss.

On one important point Dr. Bisbee falls short entirely. Nowhere does she find significant fault with İsmet İnönü, whom she seems to regard as a fitting heir to the unquestionably great Atatürk. She is consistently kind to İnönü's People's Party, and strangely cool to Celal Bayar and his Democratic Party. The Turkish electorate, whose clarity of vision she generally applauds, apparently did not share Dr. Bisbee's view of the two men when they gave Bayar a landslide victory against the Old Guard in the 1950 elections.

It must nevertheless be added that *The New Turks*, before it closes, does say what needs to be said, and in more intimate detail than has hitherto been attempted. As such, it takes its place as one of the best books on the subject now available. Moreover, it contains several useful surveys — of the peasantry, religion, culture, and other aspects of the Turkish scene — as well as the most cogently argued defense of Turkey's wartime neutrality this reviewer has found anywhere. In chapters dealing with the Dardanelles and Turkey's position in our present-day divided world, the book is firm and mature.

HAL LEHRMAN
New York, N. Y.

Der Islam in der Neuen Türkei: Eine Rechtsgeschichtliche Untersuchung, by Gotthard Jäschke. Vol. I, No. 1-2, *The World of Islam*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1951. 174 pages. 25 guilders.

This book, written by one of the leading German authorities on Turkey, can be recommended to those interested in the manifold evolution of the reforms in the Turkish Re-

public, particularly the change to a secular state.¹

An introductory chapter briefly traces the relationship between nationalism and religion in various Muslim countries from Ottoman times to the modernization movements of present-day Islam. The place of the Shari'ah with relation to nationalism and reformism and the ideas of Ziya Gökalp are treated with particular care. The information offered is a very elaborate compilation of material. It is to be regretted, however, that Professor Jäschke makes little attempt to analyze the comprehensive Turkish reform movements of the 20th century.

The modernization of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is next treated, with particular attention given to the adoption of the Swiss civil code, the secularization of the Turkish Constitution, the change from the Arabic to the Roman alphabet, and the Turkification of religious rituals. At this point an error made by the author should be corrected. The control of religious affairs in Turkey is not under the President of the Republic, but is attached to the Prime Minister's office. It might be said in this connection that the religious tie-up to that office does not make for real laicism in Turkey.

Professor Jäschke's book also covers the history of religious administration, religious education, and laicism, and concludes with a summary of the opinions of critics on the religious situation in modern Turkey. The author also poses some important problems as to the future of religious development in Turkey.

Numerous Turkish expressions together with their German translations are repeated so insistently that the reader is led to wonder if the author declines to assume responsibility for them. This reviewer feels that some Turkish words are not happily translated. For instance, the phrase "mahkeme-i nizamiye" is taken as "ordentlichen Gerichte," whereas in reality these tribunals are named "nizamiye" merely because they were instituted after the

¹ A perusal of H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (1945), and Uriel Heyd, *The Foundation of Turkish Nationalism* (1949), will assist the reader to a better understanding of Professor Jäschke's detailed work.

Tanzimat period (*tanzimat*, *nizam*). And "asrı bir hukuk" is translated erroneously as "zeitgemassen Rechts." Here the epithet "asrı" means only "secular," "laic." One must emphasize the erroneous translation of the word "laic" as "la-dini" ("irreligious"), of which the author takes no notice. This inadequate translation dates from the writings of Ziya Gökalp, with an unhappy effect on politico-religious relations among Turks themselves.

This book gives striking evidence of the erudition of the author. Almost half of every page has been filled with footnotes and documentation, which are not always necessary or of real value. This characteristic of German scholarship makes such a work difficult to review. However, the reader will find Professor Jäschke's book a successful and generally accurate compilation of events in the history of religious development in Turkey.

A. ADNAN-ADIVAR
Istanbul, Turkey

Napoleon and the Dardanelles, by Vernon J. Puryear. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. 437 pages. \$5.00

This is the fourth book by Professor Puryear dealing with the diplomacy of the Eastern Question in the 19th century. Each has covered an earlier period than its predecessor. This latest volume, dealing with French Near Eastern policy from 1802 to 1815, serves as background for his *France and the Levant* (1814-1833).

The present title is somewhat misleading, since the book is not confined to the question of the Dardanelles, nor yet that of the Straits as a whole. Rather Dr. Puryear has undertaken to survey, chiefly on the basis of the documents in the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, the complexities of Napoleon's relations with the Ottoman Empire and Persia against a broader background of conflicts of interest between France, Russia, and England.

The result is a meticulous chronological account, much of which is paraphrase or summary of the documents. The author rightly concentrates on the crucial years 1805 to 1809, which marked both the zenith of Napoleon's influence in the Near East and the start of its

decline. He shows clearly how that influence grew from 1802 on, especially after Napoleon's victories at Austerlitz and Jena. The result was that by 1806 Turkey was fighting with France against Russia, Sebastiani as French Ambassador had no peer in prestige at the Porte, and Persia was drawn into the Treaty of Finkenstein as part of Napoleon's projected combination against Russia and England.

Dr. Puryear examines the Tilsit Treaty of 1807, whereby Napoleon abandoned Turkey and Persia for alliance with Russia. Napoleon's hopes of retaining some grip on Turkey by mediating a Russo-Turkish peace vanished as he sparred with Russia over a possible partition of Turkey and campaign against India. Dr. Puryear sets forth in detail the fruitless conversations on partition up to its virtual abandonment after Napoleon's Erfurt interview with Alexander I. He believes that Napoleon's refusal to yield the Dardanelles to Russia is the key to the breakup of the Franco-Russian alliance and hence one of the main causes of the collapse of Napoleon's empire; the other causes of collapse he does not weigh against this.

The reader needs a sound knowledge of the Napoleonic period, for Dr. Puryear refers only briefly to most of Napoleon's other problems as they affected his dealings with Russia and the East. The broad picture is often missing. Students of Ottoman history will find the account, which is frankly from the French viewpoint, inadequate in several respects—Ottoman decline and attempted reform, the problem of the *derebey*, and the revolutions of 1807 and 1808. Dr. Puryear does not examine the full significance of the Bucharest treaty of 1812, and does not attempt to track down the romantic story that Napoleon's divorce from Josephine determined Mahmud II to avenge his mother's compatriot from Martinique by making peace with Russia as Napoleon set out for Moscow. Dr. Puryear has, in fact, eliminated personality and color from his story except in a few instances, notably the meeting of Mirza Riza and Napoleon at Finkenstein. Some contemporary interest is added by the frequent parallels he draws to later events, chiefly in World War II, but the analogies are not closely examined.

Omissions such as these are the privilege of the author. Napoleonic diplomacy in the Near East is a subject, however, that deserves a less pedestrian treatment than the author has here given it. Maps would also have been a help. The documentation is thorough and the bibliography sound, though not all-inclusive — he omits many general works and some monographs, such as Enver Ziya Karal's study of Halet Efendi's embassy to Paris. The chief merit of *Napoleon and the Dardanelles* lies in Dr. Puryear's scholarly research in the diplomatic documents of the period.

RODERIC H. DAVISON
George Washington University

ALSO NOTED

General

Arab Civilization, by Joseph Hall. Translated from the German [*Die Kultur der Araber*] by S. Khuda Bakhsh. Lahore: S. M. Ashraf, 1951. Rs.6/-.

Beyond Euphrates, by Freya Stark. London: John Murray, 1951. 25s. 40 illustrations, map. The autobiography of the author during her sojourns in Persia, the borders of the Caspian, Syria and her "treasure-hunt" in Luristan. Covers the period 1928-35.

The Birth of Civilization in the Near East, by Henri Frankfort. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1951. 116 pages. \$5.00.

Cairo to Damascus, by John Roy Carlson. New York: Knopf, 1951. xiv + 474 pages, photographs. \$4.50. A journalist's sensational account of political intrigue and dissension in the Middle East.

Eastern Science, by H. J. J. Winter. London: John Murray, 1951. 4s. 6d. A description of some of the main contributions of the East to science.

The Essential T. E. Lawrence. Selected with a preface by D. Garnett. London: Jonathan Cape, 1951. 318 pages. 12s. 6d. An attempt to present the life of Lawrence as a whole in his own words.

Lone and Level Sands, by Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney. New York: Farrar, 1951. 314 pages, photographs. \$4.00. A personal record of an American air intelligence officer's experience in India, Africa, and the Pacific.

The Near East and the Great Powers. Edited by Richard N. Frye. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. \$3.50. Papers delivered at Harvard's 1950 conference on the Near East.

The Reign of Al-Mu'tasim (833-842), by Abu al-Tabari. Translated from the Arabic by Elma Marin. New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1951. xvii + 142 pages. \$3.50. The history of the

years when the factors which led to the eventual decline of the 'Abbasid dynasty became evident. *The Struggle for the Mediterranean, 1939-1945*, by Raymond De Belot. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. xix + 287 pages. \$4.00. The basically maritime nature of the Mediterranean war is fully brought out in this objective and critical book by a French admiral who witnessed it as a noncombatant.

The United States and Turkey and Iran, by Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (American Foreign Policy Library Series), 1951. xii + 291 pages. \$4.25.

The Wanderer, by Mika Waltari. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1951. \$3.75. A novel laid in the Middle East during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent.

Arab World

The Bahrein Islands, by Abbas Foroughy. New York: Verry Fisher, 1951. 128 pages. \$3.50.

Rulers of Mecca, by Gerald de Gaury. London: George Harrap, 1951. 317 pages. 21s. The first full-length account in English of the Meccan rulership, held by members of the Quraysh tribe for over a thousand years.

Egypt

The Cairo Nilometer, by William Popper. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1951. xi + 269 pages. \$3.00. A study of the annual rise of the Nile as measured in the well of the Nilometer on Roda Island, Cairo.

Histoire de l'Égypte Moderne, by Maxime Chrétiens. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951. 128 pages.

The Lost Pharaohs, by Leonard Cottrell. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. 247 pages. \$6.00. The romance of Egyptian archaeology for the layman.

Old and New Forces in Egyptian Education, by Abu Al-Futouh. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1951. \$3.00.

Science and Science Education in Egyptian Society, by Yusef Salah El-Din Kotb. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1951. 261 pages. \$3.25.

Social Welfare in Egypt, 1950. Ministry of Social Affairs, Government of Egypt. Cairo: Société Orientale de Publicité, 1951. 173 pages. Covers land reform, cooperative movement, social security, housing, etc.

Thiers et Mehemet-Ali, by François Charles-Roux. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1951. 320 pages. 495 fr. Deals with the crisis of 1840-41.

India

Autobiography of an Unknown Indian, by Nirad C. Chaudhuri. New York: Macmillan, 1951. \$6.00. The recent history of India seen through the eyes of an Indian journalist.

The Colombo Plan and India, by V. Vithal Babu.

Delhi: Atma Ram, 1951. 88 pages, tables. Rs.21/-.

Cradle of the Clouds, by Sudhin N. Ghose. New York: Macmillan, 1951. \$3.50. A novel of contemporary India.

Education in India: A Survey of the Lower Ganges Valley in Modern Times, by Aubrey Albert Zellner. New York: Bookman Associates, 1951. \$3.50.

English Records of Maratha History (Poona Residency Correspondence):

Volume 10, *The Treaty of Bassein and the Anglo-Maratha War in the Deccan, 1802-1804*, edited by Raghuraj Singh. Bombay: Govt. of India, 1951. 288 pages. Rs.12/-.

Volume 12, *Poona Affairs (Elphinstone's Embassy), Part I, 1811-1815*, edited by G. S. Sardesai. Bombay: Popular Press, 1950. 475 pages. Rs.15/-.

Volume 14, *Daulat Rao Sindhia and North Indian Affairs (1810-1818)*, edited by J. Sarkar. Bombay: Govt. of India, 1951. 414 pages. Rs.15/-.

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Iran

Persia and the Victorians, by Marzieh Gail. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1951. 170 pages. 12s. 6d. The impact of Persian life and literature upon Victorian England.

Rumi: Poet and Mystic, translated by Reynold A. Nicholson. New York: Macmillan, 1951. \$2.00. Selections from his writings with an introduction and notes.

Israel

The Israel Year Book, 1950-1951, edited by S. Tolkowsky, et al. New York: Zionist Organization of America. 380 pages. \$3.75.

My Mission in Israel, by James G. McDonald. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1951. 303 pages. \$3.50. A personal report by the first U.S. Ambassador to Israel.

Lebanon

Les Enfants de la Terra: Le Poison de la Solitude, by Farjallah Haik. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1951. 256 pages. 330 fr. The third volume of the trilogy, *Les Enfants de la Terre*. By a Lebanese and laid in Lebanon.

North Africa

Africa: Continent of the Future, by George E. Hynes. New York: The Association Press, 1951. 516 pages. \$3.50.

Histoire de l'Algérie, by Gabriel Esquer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950. 126 pages.

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Pakistan

Young Pakistan, by Rafiq M. Khan and Herbert S. Stark. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951. 233 pages. \$2.00. A textbook for students.

Sudan

Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer, by E. E. Evans-Pritchard. London: Oxford University Press, 1951. 196 pages. 15s. The author describes marriage customs and family life of the Nuer of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

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Turkey

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Literature

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Omar Khayyam. Edited and translated by A. J. Arberry. London: John Murray, 1951. 15s. A new version of the Rubaiyat based upon recent discoveries. It includes 100 poems not in the Fitzgerald edition.

Prose and Poetry from Hadramawt. Edited by R. B. Serjeant. London: Taylor's Foreign Press, 1951. xiv + 261 pages. 35s. South Arabian colloquial poetry is directly linked with the songs and dances which accompany the daily tasks and ceremony of the Arab peasant or tribesman. This representative selection of Hadrami verse, containing much of the rich store of popular wisdom of the country, is prefaced by a substantial discussion of the social background of the poetry, analyzing its form and content.

Religion

The Holy Quran. Lahore: S. M. Ashraf, 1951. Rs.40/-. An English translation with notes and commentary by Allama Abdullah Yusuf Ali. With Arabic text.

La Structure de la Pensée Religieuse de l'Islam, by H. A. R. Gibb. Paris: Editions Larose, 1950. 56 pages.

Maps and Pamphlets

Aid to Palestine Refugees. Washington: Department of State, 1951. 18 pages, illustrated. (Publication No. 4191.) 10¢.

Erdol aus dem Mittleren Osten: Zahlen, Probleme, Projekte, by H. Hassmann Hamburg: Industrie-zerlar, von Hernhaussen, 1950. 31 pages.

India in Maps. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 1950. 55 pages. A useful

collection of 40 maps giving information on many facets of Indian life—physical features of the land, and the political, economic, scientific, and cultural aspects of modern India.

Iran, Point of World Interest, Background; June 1951. Washington: Department of State, 1951. 8 pages, illustrated. (Publication No. 4262.) 10¢.

Is Peace Possible in the Middle East?, by Lord Wilmot and others. New York: Town Hall, Inc., 1951. 14 pages. 15¢.

Jongste Politieke Ontwikkelingen in Tunesie, by L. Adam. Leyden: University Press, 1951. 36 pages, maps.

List of Scientific Papers Published in the Middle-East. Cairo: Middle East Science Cooperation Office, 1950. 76 pages.

A Map of Israel, including plans of Juffa-Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, the Middle East. Produced under the direction of Alexander Gross. London: Jewish Chronicle, 1951. Index. 40" x 30". 2s. 6d.

Ma'ruf ar-Rusafi, 1875-1945, by S. A. Khulusi. Baghdad: Khulusi, 1951. 18 pages. The life of the poet together with an account of the life of the poetess, Atika Wahbi al-Khazraji.

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The Struggle for Oil in the Middle East, by E. B. Espenhade, Jr. and others. Evanston: Northwestern University, 1951. 11 pages, illustrated. 10¢.

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The Turkish Straits, by Michael Sokolnicki. Beirut: The Polish Institute of Eastern Affairs, 1950. 44 pages. 3s.

Readers' Commentary

The Journal welcomes comment from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in this column, preference being given to those which correct errors of fact, offer constructive criticism of an opinion expressed, or provide additional information on a topic discussed in the Journal's pages.

The Arabic Language and Arab Psychology

I was greatly interested by Mr. E. Shouby's article, "The influence of the Arabic language on the psychology of the Arabs," in your Summer issue. I believe that every single statement he makes is correct. I also believe that the total impression given by his article is

completely misleading. The Eleatics proved, by irrefutable arguments, that movement is impossible and that Achilles could never catch up with the turtle. Mr. Shouby proves equally conclusively that rational thought cannot be conducted and expressed in the Arabic language and that it is impossible to translate adequately and accurately into Arabic a text written in a European language.

During the last twenty years I have done a good deal of writing in, and translating into and from, Arabic, English, and French. This has led me to the following conclusions regarding the classical Arabic of a thousand years ago and its somewhat dissimilar descendant, the written Arabic of today.

a) The Arabic vocabulary, once fully adequate for the needs of its times, is now sadly deficient — and this in spite of the fact that the total number of Arabic words is considerably greater than that of any other language. A language follows the vicissitudes of its society, and Arabic society stopped growing over seven centuries ago. What even fifty years of comparative stagnation can do to a language is shown by the example of French economic jargon. France, whose economists were once among the world's best, lost interest in the science round the beginning of this century and has only recently taken it up again. As a result, it has become exceedingly difficult to translate into French a highly technical economic article written in English. The same difficulties, magnified tenfold, confront the translator into Arabic. But that is due to a deficiency in technical vocabulary, which can be, and is being, remedied not only by the official Academies but by the Western-educated specialists in the different fields.

b) Arabic can express only imperfectly the numerous tenses of European languages. Just as the pluperfect, which comes naturally in French, sounds forced and clumsy in English, so all tenses other than the perfect and future do not lend themselves to elegant expression in Arabic.

c) Arabic grammar, like that of all inflected languages, is more complicated than that of languages like English and Spanish. It should however be remembered that Arabic has fewer cases and inflections than the Slav languages or German. In addition, Arabic suffers from many unnecessary complications, for example those connected with exception (*istithna*) or the rules governing the gender and case of numerals. Such irritants may be regarded as accretions which can, and one day will, be removed without impairing the structure of the language.

d) The Arabic alphabet is perfectly phonetic. The only spelling difficulties arise from the *hamza*. The right of that letter to an independent existence is however being increasingly recognized and once that is done all the difficulties caused by it will disappear.

e) Finally, and most important, the basic syntax of the Arabic language is both extremely simple and extremely logical. The most abstract thought can be, and has been, expressed with great clarity and conciseness in Arabic. A glance at a classical writer like Ibn Khaldun or Al-Ghazzali should suffice to convince anyone of this.

As for modern writers, perhaps the best example is provided by Arab jurists, who can split hairs with the subtlety of their Western colleagues.

Of course there is plenty of loose writing in Arabic — more than in English, and much more than in French. But that is due to the confusion of the writers, not to any inherent weakness of the language. When Arabs will have rubbed their mind against that of the West sufficiently long, when they will have been subjected to the gruelling training of modern disciplines, when the whole of Arab society, instead of a small privileged segment, will have become fully educated, the Arabic language will once more reveal its great potentialities as a medium of thought and expression.

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Dujaylah Land Settlement

In discussing a new development project, as Mr. Norman Burns does in your Summer 1951 issue ["The Dujaylah Land Settlement"], it is as important to dwell on imperfections, temporary though they may be, as it is to detail achievements. Particularly is this true of Dujaylah, a pilot project which is "the first project of its kind in the Arab Middle East and the forerunner of a large-scale social experiment," and as such is more of a proving ground than finished settlement project.

Project directors are necessarily in Baghdad, where they can the more effectively combat adverse political opinion and promote new Dujaylahs. Effective liaison could eliminate laxness resulting from the removal of top authority to Baghdad, but such liaison as exists is sporadic. Perhaps if financial temptations were removed from project operations more desirable results could be achieved. As it is, machinery is in short supply, and rented to the settler on a cost basis. Nearby sheikhs are allowed to rent tractors at cost plus and they frequently obtain use of tractors while settlers wait. As most of the settlers take no operational interest in their cooperative the officials,

serving without pay, are those elected in 1946. These four men, entrenched in their positions, appear to be by far the most comfortably housed and clothed, although all settlers are required to be farmers who can possess but minimal amounts of land outside their 62.5-acre project plot.

More serious is the almost general opposition of adjacent landlords and town grain merchants to the project. These men, who represent the effective government in southern Iraq, are not pleased to see a known and satisfactory way of life dissolving about them. This opposition has delayed Sayyid Hassan Muhammad 'Ali's introduction of a marketing cooperative. Much grain is still sold to sheikhs or merchants, and this often before the crop is sown, resulting in 50%-plus losses to the fellahin. Reportedly, violence has occasionally been employed to keep the fellahin within the ancient, repressive marketing system. Ignorance, due to the inadequate schooling as yet available in Dujaylah, obliges even stout fellahin to market this way rather than to sell grain independently.

Dujaylah has been in operation for 6 years, and yet no provision for a full life for the settlers has been made. Unaccustomedly segregated into "4 corners" settlements, families miss village sociability and recreation facilities. No adequate recreational outlets exist—individual center tea houses, like the schools, are often four or more muleback miles from outlying farms. This distance limits demonstration farm activities as well, and prohibits the cross-fertilizing influences of discussion. This is a serious flaw among partially illiterate settlers, particularly so as few settlers are familiar with the tree, vine, and vegetable crops which they must raise. UNESCO's educational mission, which visited Dujaylah upon Iraqi request, suggested the use of visual education to help solve both recreational problems and the farmer's unfamiliarity with many of his crops. The settlement pattern also precludes the costly piping of pure water into each dwelling. Farmers rely upon the all-purpose irrigation ditch for water, purifying it for drinking with chemicals.

The experimental farms are well designed to produce superior crops, using the same area and facilities available to each settler. Unfortunately, the three farms are too few and located too far from most farmers for effective demonstration purposes. Uneconomical integration suggested that these farms be used also as tree nurseries. This divides the energy of

their limited staff and has greatly delayed the excellent tree-planting program.

If extant blueprints are not immediately translated into a comprehensive drainage scheme, all cultivated soil within the project will salt up. The lands settled first have less than three years of grace left. Soil erosion, while minor on this level plain, was also left out of the original blueprints. This will create localized difficulties in the near future.

The poor quality of most project livestock results from a lack of funds, plus legislation permitting settlers to purchase stock on local markets. Had improved stock been available in 1945, the administrative staff would not now have to educate farmers to accept improved poultry and cattle, presently being developed on the experimental farms. Other livestock will be cared for in the future, with the aid of legislation designed to restrict purchases to improved breeds. Statistical studies, not now undertaken as data is not compiled, would assist in planning future projects.

Age-old forms of crop rotation now practiced need to be altered if full production is to be obtained. Egyptian experience suggests long-rooted alfalfa and beerseem clover in 3-year rotation with grain, thereby reducing fallow from 50% to 30%. Long-rooted salt-eating fodder plants would increase limited foods available for livestock, diminish salting problems, and improve caky subsoil structure. These crops are better adapted to Dujaylah soil than shallow-rooted grains which feed on the normally salty loessal topsoils rather than the far less salty clay subsoil.

Finally, settlers receive land, water, and administrative services tax free. If farmers are to develop social responsibility and form themselves into a free peasantry, they need to know that they are creating what they receive.

I have intentionally avoided mentioning the many fine features of this purely Iraqi project. Admittedly, this pilot project, even qualified by its flaws, is a remarkable success. But if it is to serve as a model for future development attention must be paid to comprehensive planning which is more closely adjusted to the local environment. Hasan Muhammad 'Ali is well aware of Dujaylah's shortcomings and is working to eliminate them, while applying lessons learned to future project plans. It is to be hoped that he can succeed, although apathy and landowners' political opposition make his task arduous.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer, Consultant in Near East Bibliography, Library of Congress

With contributions from: Elizabeth Bacon, Richard Ettinghausen, Sidney Glazer, Harold W. Glidden, Harvey P. Hall, George C. Miles, Leon Nemoy, M. Perlmann, William D. Preston, C. Rabin, Mohammed Rashti, Dorothy Shepherd, and Andreas Tietze.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East generally since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of Soviet Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Zionism and Palestine*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library in New York.

For list of abbreviations, see page 536.

GEOGRAPHY

(General, description, travel and exploration, natural history, geology)

- 4397 BAGNOLD, R. A. "Sand formations in Southern Arabia." *Geog. J.* 117 (Mr '51) 75-86. The need for knowledge of the growth and movement of desert dunes is increasing as roads, air fields, oil installations, etc. spread into the sandy regions of the world. Brig. Bagnold holds that the characteristics of the local wind regime, rather than the surface relief of the floor, are responsible for the shapes assumed.

HISTORY

(Ancient, medieval)

- 4398 PHILBY, H. ST. J. B. "Notes on the last kings of Saba." *Muséon* (Louvain) 63 (1950) 269-72. Deals chiefly with the royalty of the latter part of the period following the first Abyssinian occupation.
- 4399 RICHMOND, IAN A. "The cult of Mithras in Roman Britain." *Illust. London News* 218 (Mr '24 '51) 454-7. Discussion of the Persian cult in connection with a recently discovered shrine from the early 3rd century which was in use until the early 4th century. The monument, its sculpture, and

altars are illustrated in 7 figures and there are 2 additional drawings giving cult scenes in the reconstructed building.

- 4400 STRAUSS, E. "L'inquisition dans l'état mam-louk." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 25, no. 1-4 (1950) 11-26. Already in the days of the first Abbasids Muslim authorities brought to trial heterodoxies of every kind whose theses seemed likely to endanger the foundations of the government or disturb the public order. This study deals with the procedures involved and such groups as atheists, defamers of the memory of the Prophet, and Christian converts from Islam.

- 4401 KHADDURI, MAJID. "The juridical theory of the Islamic state." *Muslim World* 41 (Jl '51) 181-5. The Islamic state after the death of Muhammad was assumed to be derived originally from a divine source. In practice it tended to be democratic. But as time went on it became increasingly autocratic as a result of Byzantine and Persian influences.

HISTORY AND POLITICS

(Modern)

- 4402 "Anglo-Egyptian relations." *Round Table* no. 162 (Mr '51) 112-9. Explores the factors that prevent complete understanding

- between the British and the Egyptians, who, despite surface indications to the contrary, genuinely like each other.
- 4403 "The Arab League: development and difficulties." *World Today* 7 (My '51) 187-96. The League has failed, often "deliberately," primarily because it is an arena for inter-Arab struggle rather than the "expression of a united Arab world."
- 4404 "Cross-currents in Morocco." *World Today* 7 (My '51) 212-26. Morocco has been successfully divided against itself "with the sanction if not the encouragement of the French authorities." Moroccan demands are basically just, says the author, and it is time that they were seriously and sympathetically considered.
- 4405 "The fires of Iran." *Life* (Je 18 '51) 108-37. Excerpts from Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas' cogent analysis of the reasons for the effectiveness of Communist propaganda in Iran. Illust.
- 4406 ASHKENAZI, TOUVIA. "The Middle East — vital outpost of European defense." *New Leader* (New York) (Je 18 '51) 16-9. The author makes out a strong case for shoring up the area militarily and economically on a regional approach without, however, offering any practicable suggestions as to how this may be done.
- 4407 BARBOUR, NEVIL. "Britain and the rise of Arab nationalism." *Fortnightly* (Jl '51) 438-45. An able treatment of both the favorable and unfavorable features of Anglo-Arab relations.
- 4408 BARTON, WILLIAM P. "U.S.A., Commonwealth and Muslim world." *Fortnightly* 113 (My '51) 305-10. Summarizes the grievances of the Muslim states against the west.
- 4409 BAYNE, EDWARD ASHLEY. "Crisis of confidence in Iran." *For. Aff.* 29 (Jl '51) 578-90. The British insistence on a commercial solution of political questions, the American treatment of the country as an economic problem, and the Iranian lack of self-confidence are responsible for the present situation.
- 4410 BEN-JACOB, JEREMIAH. "The vision of Abdullah." *Congress Weekly* (New York) 18 (Ag 20 '51) 8-10. Abdallah of Jordan was neither a British puppet nor a man of destiny, neither a master statesman nor a fool. He avoided the errors of his father but committed some of his own. "He was certainly not a force for evil. In a sense he was a force for good. But he wasn't good enough."
- 4411 BLACK, C. E. "United States: old problems in new hands." *Current Hist.* (Jl '51) 28-32. Describes the strategic problems confronting the U.S. and the USSR in building spheres of influence in the Middle East.
- 4412 COMSTOCK, ALZADA. "Egypt: nationalism threatens the Canal." *Current Hist.* 21 (Jl '51) 24-7.
- 4413 ELLIS, ELLEN DEBORAH. "Tensions in the Middle East." *Current Hist.* (My '51) 262-5. A rehash of familiar facts.
- 4414 EREN, NURI. "The Middle East and Turkey in world affairs." *Annals* (Philadelphia) 276 (Jl '51) 72-80. Mr. Eren, who is director of the Turkish Information Office in the United States, skilfully explains "why the life of every Tom, Dick, and Harry in the United States is closely connected with the life of every Orhan, Ali, and Mehmet in Turkey."
- 4415 GROSVENOR, G. and WILLIAMS, M. O. "Turkey paves the path of progress." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 100 (Ag '51) 141-86. The text and illustrations provide a pleasant, rambling introduction to Turkey today.
- 4416 HALL, HARVEY P. "The Arab states: oil and growing nationalism." *Current Hist.* 21 (Jl '51) 19-23. The strategic importance of the Arab states to the U.S. is based on three factors: geographical location, oil resources, and human potential. The U.S. stake in Arab oil is briefly summarized.
- 4417 HUDSON, G. F. "What next in explosive Iran?" *Commentary* 12 (Jl '51) 45-50. Not the least of the merits of this well written article is that it does not even once refer to Iran as "oil rich." In spite of the flamboyant title, a solid and illuminating analysis of Iranian nationalism.
- 4418 INGBER, DAVID and BENJENK, M. "Turkey in transition." *Fortnightly* 113 (My '51) 317-21. Analysis of the first year in power of the Democratic Party ("essentially the mouthpiece of the business community"). The authors conclude that Turkey is doing remarkably well in a world of collective insecurity.
- 4419 KHATISSIAN, ALEXANDER. "The memoirs of a mayor, VI." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 3 (Winter '50-'51) 106-13. The author was mayor of Tiflis during the February Revolution of 1917 and observed some of the effects on the Caucasus.
- 4420 LANDAU, ROM. "Morocco and the crisis." *Fortnightly* 113 (My '51) 311-6. An interesting discussion of the historical background of the crisis and the suggestions made to resolve it.
- 4421 LENCZOWSKI, GEORGE. "Iran: nationalism erupts." *Current Hist.* (Jl '51) 12-8. Offers an explanation of Soviet interference in Iran as deriving from British timidity and American indifference.
- 4422 LENGYEL, EMIL. "Social tensions in the Middle East." *Annals* 276 (Jl '51) 28-34. Glaring inequalities, oil, Soviet propa-

- ganda, effendi leadership, and the vociferous demands of Arab women for equal rights are the main factors contributing to the instability of the area.
- 4423 LEWIS, BERNARD. "Recent developments in Turkey." *Internat. Aff.* 27 (Jl '51) 320-31. An acute analysis of the Democratic Party victory in 1950 and a summary of the political and economic steps taken to broaden and liberalize the basis of Turkish society.
- 4424 MANDALIAN, JAMES G. "The 151 repatriates from America." *Armenian Rev.* 4 (Spring '51) 89-100. An extremely interesting account of the Soviet-engineered departure of a group of Armenians in 1947. Speculation on the propaganda motivations of the episode.
- 4425 MELLADO, I. R. and MARTÍN, M. M. "La tensión anglo-egipcia: la evacuación militar británica del Canal de Suez." *Política Internacional* (Madrid) (Jl '50) 131-40. Analyzes several solutions, but favors as the most viable and most satisfactory to all concerned the inclusion of Egypt in the Atlantic Pact Organization.
- 4426 MIKARDO, IAN. "Have the Arabs given up the 'second round'?" *Commentary* 11 (My '51) 465-9. Despite the sabre rattling, the second round has ceased to be practical politics, says the author, because: (1) serious divisions persist among the Arab states; (2) the Arabs realize that their threats of war no longer impress the West; (3) Arab armies are needed to maintain order at home. In general, the Arab League is showing signs of a new maturity and learning to face reality.
- 4427 NAAMANI, ISRAEL. "Iran and her problems." *Middle East. Aff.* (New York) 2 (Je-Jl '51) 203-12. A round-up of familiar facts.
- 4428 NORTHROP, F. S. C. "Asian mentality and United States foreign policy." *Annals* 276 (Jl '51) 118-27. A plausible, if incomplete, explanation of why the Muslim and Hindu peoples, in spite of their profound divergences, were almost unanimously opposed to American policy in Asia, particularly in Korea. Some valuable advice for U.S. statesmen.
- 4429 PRICE, M. PHILIPS. "The Persian situation." *Contemp. Rev.* 1027 (Jl '51) 1-5. Mr. Price, a British M.P., is more gloomy than most observers. He suggests only hope and a readiness to withdraw to the reliable bastions of defense in the Mediterranean, particularly Turkey.
- 4430 PRICE, WILRICH. "Impressions of Turkey." *Contemp. Rev.* 1027 (Jl '51) 14-9. Interesting if not penetrating.
- 4431 SABLIER, EDOUARD. "Au cœur de l'Asie un nouvel état est né: Le Pouchtounistan." *Afghanistan* 6 (O-D '50) 13-6. The official Afghan "party line" on Pushtunistan. Includes an official statement about the "Rise of an Independent Buffer State."
- 4432 SMIRNOV, D. "Shaykh Mansur and his Turkish abettors." *Foprosy Ist.* (Moscow) (O '50) 19-39. Ushurma-Mansur's anti-Russian activity in the Caucasus began in 1785. Russian archival material is quoted.
- 4433 TADMOR, GIDEON. "The Lebanese elections." *Middle East Aff.* (New York) 2 (Je-Jl '51) 247-50. A brief description of the successful efforts made to ensure free elections, an interpretation of the results, and some general criticisms of the election system.
- 4434 TASHJIAN, JAMES H. "The American military mission to Armenia, VIII, IX." *Armenian Rev.* 3, 4 (Winter '50-'51, Spring '51) 69-84 ff. Text and documents appended to the report of the fact-finding mission charged with bringing back to the U.S. information relative to the proposal of an American mandate for the area.
- 4435 THOMAS, LEWIS V. "Turkey, guardian of the Straits." *Current Hist.* (Jl '51) 8-11. Turkey's strategic position and her efforts to contain Soviet expansion into the Near East.
- 4436 TOWSTER, JULIAN. "Russia, persistent strategic demands." *Current Hist.* (Jl '51) 2-7. Outline of Soviet interest in the Near East. As for Iran, the Soviets are not interested in obtaining oil or a gateway to India. They want to accelerate the process of British recession in the area and to prevent American influence from taking its place.
- 4437 URZAIZ, LUIS DE VILLEGAS. "La defensa de los estrechos turcos y del mediterraneo." *Política Internacional* (Madrid) (D '50) 119-29. A review of recent political developments affecting the Straits.
- 4438 VRATZIAN, SIMON. "The Armenian revolution and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, II." *Armenian Rev.* 3 (Winter '50-'51) 58-63. Continuation of the history of this organization that was set up to defend Armenian rights by whatever means might be necessary.
- 4439 ZVYAGIN, Y. "The foreign press on the Iranian oil issue." *New Times* (Moscow) 27 (Jl 4 '51) 11-4. In spite of the serious differences of opinion among them, the American and British imperialists agree that "the Iranian people must at all costs be prevented from enjoying the benefits of their own oil resources."

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation, and communications)

- 4440 ANIS, MAHMOUD AMIN, "A study of the national income of Egypt." *L'Égypte Contemporaine* (Cairo) 41 (no. 261-3) 654-924. A basic study of the data for 1937-45, with a careful analysis of the deficiencies of the available material.
- 4441 BONNÉ, ALFRED. "Incentives for economic development in Asia." *Annals* 276 (Jl '51) 12-9. The author feels that "development from above" rather than private initiative can lead to the economic transformation of oriental societies. The new world agencies in the field of economic and social development offer considerable hope.
- 4442 BURNS, NORMAN. "The Dujaylah land settlement." *Middle East J.* 5 (Summer '51) 362-6. A description of the land settlement scheme being carried out by the Iraqi Government in central southern Iraq. Its economic success has been demonstrated; continued progress depends on political factors affecting its administration.
- 4443 FISK, BRAD. "The Wadi Tharthar flood control project." *Middle East J.* 5 (Summer '51) 366-70. A description of the project for which the International Bank loaned Iraq \$12,800,000 in 1950.
- 4444 HIMADEH, SA'ID B. "Economic factors underlying social problems in the Arab Middle East." *Middle East J.* 5 (Summer '51) 269-83. Attempts at social reform will be unsuccessful until the basic problem of poverty is attacked.
- 4445 SINCLAIR, ANGUS. "Iranian oil." *Middle East Aff.* 2 (Je-Jl '51) 213-20. History of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession until the vote by the Majlis on Mar. 15, 1951, to nationalize the industry. The conclusion lists 13 causes that led to this action.

See also: 4451

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

(General, education, population and ethnology, medicine and public health, religion, law)

- 4446 AIDIN, A. "The Christian approach to Iranian Muslims." *Muslim World* 41 (Jl '51) 160-5. Some valuable insights into the modern Iranian mind well worth pondering by all concerned with Iran.
- 4447 ANDERSON, J. N. D. "Recent developments in Shari'a law, IV." *Muslim World* 41 (Jl '51) 186-8. Discusses problems of dower, maintenance, paternity and custody of children, particularly as treated in Egyptian reform legislation.

- 4448 BAUSANI, A. "Il martirio del 'Bāb' seconda la narrazione di Nabil Zarandi." *Oriente Mod.* 30 (O-D '50) 199-207. The story of the Bāb as derived from original Baha'i sources.
- 4449 ESFANDIARY, H. A. "Education in Iran." *Middle East Aff.* 2 (Je-Jl '51) 225-8. Some observations on the modern educational system by the cultural attaché of the Iranian Embassy in Washington.
- 4450 GOITEIN, S. D. "The transplantation of the Yemenites—the old life they led." *Commentary* 12 (Jl '51) 24-9. An interesting and scholarly description of the communal structure of the Yemenite Jews who were scattered throughout the country in some 800 localities. Many fresh facts about Yemen.
- 4451 HIMADEH, SA'ID B. "Significant historical, economic and social factors responsible for the condition of rural communities in Arab lands." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* (Beirut) 3 (D '50) 426-36. Causes of decline, formation of feudal regime, and its disintegration. Even in Lebanon fewer than 200 persons own half of the surveyed land.
- 4452 HUZAYYIN, SULAYMĀN. "Cultural setting of plans for social reform in the Arab countries." (in Arabic). *al-Abhāth* 3 (D '50) 302-14. Ancient elements and later accretions are remarkably fused. Some cultural unity has always been preserved.
- 4453 JÄSCHKE, G. "Der Islam in der neuen Türkei." *Welt des Islams* (Leiden) 1, no. 1-2 (1951) 1-174. A capital study of three decades of secularization, its political and intellectual background, and the residues of Islam in the state and among the people.
- 4454 PATAI, RAPHAEL. "Relationship patterns among the Arabs." *Middle East Aff.* 2 (My '51) 180-5. Interesting observations on the origin of male predominance in Arab society, based on Hilma Granqvist's *Birth and childhood among the Arabs* and *Child problems among the Arabs*.
- 4455 ROBSON, JAMES. "The material of tradition, I." *Muslim World* 41 (Jl '51) 166-80. Helpful notes on understanding the methods of the men who compiled the texts that are second only to the Qur'ān in sacredness to the Muslims.
- 4456 SHOUBY, E. "The influence of the Arabic language on the psychology of the Arabs." *Middle East J.* 5 (Summer '51) 284-302. Presents the hypothesis, supported by considerable experimental evidence, that the division between literary and colloquial Arabic, its conservatism, and overemphasis on linguistic signs has helped to produce in the Arab stereotyped emotional responses, a need to overassert and exaggerate, and two levels of morality.

See also: 4399, 4401, 4444, 4471.

ART

(*Archaeology, architecture, epigraphy, numismatics, minor arts, painting, music, manuscripts and papyri*)

- 4457 DUSSAUD, R. "Les fouilles de Suse en 1948-1949." *Syria* 27, no. 3 (1950) 377-8. Deals with the excavation campaign at Susa, particularly with the finding of a Parthian necropolis, and archaeological explorations in the vicinity (Eivan-e Kerkha, Mesed-i Soleiman).
- 4458 DUSSAUD, R. "Le palais ghaznevide de Lashkari-Bazar." *Syria* 27, no. 3 (1950) 379. Brief report on the important site near Qal'a-i Bist on the Helmand, in Afghanistan.
- 4459 ÉCOCHARD, MICHEL. "Note sur un édifice chrétien d'Alep." *Syria* 27, no. 3 (1950) 270-83. Illust. Reconstruction of the 6th century cathedral church of Aleppo from remains in the Madrasa Hallāwiya.
- 4460 FAIRSERSIS, WALTER A. "Archaeological research in Afghanistan." *Afghanistan* 6 (O-D '50) 31-4. A survey of the prehistoric research undertaken by the expedition of the American Museum of Natural History of New York.
- 4461 GARITTE, G. "Une version arabe de l'Agathange grec dans le Sin. Ar. 395." *Muséon* 63, no. 3 (1950) 231-47.
- 4462 KHATCHATRIAN, A. "The architecture of Armenia." *Armenian Rev.* 4 (Spring '51) 3-51. A technical study involving a combined approach from the standpoints of historical archaeology and architectural architectonics. Illust.
- 4463 ROSSI, E. "Un nuovo manoscritto del *Kitāb-i Dede Qorgut*." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* 25, no. 1-4 (1950) 34-43. The ms. is a collection of epic tales of the Oguz Turks of eastern Anatolia.
- 4464 SCHLUMBERGER, DANIEL. "Les fouilles de Lashkari-Bazar." *Afghanistan* 6 (O-D '50) 46-56. The latest report on the French excavations of the 11th century palace of Maḥmūd of Ghazna on the Helmand River; it includes the first publication of some of the discovered frescoes and other wall decorations. Illust.
- 4465 STCHOUKINE, IVAN. "Les peintures de la Khamseh de Nizami du British Museum, Or. 6810." *Syria* 27, no. 3 (1950) 301-13. With the help of style analysis, the author attributes four miniatures to Mirak, one to 'Abd al-Razzāq, three to Behzād. The last artist is said to have collaborated on three more miniatures and the final ten paintings are credited to Behzād's studio, five of them tentatively to Qāsim Ali.
- 4466 TARCHNISVILI, MICHEL. "Les récentes découvertes épigraphiques et littéraires en

Georgien." *Muséon* 63, no. 3 (1950) 249-60. The inscriptions are all pre-eighth century. The article includes a discussion of a palimpsest that throws some light on the Georgian patristic background of the same period.

LANGUAGE

- 4467 BEESTON, A. F. L. "Notes on old South Arabian lexicography, II." *Muséon* (Louvain) 63, no. 3 (1950) 261-8. (5) qš' (6) dmr (7) mhrdw (8) bn.
- 4468 FREIMAN, A. A. "Stalin's theory of the science of language and Iranian linguistics." (in Russian) *Izvest. Akad. Nauk, Otdel. Lit. i Yaz.* 10, no. 1 (1951) 50-65.
- 4469 LESLAU, WOLF. "Observations on 'Gurage Notes'." *Africa* (London) 21 (Ap '51) 139-45. Answer to Ullendorf's criticism of the author's method in collecting material on this Ethiopic language.

See also: 4456.

LITERATURE

- 4470 HOWARTH, HERBERT. "Flecker: the poet and his east." *Commentary* 11 (My '51) 449-57. Flecker was a British poet (died 1915) who had penetrated deeply into understanding the Arab mind. His talent was great and he created some of the best oriental poems in the English language. Howarth's analysis of Flecker is masterly.
- 4471 AL-MAQDISI, ANĪS. "Social trends in modern Arabic literature." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* 3 (D '50) 448-62. Humanist trends in general, the impact of major events (the Turkish revolution, President Wilson's 14 Points, the Atlantic Charter, and the establishment of the U.N.).
- 4472 MARÇAIS, WILLIAM. "La femme dans les Mille et Une Nuits." *Rev. de la Méditerranée* (Algiers) 10 (Ja '51) 3-17. A basic misogyny characterizes the treatment of women in the *Arabian Nights*. Pre-nubile women do not appear at all; the old ones are odious and ugly; the in-between ones are generally lovely, but cunning.
- 4473 SERJEANT, R. B. "The quarters of Tarim and their *tanjūrah*." *Muséon* 63, no. 3 (1950) 276-84. A *tanjūrah* is a kind of rallying-song or theme belonging to each of the five sections into which the South Arabian town of Tarim is divided.

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- 4475 LE TOURNEAU, R. "Éléments d'une bibliographie des questions musulmanes actuelles." *Bull. des Études Arabes* (Algiers) 11 (Ja '51) 6-12. Arranged by country and drawn largely from French sources.
- 4476 RENTZ, GEORGE. "Recent literature on the Hadramaut." *Middle East J.* 5 (Summer '51) 371-7. . . . comprehensive survey of books and the more important articles in Western languages; briefer reference to material in Arabic.
- 4477 RICCI, LANFRANCO. "Publicazioni in amaro di questi ultimi anni." *Oriente Mod.* 30 (O-D '50) 186-98.
- 4487 *The Middle East: a political and economic survey.* Geog. J. (London) 117 (Mr '51) 94 (N.N.L.); *Oriente Mod.* 30 (O-D '50) 215. (E. Rossi).
- 4488 *Ser'at adkeme mēlgā.* *Oriente Mod.* 30 (O-D '50) 208-9. (L. Ricci).
- 4489 ALDRIDGE, JAMES. *The diplomat.* *Middle East J.* 5 (Summer '51) 390-1. (Edwin M. Wright). Much of this novel concerning the 1946 Azerbaijan crisis is good history, but Soviet motives are greatly underrated.
- 4490 ATEŞ, A., ed. *K. tarğumān al-balāga* (of M. b. 'Umar al-Rādūyānī). *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* 25, no. 1 (1950) 114-7. (Turhan Ghengei).

BIOGRAPHY

- 4478 CANTINEAU, J. "Adrien Barthélemy (1859-1949)." *Syria* 27, no. 3 (1950) 385-6. Obituary of the French Islamist.
- 4479 DE BRIAILLES, CHANDON. "John L. La Monte." *Syria* 27, no. 3 (1950) 386. Note on the American historian of the Crusades and the Latin Orient.
- 4480 DELLA VIDA, G. L. "Carlo Conti Rossini." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* 25, no. 1 (1950) 153-6. An appreciation of the distinguished Ethiopic scholar.
- 4481 GAUDEFROY-DEMOMBYNES, M. "Jean Sauvaget (1901-1949)." *Syria* 27, no. 3 (1950) 383-5. Obituary of the French Islamist and historian of Muslim art, with a short analysis of his writings.
- 4482 GROUSSET, R. "Un savant français: Joseph Hackin." *Afghanistan* 6 (O-D '50) 1-12. Hackin was an archaeologist.
- 4483 SOMOGYI, JOSEPH. "Ignace Goldziher (1850-1921)." *Muslim World* 41 (Jl '51) 199-208. An extremely interesting account of the life, writings, and significance of one of the greatest Islamic scholars of modern times.
- 4491 BILAINKIN, GEORGE. *Cairo to Riyadh diary.* *Middle East J.* (Summer '51) 385-6. (Hermann Frederick Eilts). "Errors of fact . . . aggravate the basic ailment of the book — superficiality."
- 4492 BLAKE, R. P., and FRYE, RICHARD N. *History of the nation of archers (of Girigor of Akanc).* *Armenian Rev.* 4 (Spring '51) 156-7. (H. Kurdian). Lists several alleged errors in translation.
- 4493 BLOCH, A. *Vers und sprache im altarabischen.* *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* 25, no. 1 (1950) 110-1. (F. Gabrieli).
- 4494 BOWEN, JR., RICHARD LE BARON. *The early Arabian necropolis of Ain Jawan.* *Muséon* 63, no. 3 (1950) 300-1. (A. Jamme). Ain Jawan is a pre-Islamic and early Islamic site on the Persian Gulf.
- 4495 BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. *The security of the Middle East.* *Internat. Aff.* 27 (Jl '51) 390-1. (S. H. Longrigg); *Middle East J.* (Summer '51) 377-9. (Dorothy Thompson). An attempt to analyze how the U.S. can "increase the security of this area, with a respect to both external and internal disruptive forces." Alternatives of action are presented.

BOOK REVIEWS

- 4484 *Labour conditions in the oil industry in Iran: report of a mission of the I.L.O.* *Internat. Aff.* 27 (Jl '51) 391-2. (R. W. Bullard). "The impression one gets from the report . . . is that the Company has been on the whole . . . a very good employer."
- 4485 *Labour problems in Turkey: report of a mission of the I.L.O.* *Internat. Aff.* 27 (Jl '51) 391. (A. C. Edwards).
- 4486 *Memento économique de l'Égypte.* *Internat. Aff.* 27 (Jl '51) 392-3. (George Kirk). "The drily academic treatment is . . . uninspiring . . . and the historic background . . . unworthy." *Middle East J.* 5 (Summer '51) 386-7. (Charles Issawi). A careful study of the main trends of the last fifteen years.
- 4496 BRUNSCHVIG, ROBERT. *La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafsides.* *Rev. Hist.* (Paris) 75 (Ja '51) 127-30. (R. Blachère).
- 4497 BULLARD, SIR READER. *Britain and the Middle East.* *Middle East J.* 5 (Summer '51) 379-80. (Ralph R. Reuter). A shade too optimistic in evaluating Britain's position.
- 4498 CAMPBELL, C. G. *Tales from the Arab tribes.* *Middle East J.* 5 (Summer '51) 384-5. (R. F. S. Starr). Major Campbell is "to be complimented on the quality of his prose" in these ingratiating folk-tales of lower Iraq — which are, however, the common property of the whole Arab world; *Muslim World* 41 (Jl '51) 218. (Mary B. Allison).

- 4499 CAROE, OLAF. *Wells of power: the oil-fields of south-western Asia*. Internat. Aff. 27 (Jl '51) 392. (George Kirk); Middle East J. 5 (Summer '51) 380-1. (Georgiana G. Stevens). "Starting with the premise that Middle East oil must be the primary target of any aggression, the author urgently draws attention to the need of filling the void left in Persian Gulf defenses by the withdrawal of British authority from the area."
- 4500 CERULLI, E. *Il Libro della scala*. Riv. degli Studi Orient. 25, no. 1 (1950) 111-3. (E. Rossi).
- 4501 CHOURAQUI, ANDRÉ. *La condition juridique de l'Israélite Marocain*. Africa 21 (Ap '51) 162-4. (Sibyl E. Crowe).
- 4502 DENNETT, DANIEL C. *Conversion and poll tax in early Islam*. (in Arabic) *al-Abhath* 3 (D '50) 521-3. (A. Frayha).
- 4503 DESIO, ARDITO. *Le vie della sete*. Oriente Mod. 31 (Ja-Mr '51) 51-2. (E. Rossi).
- 4504 DER NERSESSIAN, SIRARPIE. *An Armenian gospel of the 15th century*. Armenian Rev. 4 (Spring '51) 156. (H. Kurdian).
- 4505 DE VILLARD, UGO MONNERET. *Le pit-ture musulmane al soffitto della cappella palatina in Palermo*. Syria 27, no. 3 (1950) 371-3. (R. Dussaud).
- 4506 DICKSON, H. R. P. *The Arab of the desert*. Oriente Mod. 30 (O-D '50) 216. (E. Rossi).
- 4507 DUDA, H. W. *Balkantürkische studien*. Riv. degli Studi Orient. 25, no. 1 (1950) 129-31. (A. Bombaci).
- 4508 EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*. Muslim World 41 (Jl '51) 213-4. (Arthur Jeffery).
- 4509 FARRA, ADNAN. *L'industrialisation en Syrie*. Middle East J. 5 (Summer '51) 387-8. (F. G. Bochenski). Objective estimate of the potentialities of industrialization in Syria, but the problem of markets is not adequately treated. Besides the topic at hand, raw materials, fuel, labor, capital, demography, and general economy are discussed.
- 4510 FRASER-TYTTLER, W. K. *Afghanistan*. Muslim World 41 (Jl '51) 219-20. (Richard N. Frye). "Although one may disagree with many conclusions of the book, it can be recommended as a valuable addition to the scanty literature on Afghanistan."
- 4511 FREMANTLE, ANNE. *Desert calling*. Muslim World 41 (Jl '51) 212-3. (William E. Mulligan).
- 4512 GAUDEFROY-DEMOMBYNES, M. *Muslim institutions*. Muslim World 41 (Jl '51) 209. (S. M. Zwemer). "This valuable study . . . is a masterly exposition of nearly every aspect of Islam."
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- 4518 HADDAD, GEORGE. *Fifty years of modern Syria and Lebanon*. Middle East J. 5 (Summer '51) 385. (Roger H. Soltan). A praiseworthy attempt to describe political, social, economic, and cultural progress that is marred, however, by "satisfied optimism" and poor typographical presentation.
- 4519 HAKIM, KHALIFA ABDUL. *The metaphysics of Rumi*. Muslim World 41 (Jl '51) 224-5. (David T. Lindell).
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- 4522 ISSAWI, CHARLES. *An Arab philosophy of history*. Oriente Mod. 31 (Ja-Mr '51) 51. (F. Gabrieli).
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- 4526 KIRK, GEORGE E. *A short history of the Middle East*. J. Mod. Hist. 23 (Je '51) 166-7. (George Rentz). "Kirk's . . . book — despite its shortcomings, not all of which are due to its brevity — may be heartily recommended." The review lists some of the shortcomings.
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- 4537 LITTMANN, ENNO. *Ahmed il-Bedawî*. *Muséon* 63, no. 3 (1950) 312-3. (G. Ryckmans). *Il-Bedawî*, who died in 675 A.H., was one of the most popular saints of Muslim Egypt. His tomb is a national sanctuary and visited by the pilgrims to Mecca.
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- 4541 NAIMY, MIKHAIL. *Kahlil Gibran*. *Muslim World* 41 (Jl '51) 223-4. (Elizabeth de W. Root).
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- 4550 RATHJENS, CARL. *Die pilgerfahrt nach Mekka*. *Muséon* 63, no. 3 (1950) 309-10. (G. Ryckmans).
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- 4553 SMITH, M. *Readings from the mystics of Islam*. *Oriente Mod.* 31 (Ja-Mr '51) 49-50. (F. Gabrieli).
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- 4559 WHITTING, C. E. J. *Al-Fakhri. Armenian Rev.* 3 (Winter '50-'51) 155. (H. Kurdian). "It commends itself . . . to those who are interested in Armenian history and particularly the workings of the Islamic government mentality in relation to Armenians."
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ABBREVIATIONS

Acad., Academy
Aff., Affairs
Amer., American
Bull., Bulletin
Cent., Central
Contemp., Contemporary
D., Deutsch
Dept., Department
East., Eastern
G., Gesellschaft
Geog., Geographical
Gt. Brit., Great Britain
Hist., Historical
Illust., Illustrated
Inst., Institute
Internat., International
J., Journal

M., Morgenländischer
Mag., Magazine
Mod., Modern, Moderno
Mus., Museum
Natl., National
Numis., Numismatic
Orient., Oriental
Pal., Palestine
Philol., Philological
Polit., Political
Quart., Quarterly
Res., Research
Rev., Review, Revue
Soc., Society
Stud., Studies
Trans., Transactions
Z., Zeitschrift

Russian

Akad., Akademii
Fil., Filosophi
Ist., Isotorii
Izvest., Izvestiya
Lit., Literaturi
Otdel., Otdeleniye
Ser., Seriya
Sov., Sovetskoye
Yaz., Yazika

Turkish

Coğ., Coğrafya
Fak., Fakulte
Üniv., Üniversite

Arabic

K., Kitāb
Maj., Majallah, Majallat

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